Non-relationship mood variables

• Arousal. The degree to which the agent is physiologically aroused. In future work it may be useful to discriminate multiple dimensions for this variable (such as how tense or relaxed the agent is, how active or drowsy, and so forth). Our model is not so sophisticated. In general we consider the physiological processes to be beyond the scope of this work. Range: 0.1 to 3 where 0.1 represents a comatose state and 3 represents maximum arousal.
• Physical well-being. The degree to which the agent is feeling (physically) ill or well. Range: 0.1 to 3, where 0.1 represents intense discomfort and 3 intense vitality.
• Valence bias. The degree to which an agent will have a bias towards negative or positive emotions. This is useful in the simulation for the coarse-grained representation of the, essentially, good and bad moods that may result from the emotional experiences of the automated agents. This variable is distinct from the two variables following in that, rather than change the intensities of specific classes of emotions, it sets a base starting point for the calculation of all valenced reactions. Represented as a bias, positive or negative, and a strength 1 to 3, where 3 represents a maximal tendency to appraise the world in a negative light, or in a positive light. Default strength is 1. There is no default bias.

  There are a number of psychological phenomena which may be thought of as contributing to an agent's valence bias, notably including mood disorders. Though such phenomena are not well understood and rigorous models of their determination are scarce [MacLeod and Mathews1989], there is a body of literature pertaining to mood disorders and more common, less serious, analogs of these disorders, experienced by non-disordered people in everyday situations (e.g., mild, possibly transient depression). We have therefore included variables to represent mild degrees of two acknowledged mood-biasing phenomena, namely depression and anxiety.

• Depression-ecstasy. From generalized sadness and feeling of hopelessness to generalized euphoria and feeling of well-being. This variable is modeled after the clinical notions of depressive and manic states which seem to have a number of cognitive correlates. Depression is generally characterized as a predisposition towards sadness and negative life-construals while mania is characterized by overestimation of abilities, ignoring negative repercussions of events, etc. [Association1987]. Interestingly, non-depressive subjects seem to be biased towards positive construals of themselves and others (e.g., having a bias towards viewing themselves as praiseworthy) while depressives seem to lack this bias, yielding even-handedly mixed positive and negative self-construals [Greenberg and Alloy1989]. Represented as a bias, positive or negative, and a strength 1 to 3, where 3 represents a the highest degree of depression, or the highest degree of ecstasy. Default strength is 1.5. (See discussion below.) There is no default bias.
• Anxiety-invincibility. From generalized fear and feeling of loss of control, to generalized hope and feeling of powerfulness. This variable is modeled after the clinical notion of general anxiety which seems to have cognitive correlates which are in some cases similar to, and in other ways distinct from, depression. For example, anxious subjects seem to ascribe more negative anxiety-relevant traits (e.g., nervousness) to themselves and to unknown others than positive anxiety-relevant traits (e.g., assurance) [Greenberg and Alloy1989]. Represented as a bias, positive or negative, and a strength 1 to 3, where 3 represents a the highest degree of anxiety, or the highest degree of perceived invincibility. Default strength is 1. There is no default bias.
• Importance of all Goals, Standards, and Preferences.

  The degree to which all of the goals, standards, and preferences of an agent are important to that agent. As with valence-bias, this is a coarse-grained representation of a phenomenon that affects the intensity of all emotions, namely that when an agent's emotional resources are diminished or enhanced, that agent's goals, standards, and preferences may all become more important, or less important, respectively. For example, when an agent has had a series of bad things happen, the agent may have an increased desire for something good to happen. When the agent's goals are blocked in this state, the agent is more intensely unhappy about it; when the agent encounters some appealing object, it is seen as all the more appealing. Range: 0.3 to 3, where 3 represents the maximally increased importance of goals, standards and preferences.