These variables, based on the central intensity variables of Ortony, et al. [Ortony et al. 1988], appear as part of the agents' appraisal mechanisms and represent the degrees to which various events, actions of agents, and objects are important to them. For example, two agents may like music, but for one it is very important and has the potential for generating ecstasy, whereas for the other it may lead, at most, to a moment of mild pleasure.
The importance of situations for which goal-based and standard-based appraisals are made may be assessed differently depending on whether a goal is achieved (standard upheld) or blocked (standard violated). This is because some concerns can only lead to negative or neutral outcomes, whereas others can only lead to neutral or positive outcomes. For example, one is not ordinarily happy about ``not getting cancer,'' but might be very distressed if such a preservation health goal were blocked. Similarly, serendipitously winning in the lottery is an important event, whereas losing is not. The same is true of standards, where, for example, it is not normally considered praiseworthy to refrain from committing crimes, but it is considered blameworthy to commit them. Preferences and non-preferences are represented separately, and so in each instance a single variable suffices. For discussion see also [Schank and Abelson1977], and [Elliott1992]).
The default values for the variables in this section are meaningful only in that they highlight our assumption that the degree to which a goal, standard, or preference is important to an agent makes a relatively significant contribution to calculations of emotion intensity. However, to avoid such absurdities as having the breaking of a shoelace and the theft of one's car lead to similarly intense emotions, these values must be specified.