

Reading Packet
LSP 200 Multiculturalism/US: Racial/Ethnic Relations
Fall 2016

| Date Due | Reading |
|----------------------|---|
| Tuesday Sept. 13 | Steve Chapman , "Republicans and racial fears" Steve Chapman , "Is American Multiculturalism a Failure?" |
| Thursday Sept. 15 | Martin Bulmer & John Solomos, "Rethinking Ethnic and Racial Studies" |
| Tuesday Sept. 20 | Michael Banton , "Progress in Ethnic and Racial Studies" |
| Thursday Sept. 22 | Joane Nagel , "Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture" Part A |
| Tuesday Sept. 27 | Joane Nagel , "Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture" Part B |
| Thursday Sept. 29 | Joane Nagel , "Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture" Part C |
| Tuesday Oct. 4 | Ralph R. Donald , "Savages, Swine and Buffoons: Hollywood's Selected Stereotypical Characterizations of the Japanese, Germans, and Italians in Films Produced During World War II" |
| Thursday Oct. 6 | Phillips , "What the President Saw" |
| Tuesday Oct. 11 | Herbert J. Gans , "Symbolic ethnicity: the future of ethnic groups and cultures in America,..." Part A |
| Thursday Oct. 13 | Herbert J. Gans , "Symbolic ethnicity: the future of ethnic groups and cultures in America,..." Part B |
| Tuesday Oct. 18 | W.E.B. Du Bois , "Strivings of the Negro People" |
| Thursday Oct. 20 | Deanna Othman , "Will Muslims ever be part and parcel of America?" |
| Tuesday Oct. 25 | James Fallows , "Review of <i>Fields of Blood</i> by Karen Armstrong" |
| Thursday Oct. 27 | Mary Hudetz , "Native Americans Push to Rename Columbus Day" |
| Tuesday Nov. 1 | Rohit Kumar , "Why Preserving Ancestral Languages Is Key for Uplifting Immigrant American Communities" |
| Thursday Nov. 3 | Carol Anderson , "White rage doesn't have to take to the streets: The historic resistance to racial progress" Dawn Turner , "White separatist echoes Trump: Your fear is real" |
| Tuesday Nov. 8 | David Savage , "Affirmative action, but not for the poor..." |
| Thursday Nov. 10 | Jackie C. Horne , "Harry and the Other: Answering the Race Question in J. K. Rowling's Harry Potter" |
| Tuesday Nov. 15 | ---- |

Steve **Chapman**, “Republicans and racial fears,” *Chicago Tribune* (September 3, 2015):1;21

After the 2008 presidential election, it was obvious that American politics was entering a new era in which race would figure less than it had before. For the first time in our history, we had a president who was not white, and it was bound to have a profound, positive impact.

Whites would find that a black president would not make their lives worse. Blacks would face less prejudice and feel more fully American. The deep wounds of slavery and discrimination would heal and fade. We were entering a “post-racial” era.

It lasted about as long as the average honeymoon. Barack Obama stimulated more racial neuroses than he banished. Before long, Fox News host Glenn Beck called him a “racist” with a “deep-seated hatred for white people.” Rush Limbaugh said he was “behaving like an African colonial despot.” Obama’s birth certificate was an issue that wouldn’t go away.

From this year’s campaign, it’s clear that race is as potent a factor as ever. In fact, attitudes about race may be the basic divide in the 2016 election. The shooting of Michael Brown in August 2014 exposed a wide gulf among Americans — between those of any race who regarded black anger about police conduct as legitimate and those who didn’t. To a large extent, the split ran along partisan lines.

An ABC News-Washington Post poll last year found that Republicans were twice as likely as Democrats to think whites and blacks get equal treatment from the criminal justice system or to say police don’t discriminate. Put simply, most Democrats sympathize with African-American grievances. Most Republicans don’t.

In an Associated Press-Times Square Alliance survey in December, GOP voters said the rise of Islamic State was the most important news event of 2014. Democrats, by contrast, gave priority to the unrest in Ferguson, Mo., and elsewhere over the deaths of unarmed black men at the hands of cops.

This is not purely a matter of differing philosophies of criminology. On issue after issue, racial attitudes play a major role in where the two parties come out. Illegal immigration, Black Lives Matter, the Confederate flag, even the mountain previously known as McKinley — all are filtered through fundamental, sometimes subconscious feelings about race.

Donald Trump is doing so well because he exploits racial anxieties masterfully without ever raising them directly. He complains we are “losing our country,” ridicules “political correctness,” accuses Mexicans of “bringing crime” and claims to represent the “silent majority.” All these themes are designed to appeal to white resentments and fear of minorities. Trump’s strategy is hardly unique. When a white sheriff’s deputy was shot to death in Houston, allegedly by a black man, Ted Cruz blamed it on Obama for striving to “tear us apart along racial lines, to inflame racial divisions.”

When Maryland Gov. Martin O’Malley apologized for telling Black Lives Matter protesters that “all lives matter,” Jeb Bush took umbrage. “If he believes

that white lives matter, which I hope he does, then he shouldn't apologize with a group that seemed to disagree with it," said Bush, neatly smearing both O'Malley and the protesters.

Mike Huckabee said Martin Luther King Jr. would "be appalled by the notion that we're elevating some lives above others." It's never clear whether Huckabee is an ignoramus or merely a demagogue. For the record, King said, "A society that has done something special against the Negro for hundreds of years must now do something special for the Negro."

The activists' slogan is meant to elevate the value of black lives, not diminish that of white ones. A longer version would be: "Black lives should matter as much as white lives."

Responding to police mistreatment of African-Americans by saying "all lives matter" is like demanding that doctors divide their time evenly between the healthy and the sick. Taking the slogan to be racist is like regarding Black History Month as racist. Which, come to think of it, Trump probably does.

Whites are on their way to becoming a minority of the population. The Republican candidates know that many of the party faithful associate this trend with national decline and social decay, so they cater to — and maybe even share — these fears.

For half a century, the GOP has reaped political success from the racial reality once noted by Alabama's George Wallace (a segregationist Democrat): "They's more of us than they is of them."

That won't be the case for many more years, and a party that wants to prosper has to adapt. But Republicans are campaigning like it's 1968.

(Chapman is a member of the *Tribune* Editorial Board and a columnist for the paper.)

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Steve **Chapman**, “Is American Multiculturalism a Failure?”

Chicago Tribune (Sept. 1, 2016): sect.1;19,

<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/chapman/ct-trump-immigration-race-blacks-whites-hispanics-muslims-perspec-0901-jm-20160831-column.html>

Has the great American experiment in diversity ended in failure? That's the impression you might get from an array of recent developments — Black Lives Matter protests, anti-Muslim sentiment, resentment of unauthorized immigrants and, last but not least, Donald Trump. We seem to be loudly fracturing and separating, not coming together. We're all *pluribus* and no *unum*.

Trump's embracing of the alt-right movement, which was condemned at length by Hillary Clinton in a recent speech, highlights our apparent racial and religious polarization. His new campaign CEO is also head of Breitbart News, which regularly fans white fears and denounces "multiculturalism."

A characteristic Breitbart story began mournfully, "Four centuries after white Christians landed in Jamestown and settled what would later become America, a report reveals that white Christians are now a minority in the nation their forebearers settled." (They were also a minority then, by the way.)



In denouncing alt-right, Hillary Clinton does what conservatives have not

More mainstream conservatives also fret about the perils of diversity. "Multicultural societies," warned Victor Davis Hanson, a scholar at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, "usually end up mired in nihilistic and endemic violence."

It's clear from Trump's capture of the Republican presidential nomination that many whites regard demographic diversity as an evil, not a blessing. When Trump vows to "make America great again," he harks back to a time when the country was more homogeneous.

But the Trump phenomenon is a symptom of growing desperation, not growing strength, among a shrinking faction whose conception of America is obsolete. These people are in a frenzy because they are beginning to realize the battle is

lost. Most Americans have come to embrace the inclusion of every race, ethnicity and religion in our society.



How America's white working class lost its patriotism

That wasn't always the case. In 1994, reports the Pew Research Center, 63 percent of Americans said immigrants were a burden. Today 59 percent regard them as an asset. The shift is even more pronounced among young people, 76 percent of whom have a positive view of immigrants.

For many people, racial and ethnic lines are increasingly irrelevant. In 2010, 15 percent of new marriages occurred between partners of different races or ethnicities — more than double the rate in 1980. "Among all newlyweds in 2010, 9 percent of whites, 17 percent of blacks, 26 percent of Hispanics and 28 percent of Asians married out," reports Pew.

One reason white Christians are a declining share of the population is that more whites are abandoning Christianity. Since 2007, the share of whites with no religious affiliation has risen from 16 percent to 24 percent.

Islamophobia is rife among Trump supporters. Two-thirds of them express negative attitudes toward Muslims. But only one-third of all Americans feel that way. Islamist terrorism has obviously fueled worries and suspicions. Even so, in 2011, 82 percent of American Muslims said they were satisfied with their lives — which suggests they don't find prejudice to be a major problem.

The biggest source of racial tension is also the oldest one — the divide between whites and blacks, manifested in economic disparities and broadly different views of law enforcement. Most whites express confidence in police, but only 30 percent of African-Americans share that trust. Though blacks continue to feel they face discrimination, most whites believe they don't.

Other groups, though, have integrated themselves into American society more fully than could have been expected. Asian-Americans, who once faced intense prejudice, are likelier than any other group to intermarry and live in racially mixed neighborhoods. Their households also have a higher median income than white households.

In a society dominated by racial animosity, you'd see different groups segregating themselves, or being segregated, from others. That's not what is happening.

Scholars John Logan of Brown University and Wenquan Zhang of the University of Wisconsin at Whitewater found that compared with 1980, in the 20 most diverse metropolitan areas, people of every race are likelier to live in "global neighborhoods" inhabited by whites, blacks, Hispanics and Asian-Americans. In these cities, half of whites now live in such areas.



Cops taunted, victim disrespected and the violence goes on

If multicultural societies were prone to intergroup violence, a growing immigrant population would generate more disorder. In fact, Harvard sociologist Robert Sampson has documented that the rise in immigration has produced a sharp decline in crime rates. "The transformed vitality of cities was most visible in the places that had seen the greatest increases in immigration," he wrote in *The American Prospect*.

Achieving vitality through diversity? In America, that's not a naive dream. It's a solid fact.

Steve Chapman is a member of the Tribune Editorial Board

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Martin **Bulmer** & John **Solomos**, [Excerpts from] "Introduction: Re-thinking Ethnic and Racial Studies," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 21:5, 819-837 [for full article which also includes endnotes and bibliography, see Library's website]

Racism, Power and Politics

[822-23] "...**race and ethnicity are not 'natural' categories**, even though both concepts are often represented as if they were. Their boundaries are not fixed, nor is their membership uncontested. Race and ethnic groups, like nations, are imagined communities. People are socially defined as belonging to particular ethnic or racial groups, either in terms of definitions employed by others, or definitions which members of particular ethnic groups develop for themselves. They are ideological entities, made and changed in struggle. They are **discursive formations**, signalling a language through which differences are accorded social significance may be named and explained. But what is of importance for us as social researchers studying race and ethnicity is that such ideas also carry with them material consequences for those who are included within, or excluded from, them.

Efforts to divide human beings into groups on the basis of alleged genetic or phenotypical differences have proved to be spurious and misleading, even in some cases politically disastrous. Rather, it is best to see race as a means of representing difference such that contingent attributes, such as skin colour, are transformed into essential bases for identities. But this is not to deny that race remains, at the level of everyday experience and social representation, a potent social and political category around which individuals and groups organize their identity and construct a politics. As such, **race is socially constructed**; and blackness and whiteness are not categories of essence but defined by historical and political struggles over their meaning.

From this perspective categories such as race and ethnicity are best conceived as social and political resources, that are used by both dominant and subordinate groups for the purposes of legitimizing and furthering their own social identities and interests. Race and ethnicity feature as part of the power structure of a society, and need to be analyzed in terms of the significance which ethnicity and race assume in a society. Different approaches are taken in different disciplines, and within different schools of social science. The objective differences in the social situation of different ethnic and racial groups as they are defined in the society can be studied, and the significance of disadvantage and deprivation brought out. Much recent work on social exclusion has been in this vein.

Emphasis may also be put on social identities. In this context it is important to remember that identities based on race and ethnicity are not simply imposed, since they are also often the outcome of resistance and political struggle in which racialized minorities play a key and active role. For this reason it is more accurate to speak of a racialized group rather than a racial group since **race is a product of racism and not vice versa. Racism is an ideological defense of specific social and political relations of domination, subordination and privilege.** Racism operates as other ideologies do, by constituting new historical and ideological subjects for ideological discourses.

Race, and equally too ethnicity, is about the representation of difference. Sites of difference are also sites of power, a power too whereby the dominated come to see and experience themselves as 'Other'."

[824-5] "It is almost impossible to read a newspaper or watch television news coverage without seeing the contemporary expressions of racist ideas and practices, whether in terms of the rise of neo-fascist movements in some societies or the implementation of policies of genocide and what is euphemistically called 'ethnic cleansing'."

[824-5] "...it is of some importance not to lose sight of the complex social, political and cultural determinants that shape contemporary racist discourses and movements and other forms of racialized discourse and mobilization. Indeed, what is clear from recent accounts of the growth of new forms of cultural racism is that within the language of contemporary racist movements there is both a certain flexibility about what is meant by race as well as an attempt to reconstitute themselves as movements whose concern is with defending their 'nation' rather than attacking others as such. It is perhaps not surprising in this context that within the contemporary languages of race one finds a combination of arguments in favor of cultural difference along with negative images of the 'Other' as a threat and as representing an 'impure' culture.

Of course, subordinate groups may use difference to mystify, to deny knowledge of themselves to the dominant groups and to confuse and to neutralize those who attempt to control, 'help' or research them. They may use difference to stress their own separateness, and to authorize their own representations. They may seek to legitimize their definitions of cultural differences, including those against others from within their own collectivity. They may 'seize the category', claim it for their own and invert it, attaching positive value where before it was negative. This at times can lead, as we shall see later, to a strange convergence in the language of the racist right and of the black or ethnic nationalists, as both infuse the race or ethnic category with essentialist, and supposedly naturally inherited, characteristics."

Race, Ethnicity and Identity

[825] "Because *race* and *ethnicity* are intrinsically forms of collective social identity the subject of identity has been at the heart of both historical and contemporary discussions about these issues."

[826] "Identity gives one a sense of personal location, and provides a stable core of one's individuality; but it is also about one's social relationships, one's complex involvement with others, and in the modern world these have become even more complex and confusing. Each of us lives with a variety of potentially contradictory identities, which battle within us for allegiance: as men or women, black or white, straight or gay, able-bodied or disabled. The list is potentially infinite, and so therefore are our possible belongings. Which of them we focus on, bring to the fore, identify with, depends on a host of factors. At the center, however, are the values we share or wish to share with others.

So identity is not simply imposed. It is also chosen, and actively used, albeit within particular social contexts and constraints.”

[828] “Identity politics has allowed many formerly silenced and displaced groups to emerge from the margins of power and dominant culture to reassert and reclaim suppressed identities and experiences; but in doing so, they have often substituted one master narrative for another, invoking a politics of separatism, and suppressed differences within their own ‘liberatory’ narratives.

This is the same point made succinctly by Stuart Hall in his own critique of black essentialism. Hall argues that essentialist forms of political and cultural discourse naturalize and dehistoricize difference, and therefore mistake what is historical and cultural for what is natural, biological and genetic. The moment, he argues, we tear the signifier ‘black’ from its historical, cultural and political embedding and lodge it in a biologically constituted racial category, we valorize, by inversion, the very ground of the racism we are trying to deconstruct. We fix the signifier outside history, outside of change, outside of political intervention.”

Multiculturalism and Identity

[829-30] “As we look towards the next century one of the main questions that we face is the issue of multiculturalism. As Michel Wieviorka (‘Is multiculturalism the solution?’) convincingly argues, the notion of multiculturalism has become an important point of reference in both the academic and the popular lexicon. ... Some important elements of this debate are the issue of the political rights of minorities, including the issue of representation in both local and national politics, and the position of minority religious and cultural rights in societies which are becoming more diverse...”

“Debates about these issues are thus inherently politicized and take place in the context of mobilizations that use racial and ethnic symbols as a basis for making demands for social and cultural rights, as well as political representation.”

“‘Multiculturalism’, the seeking of equal rights and recognition for ethnic, racial, religious, or sexually defined groups, is one of the most pervasive and controversial intellectual and political movements in contemporary Western democracies.’ ...it is also clear that multiculturalism is inherently contradictory, both in conceptual and political terms.”

[831] “Following Charles Taylor, one may characterize multiculturalism as a “politics of difference” that fuses egalitarian rhetoric with a stress on authenticity and rejection of Western universalism, which is seen as falsely homogenizing and a smokescreen for power. Multiculturalism is modern and anti-modern at the same time.

From this perspective multiculturalism has to be seen as being partly about (i) the struggle for equality by minorities who are excluded from equal inclusion in society, and (ii) the affirmation of cultural difference through claims to ethnic and racial authenticity.”

[834] “Recent trends in Britain seem to indicate that a mythic longing for cultural homogenization is alive, not just among nationalists and racists who are celebrating Great Britain, but among the minority and anti-racists as well.”

[834] “Yet what is quite clear is that the quest for ever more specific as opposed to universal identities is becoming more pronounced in the present political environment. The search for national, ethnic and racial identities has become a pronounced, if not dominant, feature of political debate within both majority and minority communities in the ‘post- modern’ societies of the 1990s.”

[835] “One of the great ironies of the present situation is that during the second half of this century transnational economic, social and political relations have helped to create a multiplicity of migrant networks and communities that transcend received national boundaries. Categories such as migrants and refugees are no longer an adequate way to describe the realities of movement and settlement in many parts of the globe. In many ways the idea of diaspora as an unending sojourn across different lands better captures the reality of transnational networks and communities than the language of immigration and assimilation. Multiple, circular and return migrations, rather than a single great journey from one sedentary space to another, have helped to transform transnational spaces.”

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Michael **Banton**, [Excerpts from] **“Progress in ethnic and racial studies,”** *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24:2 (2001): 173-194

[for full article which also includes endnotes and bibliography, see DePaul Library's website]

What is Ethnicity?

[179] “The concept of ethnic origin, or origins, is not problematic because an individual can declare what he or she believes his or her ethnic origins to be. Yet there can be no satisfactory definition of an ethnic group unless it is first made clear for what purpose the definition is required.”

[179-80] “In the English language the expression ‘ethnic group’ was proposed by Huxley and Haddon in 1935 as a substitute for the use of ‘race’ to identify groups at the national level. Very shortly afterwards the same word came into use independently in the USA to identify hyphenate groups (like Irish-Americans) at a sub-national level. It is advisable to distinguish the two usages and identify as ‘primary ethnicity’ the shared sentiment and collective action of persons who belong together, or believe they should belong together, as members of a sovereign political unit.” ... “Nor is it easy to define a group based on a language as opposed to a dialect. The one can shade into the other and political considerations of national pride can represent small differences as important. With the separation of the Czech from the Slovak republic, and Croatia from Serbia, there have been moves to differentiate what were previously seen as minor variations upon a single language.”

[181] “The groups which are called nations, ethnic groups, racial, religious and linguistic minorities, castes, classes and indigenous peoples are aggregates composed of individuals who in varying degrees share with other members a variety of characteristics.” “Five more ‘relevant’ but not essential attributes have also to be taken into account: (a) either a common geographical origin or descent from a small number of common ancestors; (b) a common language, which does not necessarily have to be peculiar to the group; (c) a common literature peculiar to the group; (d) a common religion different from that of neighboring groups or from the general community surrounding it, and (e) the characteristic of being a minority or being an oppressed or dominant group within a larger community.”

[188] “Ethnic groups exist only when common ethnic origin forms a basis for collective action. Shared ends, or goals, are reflected in preferences, which may well include a preference for association with persons of similar ethnic origin or race. These preferences carry notional prices: a person may be willing to forgo certain benefits in order to associate with persons of the same ethnic origin as himself or herself. When they compete as individuals this tends to dissolve the boundaries that define the groups, whereas when they compete as groups this reinforces those boundaries.”

Race history

[182] “At the heart of the ‘race-thinking’ of the pre-1939 generation lay the very diffuse notion of human races as distinct species, just as lions, tigers, leopards and jaguars are different species within the genus *Panthera*.”

[186] “The assumption that human races corresponded to animal species was most misleading of all in its failure to allow for the way that different social situations can be differently defined. The differences between lions, tigers, leopards and jaguars are relevant in all circumstances, but the differences between black, brown, red, yellow and white human beings are not. From much earlier times there have been circumstances in which shared religious faith overruled the significance ascribed to physical difference.”

[184] “the concept of a racial group is the price to be paid for a law against indirect discrimination). They are needed in social policy for combating discrimination and prejudice, while others of them are useful to the victim groups, so any attempt to eradicate ordinary language usages would be futile.”

[185] “In the USA ethnic relations are taken to be different from racial relations. Social scientists there, like members of the general public, usually assume that race designates a physical difference and ethnicity a cultural difference. One justification for differentiating the two is that physical differences change little with the passage of generations and are inherited within families, whereas cultural differences can disappear rapidly.” “When a group is considered ethnically distinctive, it is cultural characteristics which count. When it is considered racially distinctive, it is not only objective characteristics of appearance but the special significance attributed to them which is in question. For social science purposes, however, such a distinction between what is ethnic and what is racial may distract attention from the continuities between them. Racial classification implies, falsely, that the classes in question are discontinuous; it cannot take account of the way that populations which are racially classified shade into one another in ways that animal species do not. Nor does the distinction find room to recognize that a group that is physically distinctive may have a distinctive culture. African-Americans could be accounted both a racial and a cultural group, but ordinary language usage conceals this possibility and does not stimulate observers to consider in which circumstances it is the cultural rather than the physical distinction which is relevant.”

[186] “...the expressions racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, and Islamophobia have important uses in political contexts, especially for victim groups. They find these expressions empowering because they offer a vocabulary for criticizing those who discriminate against them and encourage sentiments of solidarity among members of their groups.”

[187] “...‘integration’. This concept rests on a mathematical metaphor, assuming that social processes of group interaction can be likened to the mathematical processes of making up a whole number...”

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Joane **Nagel**, [Excerpts from] "Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture," *Social Problems*, 41, No. 1

(February 1994): 152-176

[full article, which also includes endnotes and bibliography, can be found on Library's website]

Part A

Abstract: Identity and culture are two of the basic building blocks of ethnicity. *Through the construction of identity and culture, individuals and groups attempt to address the problematics of ethnic boundaries and meaning. Ethnicity is best understood as a dynamic, constantly evolving property of both individual identity and group organization. The construction of ethnic identity and culture is the result of both structure and agency—a dialectic played out by ethnic groups and the larger society. Ethnicity is the product of actions undertaken by ethnic groups as they shape and reshape their self-definition and culture; however, ethnicity is also constructed by external social, economic, and political processes and actors as they shape and reshape ethnic categories and definitions. This paper specifies several ways ethnic identity and culture are created and recreated in modern societies. Particular attention is paid to processes of ethnic identity formation and transformation, and to the purposes served by the production of culture—namely, the creation of collective meaning, the construction of community through mythology and history, and the creation of symbolic bases for ethnic mobilization.*

1- Introduction

Contrary to expectations implicit in the image of the "melting pot" that ethnic distinctions could be eliminated in U.S. society, the resurgence of ethnic nationalism in the United States and around the world has prompted social scientists to rethink models of ethnicity rooted in assumptions about the inevitability of assimilation.' Instead, the resiliency of cultural, linguistic, and religious differences among populations has led to a search for a more accurate, less evolutionary means of understanding not only the resurgence of ancient differences among peoples, but also the actual emergence of historically new ethnic groups. The result has been the development of a model of ethnicity that stresses the fluid, situational, volitional, and dynamic character of ethnic identification, organization, and action—a model that emphasizes the **socially "constructed" aspects** of ethnicity, i.e., the ways in which **ethnic boundaries, identities, and cultures**, are negotiated, defined, and produced through social interaction inside and outside ethnic communities.

According to this **constructionist view**, the origin, content, and form of ethnicity reflect the creative choices of individuals and groups as they define themselves and others in ethnic ways. **Through the actions and designations of ethnic groups, their antagonists, political authorities, and economic interest groups, ethnic boundaries are erected dividing some populations and unifying others. Ethnicity is constructed out of the material of language, religion, culture, appearance, ancestry, or regionality.** The location and meaning of particular ethnic boundaries are continuously

negotiated, revised, and revitalized, both by ethnic group members themselves as well as by outside observers.

To assert that ethnicity is socially constructed is not to deny the historical basis of ethnic conflict and mobilization. However, a constructionist view of ethnicity poses questions where an historical view begs them. For instance, to argue that the Arab-Israeli conflict is simply historical antagonism, built on centuries of distrust and contention, asserts a certain truth, but it answers no questions about regional or historical variations in the bases or extent of the conflict, or about the processes through which it might be ameliorated. In fact, scholars have asserted that both Israeli and Palestinian ethnic identities are themselves fairly recent constructions, arising out of the geopolitics of World War II and the Cold War, and researchers have documented the various competing meanings of the Arab-Israeli conflict in American political culture.

Similarly, to view black-white antagonism in contemporary American society simply as based in history—albeit a powerful and divisive history—is to overlook the contemporary demographic, political, social, and economic processes that prop up this ethnic boundary, reconstructing it, and producing tension along its borders and within the two bounded ethnic groups. For instance, Lemann's study of the post-World War II demographic shift of African Americans from rural to urban areas and from the South to the North reveals a reconfiguration of the black-white ethnic boundary in northern and southern cities. This migration magnified urban ethnic segregation, stratified black society, increased interethnic tensions, promoted ethnic movements among both blacks and whites, and produced a black urban underclass. All of these changes reflect the dynamic, constructed character of black ethnicity in U.S. society.

Since ethnicity is not simply an historical legacy of migration or conquest, but is constantly undergoing redefinition and reconstruction, our understanding of such ethnic processes as ethnic conflict, mobilization, resurgence, and change might profit from a reconsideration of some of the core concepts we use to think about ethnicity. This paper examines **two of the basic building blocks of ethnicity: identity and culture**. Identity and culture are fundamental to **the central projects of ethnicity: the construction of boundaries and the production of meaning**. In this paper, I attempt to answer several questions about the construction of identity and culture: What are the processes by which ethnic identity is created or destroyed, strengthened or weakened? To what extent is ethnic identity the result of internal processes, and to what extent is ethnicity externally defined and motivated? What are the processes that motivate ethnic boundary construction? What is the relationship between culture and ethnic identity? How is culture formed and transformed? What social purposes are served by the construction of culture? Rather than casting identity and culture as prior, fixed aspects of ethnic organization, here they are analyzed as emergent, problematic features of ethnicity. By specifying several mechanisms by which groups reinvent themselves—who they are and what their ethnicity means—I hope to clarify and organize the growing literature documenting the shifting,

volitional, situational nature of ethnicity. Next I examine the construction of ethnic identity, followed by a discussion of the construction of culture.

2- Constructing Ethnic Identity

Ethnic identity is most closely associated with the issue of boundaries. **Ethnic boundaries** determine who is a member and who is not and designate which ethnic categories are available for individual identification at a particular time and place. Debates over the placement of ethnic boundaries and the social worth of ethnic groups are central mechanisms in ethnic construction. Ethnicity is created and recreated as various groups and interests put forth competing visions of the ethnic composition of society and argue over which rewards or sanctions should be attached to which ethnicities.

Recent research has pointed to an interesting ethnic paradox in the United States. Despite many indications of **weakening ethnic boundaries in the white American population (due to intermarriage, language loss, religious conversion or declining participation)**, a number of studies have shown a maintenance or increase in ethnic identification among whites. This contradictory dualism is partly due to what Gans terms "symbolic ethnicity," which is "characterized by **a nostalgic allegiance to the culture of the immigrant generation, or that of the old country; a love for and pride in a tradition that can be felt without having to be incorporated in everyday behavior**". Bakalian provides the example of Armenian-Americans:

For American-born generations, Armenian identity is a preference and Armenianness is a state of mind... One can say he or she is an Armenian without speaking Armenian, marrying an Armenian, doing business with Armenians, belonging to an Armenian church, joining Armenian voluntary associations, or participating in the events and activities sponsored by such organizations (Bakalian 1991:13).

This simultaneous decrease and increase in ethnicity raises the interesting question: How can people behave in ways which disregard ethnic boundaries while at the same time claim an ethnic identity? The answer is found by examining ethnic construction processes—in particular, the ways in which individuals and groups create and recreate their personal and collective histories, the membership boundaries of their group, and the content and meaning of their ethnicity.

3- Negotiating Ethnic Boundaries

While **ethnicity is commonly viewed as biological in the United States** (with its history of an obdurate ethnic boundary based on color), research has shown people's conception of themselves along ethnic lines, especially their ethnic identity, to be situational and changeable. Barth first convincingly articulated the notion of **ethnicity as mutable, arguing that ethnicity is the product of social ascriptions, a kind of labeling process engaged in by oneself and others. According to this perspective, one's ethnic identity is a composite of the view one has of oneself as well as the views held by others about one's ethnic identity**. As the individual (or group) moves through daily life, ethnicity can change according to variations in the situations and audiences encountered. Ethnic identity, then, is the result

of a dialectical process involving internal and external opinions and processes, as well as the individual's self-identification and outsiders' ethnic designations—i.e., what you think your ethnicity is, versus what they think your ethnicity is. Since ethnicity changes situationally, the individual carries a portfolio of ethnic identities that are more or less salient in various situations and vis-a-vis various audiences. As audiences change, the socially-defined array of ethnic choices open to the individual changes. This produces a "layering" of ethnic identities which combines with the ascriptive character of ethnicity to reveal the negotiated, problematic nature of ethnic identity. **Ethnic boundaries, and thus identities, are constructed by both the individual and group as well as by outside agents and organizations.**

Examples can be found in patterns of ethnic identification in many U.S. ethnic communities. For instance, Cornell and McBeth discuss various levels of identity available to Native Americans: subtribal (clan, lineage, traditional), tribal (ethnographic or linguistic, reservation-based, official), regional (Oklahoma, California, Alaska, Plains), supra-tribal or pan-Indian (Native American, Indian, American Indian). Which of these identities a native individual employs in social interaction depends partly on where and with whom the interaction occurs. Thus, an American Indian might be a "mixed-blood" on the reservation, from "Pine Ridge" when speaking to someone from another reservation, a "Sioux" or "Lakota" when responding to the U.S. census, and "Native American" when interacting with non-Indians.

Pedraza, Padilla, and Gimenez, Lopez, and Munoz note a similar layering of Latino or Hispanic ethnic identity, again reflecting both internal and external defining processes. An individual of Cuban ancestry may be a Latino vis-à-vis non-Spanish-speaking ethnic groups, a Cuban-American vis-à-vis other Spanish-speaking groups, a Marielito vis-à-vis other Cubans, and white vis-à-vis African Americans. The chosen ethnic identity is determined by the individual's perception of its meaning to different audiences, its salience in different social contexts, and its utility in different settings. For instance, intraCuban distinctions of class and immigration cohort may not be widely understood outside of the Cuban community since a Marielito is a "Cuban" or "Hispanic" to most Anglo-Americans. To a Cuban, however, immigration cohorts represent important political "vintages," distinguishing those whose lives have been shaped by decades of Cuban revolutionary social changes from those whose life experiences have been as exiles in the United States. Others' lack of appreciation for such ethnic differences tends to make certain ethnic identity choices useless and socially meaningless except in very specific situations. It underlines the importance of external validation of individual or group ethnic boundaries.

Espiritu also observes a layering of Asian-American identity. While the larger "Asian" pan-ethnic identity represents one level of identification, especially vis-à-vis non-Asians, national origin (e.g., Japanese, Chinese, Vietnamese) remains an important basis of identification and organization both vis-à-vis other Asians as well as in the larger society. Like Padilla, Espiritu finds that individuals choose from an array of pan-ethnic and nationality-based identities, depending on the perceived strategic utility and symbolic appropriateness of the identities in different settings and audiences. She notes

the larger Asian-American pan-ethnic boundary is often the basis for identification where large group size is perceived as an advantage in acquiring resources or political power. However she also observes that Asian-American pan-ethnicity tends to be transient, often giving way to smaller, culturally distinct nationality-based Asian ethnicities.

Waters describes similar situational levels of ethnic identification among African Americans. She reports that dark-skinned Caribbean immigrants acknowledge and emphasize color and ancestry similarities with African Americans at some times; at other times Caribbeans culturally distinguish themselves from native-born blacks. Keith and Herring discuss the skin tone distinctions that exist among African Americans, with the advantages and higher social status that accrue to those who are lighter skinned. This color [156] consciousness appears to be embraced by blacks as well as whites, and thus demarcates an internal as well as external ethnic boundary. White Americans also make ethnic distinctions in various settings, vis-à-vis various audiences. They sometimes emphasize one of their several European ancestries; they sometimes invoke Native American lineage; they sometimes identify themselves as "white," or simply assert an "American" identity. The calculations involved in white ethnic choices appear different from those of other ethnic groups, since resources targeted for minority populations are generally not available to whites, and may not directly motivate individuals to specify an ethnicity based on European ancestry or "white"-ness. In these cases, white ethnicity can take the form of a **"reverse discrimination"** countermovement or "backlash" against the perceived advantages of non-whites. In other cases, white ethnicity is more symbolic, representing less a rational choice based on material interests than a personal option exercised for social, emotional, or spiritual reasons.

4- External Forces Shaping Ethnic Boundaries

The notion that ethnicity is simply a personal choice runs the risk of emphasizing agency at the expense of structure. In fact, ethnic identity is both optional and mandatory, as individual choices are circumscribed by the ethnic categories available at a particular time and place. That is, while an individual can choose from among a set of ethnic identities, that set is generally limited to socially and politically defined ethnic categories with varying degrees of stigma or advantage attached to them. In some cases, the array of available ethnicities can be quite restricted and constraining. For instance, white Americans have considerable latitude in choosing ethnic identities based on ancestry. Since many whites have mixed ancestries, they have the choice to select from among multiple ancestries, or to ignore ancestry in favor of an "American" or "un-hyphenated white" ethnic identity. Americans of African ancestry, on the other hand, are confronted with essentially one ethnic option-black. And while blacks may make intra-racial distinctions based on ancestry or skin tone, the power of race as a socially defining status in U.S. society makes these internal differences rather unimportant in interracial settings in comparison to the fundamental black/white color boundary.'

Despite the practice of **"hypodescent"** or the **"one drop rule" in the classification of African Americans as "black,"** Davis shows that throughout

U.S. history, there has been considerable controversy and reconstruction of the meaning and boundaries associated with blackness.

The differences between the ethnic options available to blacks and whites in the United States reveal the limits of individual choice and underline the importance of external ascriptions in restricting available ethnicities. Thus, the extent to which ethnicity can be freely constructed by individuals or groups is quite narrow when compulsory ethnic categories are imposed by others. Such limits on ethnic identification can be official or unofficial. In either case, externally enforced ethnic boundaries can be powerful determinants of both the content and meaning of particular ethnicities. For instance, Feagin's research on the day-to-day racism experienced by middle-class black Americans demonstrates the potency of informal social ascription. Despite the economic success of middle-class African Americans, their reports of hostility, suspicion, and humiliation in public and private interactions with non-blacks illustrate the power of informal meanings and stereotypes to shape interethnic relations.

If informal ethnic meanings and transactions can shape the everyday experiences of minority groups, formal ethnic labels and policies are even more powerful sources of identity and social experience. Official ethnic categories and meanings are generally political. As the state has become the dominant institution in society, political policies regulating ethnicity increasingly shape ethnic boundaries and influence patterns of ethnic identification. There are several ways that ethnicity is "politically constructed," i.e., the ways in which ethnic boundaries, identities, cultures, are negotiated, defined, and produced by political policies and institutions: by immigration policies, by ethnically-linked resource policies, and by political access that is structured along ethnic lines.

5- *Immigration and the production of ethnic diversity.*

Governments routinely reshape their internal ethnic maps by their immigration policies. Immigration is a major engine of new ethnic group production as today's immigrant groups become tomorrow's ethnic groups. Around the world, immigrant populations congregate in both urban and rural communities to form ethnic enclaves and neighborhoods, to fill labor market niches, sometimes providing needed labor, sometimes competing with native-born workers, to specialize in particular commodity markets, and as "middlemen." Whether by accident or design, whether motivated by economics, politics, or kinship, immigrant groups are inevitably woven into the fabric of ethnic diversity in most of the world's states.

It is also through immigration that both domestic and foreign policies can reshape ethnic boundaries. The growing ethnic diversity and conflict in France and Britain are direct legacies of both their successes and failures at colonial empire-building. In many other European states, such as Sweden and Germany, economic rather than political policies, in particular the importation of guest workers to fill labor shortages, encouraged immigration. The result has been the creation of permanent ethnic minority populations. In the United States, various Cold War policies and conflicts (e.g., in Southeast Asia and Central America) resulted in immigration flows that make Asians and Latin Americans the two fastest growing minority populations in the United States.

Political policies designed to house, employ, or otherwise regulate or assist immigrant populations can influence the composition, location, and class position of these new ethnic subpopulations.' Thus the politics of immigration are an important mechanism in the political construction of ethnicity.

Resource competition and ethnic group formation.

Immigration is not the only area in which politics and ethnicity are interwoven. Official ethnic categories are routinely used by governments worldwide in census-taking, and acknowledgment of the ethnic composition of populations is a regular feature of national constitutions. Such designations can serve to reinforce or reconstruct ethnic boundaries by providing incentives for ethnic group formation and mobilization or by designating particular ethnic subpopulations as targets for special treatment. The political recognition of a particular ethnic group can not only reshape the designated group's self-awareness and organization, but can also increase identification and mobilization among ethnic groups not officially recognized, and thus promote new ethnic group formation. This is especially likely when official designations are thought to advantage or disadvantage a group in some way.

For instance, in India, the provision of constitutionally guaranteed parliamentary representation and civil service posts for members of the "Scheduled Castes" or "Untouchables" contributed to the emergence of collective identity and the political mobilization of Untouchables from different language and regional backgrounds; one result was the formation of an Untouchable political party, the Republican Party. This affirmative action program produced a backlash and a Hindu revival movement, mainly among upper caste Indians who judged Untouchables to have unfair political and economic advantages). Such backlashes are common around the world. In Malaysia, constitutional provisions granting political advantages to majority Malays prompted numerous protests from non-Malays—mainly Chinese and Indians. In many of the new republics of the former Soviet Union, nationalist mobilizations are built as much on a backlash against Russia and local Russians (who comprise a significant part of the population in most republics) than on a strong historic pattern of national identity. In the United States, white ethnic self-awareness was heightened as desegregation and affirmative action programs got under way in the 1960s and 1970s. The result was a white anti-busing movement, and a "legal countermobilization" and cultural backlash against affirmative action. American Indians have also been the targets of white backlashes, mainly against treaty-protected hunting and fishing rights in the Pacific Northwest and the northern Great Lakes region.

Official ethnic categories and policies can also strengthen ethnic boundaries by serving as the basis for discrimination and repression, and thus reconstruct the meaning of particular ethnicities. Petonito outlines the construction of both "loyal American" and "disloyal Japanese" ethnic boundaries during World War II, a process which led to the internment of thousands of Japanese-Americans. Similarly, violence directed toward Iranians and Middle Easterners in the United States increased when American embassy staff were taken hostage during the Iranian revolution in 1980 and attacks against Iraqis and Arab-Americans escalated during the 1991 Gulf War. In the former case, official actions of the Carter administration, such as requiring

Iranian nationals in the United States to report for photographing and fingerprinting, contributed to an elevation of ethnic awareness and tended to legitimate the harassment of Iranians. In the latter case, official U.S. military hostilities against Iraq "spread" into U.S. domestic politics, prompting attacks on Arab and Iraqi "targets" living in the United States.

Political policies and designations have enormous power to shape patterns of ethnic identification when politically controlled resources are distributed along ethnic lines. Roosens attempts to trace the rise of ethnicity and ethnic movements in the contemporary United States. He argues that the mobilization of ethnic groups in the United States has paralleled the development of the U.S. welfare state and its racial policies:

There were few advantages in the United States.. of the 1930s to define oneself visibly as a member of the Sicilian or Polish immigrant community. When one considers the current North American situation, however, one concludes that ethnic groups emerged so strongly because ethnicity brought people strategic advantages.

Padilla's description of the emergence of a Latino ethnicity among Mexicans and Puerto Ricans in Chicago in response to city programs focused on Hispanics, is consistent with Roosens's analysis. Another example is Espiritu's account of the emergence of Asian-American ethnic identity as a strategy to counter official policies thought to disadvantage smaller Asian nationality groups. Similarly, the white backlashes described above represent one response to exclusion from what are seen as ethnically-designated rights and resources. The observation that ethnic boundaries shift, shaping and reshaping ethnic groups according to strategic calculations of interest, and that ethnicity and ethnic conflict arise out of resource competition, represent major themes in the study of ethnicity. Barth and his associates link ethnic boundaries to resource niches. Where separate niches are exploited by separate ethnic groups (e.g., herders versus horticulturalists), ethnic tranquility prevails; however, niche competition (e.g., for land or water) results in ethnic boundary instability due to conflict or displacement. Examining labor markets, Bonacich and Olzak have shown how informal job competition among different ethnic groups can heighten ethnic antagonism and conflict, strengthening ethnic boundaries as ethnicity comes to be viewed as crucial to employment and economic success. Hannan argues that the pursuit of economic and political advantage underlies the shift in ethnic boundaries upward from smaller to larger identities in modern states.' Thus, in electoral systems, larger ethnic groups mean larger voting blocs; in industrial economies regulated by the political sector, and in welfare states, larger ethnic constituencies translate into greater influence. This research paints a picture of ethnicity as a rational choice. According to this view, the construction of ethnic boundaries (group formation) or the adoption or presentation of a particular ethnic identity (individual ethnic identification), can be seen as part of a strategy to gain personal or collective political or economic advantage.' For instance, Katz reports the creation of racially restrictive craft unions by white settlers in South Africa in order to gain an edge in labor market competition and create class distance from competing black laborers. Such competitive strategies not only provide ethnic advantages, they stimulate ethnic identity

and group formation. An example is "whiteness" which Roediger argues emerged as an American ethnicity due to the efforts of working class (especially Irish) whites who sought to distance themselves and their labor from blacks and blackness; by distinguishing their "free labor" from "slave labor," they redefined their work from "white slavery" to "free labor." Political access and ethnic group formation. The organization of political access along ethnic lines can also promote ethnic identification and ethnic political mobilization. As Brass notes, "the state. . .is not simply an arena or an instrument of a particular class or ethnic group. . .the state is itself the greatest prize and resource, over which groups engage in a continuing struggle". Much ethnic conflict around the world arises out of competition among ethnic contenders to control territories and central governments. The civil war in the former republic of Yugoslavia is a clear example of ethnic political competition.' The long-standing grievances of the various warring linguistic and religious groups there did not erupt into combat until the Soviet Union lifted the threat of intervention in the late 1980s and opened the door to the possibility of ethno-political competition. The result was an armed scramble for territory based on a fear of domination or exclusion by larger, more powerful ethnic groups.

In the United States, the construction of ethnic identity in response to ethnic rules for political access can be seen in the national debate over affirmative action, in the composition of judicial (judges, juries) and policy-making bodies (committees, boards), and in the enforcement of laws designed to end discrimination or protect minorities. For example, the redistricting of U.S. congressional districts based on the 1990 census led to ethnic mobilization and litigation as African-American and Latino communities, among others, sought improved representation in the federal government. Similarly, concern based on the importance of ethnic population size for representation and resource allocation led Asian Americans to demand that the Census Bureau designate nine Asian nationality groups as separate "races" in the 1980 and 1990 census.'

Part B

6- Ethnic Authenticity and Ethnic Fraud

Politically-regulated ethnic resource distribution and political access have led to much discussion about just what constitutes legitimate membership in an ethnic group, and about which individuals and groups qualify as disadvantaged minorities. For instance, Hein outlines the debate concerning the extent to which Asian immigrants to the United States should be seen to be ethnic "minorities" with an "historical pattern of discrimination," and thus eligible for **affirmative action remedies**. In universities, concerned with admissions practices, financial aid allocation, and non-discriminatory employment and representation, the question of which ethnic groups fulfill affirmative action goals is often answered by committees charged with defining who is and is not an official minority group.

Discussions about group eligibility are often translated into controversies surrounding individual need, individual ethnicity, and ethnic proof. The multi-

ethnic ancestry of many Americans combines with ethnically-designated resources to make choosing an ethnicity sometimes a financial decision. In some instances, individuals respond to shifting ethnic incentive structures by asserting minority status or even changing their ethnicity. Ethnic switching to gain advantage can be contentious when resources are limited. In many cases, particularly those involving individuals of mixed ancestry, the designation of a resource-endowed ethnicity for public or official purposes can elicit suspicion and challenge. For instance, Snipp reports concern among Native American educators about "ethnic fraud" in the allocation of jobs and resources designated for American Indian students; this concern was reflected in the inclusion of ethnic fraud among the topics of discussion at a recent national conference on minority education.

Indeed, questions of who is Indian or Latino or black' are often raised and often are difficult to resolve one way or the other. Even when ancestry can be proven, questions can arise about the cultural depth of the individual's ethnicity (Was he or she raised on a reservation or in the city? Does he or she speak Spanish?), or the individual's social class (Was he or she raised in the inner city or in the suburbs?). Solutions to questions of authenticity are often controversial and difficult to enforce. For instance, the federal government has attempted to set the standards of ethnic proof in the case of American Indian art. The Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 requires that in order for artwork to be labeled as "Indian produced," the producer must be "certified as an Indian artisan by a [federally recognized] Indian tribe". By this legal definition, artists of Indian ancestry cannot produce Indian art unless they are enrolled in or certified by officially recognized tribes. The act has thus led a number of Indian artists to seek official tribal status (some have refused to do this) and has also served to exclude some recognized American Indian artists from galleries, museums, and exhibits. Similar local restrictions on who can sell Indian art and where it can be sold have caused bitter divisions among American Indians and other minority communities in the Southwest.

In sum, the construction of ethnic boundaries through individual identification, ethnic group formation, informal ascriptions, and official ethnic policies illustrates the ways in which particular ethnic identities are created, emphasized, chosen, or discarded in societies. As the result of processes of negotiation and designation, ethnic boundaries wax and wane. Individual ethnic identification is strongly limited and influenced by external forces that shape the options, feasibility, and attractiveness of various ethnicities.

As we have seen above, research speaks fairly clearly and articulately about how ethnic boundaries are erected and torn down, and the incentives or disincentives for pursuing particular ethnic options. However, the literature is less articulate about the meaning of ethnicity to individuals and groups, about the forces that shape and influence the contents of that ethnicity, and about the purposes ethnic meanings serve. This requires a discussion of the construction of culture.

Culture and history are the substance of ethnicity. They are also the basic materials used to construct ethnic meaning. Culture and history are often intertwined in cultural construction activities. Both are part of the "toolkit"-as Swidler called it-used to create the meaning and interpretative

systems seen to be unique to particular ethnic groups. Culture is most closely associated with the issue of meaning. Culture dictates the appropriate and inappropriate content of a particular ethnicity and designates the language, religion, belief system, art, music, dress, traditions, and lifeways that constitute an authentic ethnicity. While the construction of ethnic boundaries is very much a saga of structure and external forces shaping ethnic options, the construction of culture is more a tale of human agency and internal group processes of cultural preservation, renewal, and innovation. The next section explores the ways in which ethnic communities use culture and history to create common meanings, to build solidarity, and to launch social movements.

7- Constructing Culture

In his now classic treatise on ethnicity, Fredrik Barth challenged anthropology to move away from its preoccupation with the content of culture, toward a more ecological and structural analysis of ethnicity:

ethnic categories provide an organizational vessel that may be given varying amounts and forms of content in different socio-cultural systems ... The critical focus of investigation from this point of view becomes the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses.

Barth's quarrel was not with the analysis of culture, per se, but with its primacy in anthropological thinking. In fact, by modernizing Barth's "vessel" imagery, we have a useful device for examining the construction of ethnic culture: the shopping cart. We can think of ethnic boundary construction as determining the shape of the shopping cart (size, number of wheels, composition, etc.); **ethnic culture, then, is composed of the things we put into the cart—art, music, dress, religion, norms, beliefs, symbols, myths, customs.** It is important that we discard the notion that culture is simply an historical legacy; culture is not a shopping cart that comes to us already loaded with a set of historical cultural goods. Rather we construct culture by picking and choosing items from the shelves of the past and the present. As Barth reminds us:

... when one traces the history of an ethnic group through time, one is not simultaneously... tracing the history of "a culture": the elements of the present culture of that group have not sprung from the particular set that constituted the group's culture at a previous time.

In other words, **cultures change; they are borrowed, blended, rediscovered, and reinterpreted.** My use of the shopping cart metaphor extends Swidler's cultural toolkit imagery. Swidler argues that we use the cultural tools in the toolkit in our everyday social labors; I argue that we not only use the tools in the toolkit, but that we also determine its contents—keeping some tools already in the kit, discarding others, adding new ones. However, if culture is best understood as more than mere remnants of the past, then how did it get to its present state—how did the cart get filled, and why? What does culture do?

Culture is constructed in much the same way as ethnic boundaries are built, by the actions of individuals and groups and their interactions with the larger society. Ethnic boundaries function to determine identity options,

membership composition and size, and form of ethnic organization.

Boundaries answer the question: Who are we? Culture provides the content and meaning of ethnicity; it animates and authenticates ethnic boundaries by providing a history, ideology, symbolic universe, and system of meaning.

Culture answers the question: What are we? It is through the construction of culture that ethnic groups fill Barth's vessel—by reinventing the past and inventing the present.

8- Cultural Construction Techniques

Groups construct their cultures in many ways which involve mainly the reconstruction of historical culture, and the construction of new culture.

Cultural reconstruction techniques include revivals and restorations of historical cultural practices and institutions; new cultural constructions include revisions of current culture and innovations-the creation of new cultural forms. Cultural construction and reconstruction are ongoing group tasks in which new and renovated cultural symbols, activities, and materials are continually being added to and removed from existing cultural repertoires.

Cultural revivals and restorations occur when lost or forgotten cultural forms or practices are excavated and reintroduced, or when lapsed or occasional cultural forms or practices are refurbished and reintegrated into contemporary culture. For example, for many, immigrant and indigenous ethnic groups' native languages have fallen into disuse. Efforts to revitalize language and increase usage are often major cultural reconstruction projects. In Spain, both in Catalonia and the Basque region, declining use of the native tongues (Catalan and Euskera, respectively) due to immigration and/or Castilian Spanish domination, has spurred language education programs and linguistic **renewal** projects. In the United States, the threatened loss of many Native American languages has produced similar language documentation and education programs, as well as the creation of cultural centers, tribal museums, and educational programs to preserve and revive tribal cultural traditions. Study and instruction in cultural history is often a central part of cultural reconstruction.

Cultural revisions and innovations occur when current cultural elements are changed or when new cultural forms or practices are created. As part of U.S. authorities' various historical efforts to destroy Native American cultures by annihilation or assimilation, many Indian communities and groups used cultural **revision** and innovation to insulate cultural practices when they were outlawed by authorities. Champagne reports that the Alaska Tlingits revised traditional potlatch practices, incorporating them into Russian Orthodox or Protestant ceremonies to conceal the forbidden exchanges. Prucha reports a form of cultural innovation to protect the use of peyote in American Indian religious rites. The creation of the Native American Church imbedded peyote use in a **syncretic**, new Indian-Christian religious institution, thus protecting practitioners under the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution. Such cultural camouflage in the form of religious syncretism is reported in many societies, particularly those penetrated by missionaries operating under governmental auspices.

These various cultural construction techniques, and others that will be described below, serve two important collective ends which will be the focus of the remainder of this paper. They aid in the construction of community and they serve as mechanisms of collective mobilization. Cultural constructions assist in the construction of community when they act to define the boundaries of collective identity, establish membership criteria, generate a shared symbolic vocabulary, and define a common purpose. Cultural constructions promote collective mobilization when they serve as a basis for group solidarity, combine into symbolic systems for defining grievances and setting agendas for collective action, and provide a blueprint or repertoire of tactics.

Part C

9- The Cultural Construction of Community

In *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson argues that there is no more evocative a symbol of modern nationalism than the tomb of the unknown soldier. The illustrative power of this icon lies in the fact that such tombs "are either deliberately empty or no one knows who lies inside them"—thus, they are open to interpretation and waiting to be filled. The construction of culture supplies the contents for ethnic and national symbolic repositories. Hobsbawm refers to this symbolic work as "the invention of tradition"—i.e., the construction or reconstruction of rituals, practices, beliefs, customs, and other cultural apparatus. According to Hobsbawm, **invented traditions serve three related purposes: a) to establish or symbolize social cohesion or group membership, b) to establish or legitimize institutions, status, and authority relations, or c) to socialize or inculcate beliefs, values, or behaviors.** By this analysis the invention of tradition is very much akin to what Cohen calls "the symbolic construction of community."

The construction of history and culture is a major task facing all ethnic groups, particularly those that are newly forming or resurgent. **In constructing culture, the past is a resource used by groups in the collective quest for meaning and community.** Trevor- Roper provides an example of the construction of a national culture:

Today, whenever Scotchmen gather to celebrate their national identity, they assert it openly by certain distinctive national apparatus. They wear the kilt, woven in a tartan whose colour and pattern indicates their 'clan'; and if they indulge in music, their instrument is the bagpipe. This apparatus, to which they ascribe great antiquity, is in fact largely modern Indeed the whole concept of a distinct Highland culture and tradition is a retrospective invention. Before the later years of the seventeenth century, the Highlanders of Scotland did not form a distinct people. They were simply the overflow of Ireland.

Other scholars concur with Trevor-Roper's assertions about the constructed character of Scottish identity and culture. However, the fictive aspects of Scottish ethnicity in no way lessen the reality of Scottish nationalism in Great Britain, particularly during its heyday during the 1970s and early 1980s. During that time, Scottish and Welsh nationalism combined with the escalating

violence in Northern Ireland to represent a major political and economic threat to the integrity of the United Kingdom. Indeed, despite its invented origins, Scottish nationalism contributed to a major devolution of political authority to the British Celtic states.

For newly forming ethnic and national groups, the construction of community solidarity and shared meanings out of real or putative common history and ancestry involves both cultural constructions and reconstructions. Smith refers to ethnic and national groups' "deep nostalgia for the past" that results in efforts to uncover or, if necessary, invent an earlier, ethnic "golden age". For instance, **Karner describes the reconstruction of Finnish cultural history (folklore, music, songs) by Swedish-speaking Finnish intellectuals during the mobilization for Finnish independence.** Similarly, Kelly discusses the efforts of Lithuanian-Americans to learn the Lithuanian language and to reproduce Lithuanian foods, songs, dances, and customs illustrating the process whereby people transform a common ancestry (whether by birth or by marriage) into a common ethnicity. And in their homeland, Lithuanians themselves are embarked on a journey of national reconstruction, as decades of Russian influence are swept away in an effort to uncover real and historical Lithuanianness.

The importance of cultural construction for purposes of community building is not limited to the creation of national unity. Cultural construction is especially important to panethnic groups, as they are often composed of subgroups with histories of conflict and animosity. For instance, Padilla discusses the challenges facing Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans in Chicago as they attempt to construct both Latino organizations and an identity underpinned by the assertion of common interests and shared culture—a commonality that is sometimes problematic. Espiritu also documents the tensions surrounding nationality and cultural differences in the evolution of an Asian-American pan-ethnicity.

One **strategy used by polyethnic groups to overcome such differences and build a more unified pan-ethnic community is to blend together cultural material from many component group traditions.** About half of the American Indian population lives in urban areas. Urban Indians have borrowed from various tribal cultures as well as from non-Indian urban culture to construct supratribal or "Indian" cultural forms such as the powwow, the Indian Center, Indian Christian churches, Indian bowling leagues and softball teams, and Indian popular music groups. In the urban setting, tribal differences and tensions can be submerged in these pan-Indian organizations and activities.

Building a cultural basis for new ethnic and national communities is not the only goal prompting cultural reconstruction. Cultural construction is also a method for revitalizing ethnic boundaries and redefining the meaning of ethnicity in existing ethnic populations. The Christmas season celebration of Kwanzaa by African Americans is an example of the dynamic, creative nature of ethnic culture, and reveals the role scholars play in cultural construction. Created in the 1960s by Professor Maulana Karenga, Kwanzaa is a seven-day cultural holiday which combines African and African-American traditions. The reconstruction and study of cultural history is also a crucial part of the

community construction process and again shows the importance of academic actors and institutions in cultural renewal. Examples can be found in the recent emergence of various ethnic studies programs (e.g., Latino, American Indian, African-American, Asian Studies) established in colleges and universities around the United States during the past three decades. Such programs are reflective of a renewed and legitimated interest in ethnicity and cultural diversity. These programs, as well as classes in oral history and ethnic culture, serve as important resources in cultural revivals and restorations.

10- Cultural Construction and Ethnic Mobilization

Cultural construction can also be placed in the service of ethnic mobilization. Cultural renewal and transformation are important aspects of ethnic movements. Cultural claims, icons, and imagery are used by activists in the mobilization process; cultural symbols and meanings are also produced and transformed as ethnic movements emerge and grow. While there is a large literature on the structural determinants of ethnic mobilization, recent social movement research reflects increased interest in the nature of social movement culture and the interplay between culture and mobilization. An examination of this literature offers insight into the relationship between culture and ethnic mobilization.

For instance, Snow and his associates argue that social movement organizers and activists use existing culture (rhetorical devices and various techniques of "frame alignment") to make movement goals and tactics seem reasonable, just, and feasible to participants, constituencies, and political officials. For example, nuclear disarmament movement leaders responded to questions about the hopelessness of opposing a military-industrial complex bent on the production of nuclear weapons by drawing a parallel between the elimination of nuclear weapons and the abolition of slavery - namely, the success of abolitionism was achieved despite an equally daunting opposition. Thus, by drawing on available cultural themes, the discourse surrounding movement objectives and activism is more likely to recruit members, gain political currency, and achieve movement goals.

Gamson and his associates document the ideational shifts and strategies used by movements, policymakers, and opposition groups to shape debates, define issues, and to paint the most compelling portrait of each side's claims and objectives. For instance, Gamson and Modigliani argue that the changing culture of affirmative action results from a struggle over the definition of equality, justice, and fairness, as various political actors frame the issues in competing ways, e.g., affirmative action as "remedial action" versus "reverse discrimination." The rhetorics, counter-rhetorics, and rhetorical shifts characterized in this research are common to all social movements, including ethnic movements. They reflect the use of cultural material and representations in a symbolic struggle over rights, resources, and the hearts and minds of constituents, neutral observers, and opponents alike.

The work of Snow and Gamson illustrates the use of existing culture by movement organizers and activists, and shows several forms of cultural reconstruction, where cultural symbols and themes are borrowed and sometimes repackaged to serve movement ends. There is another way in which

cultural construction occurs in movements-where protest is a crucible of culture. For instance, Fantasia describes a "culture of solidarity" that arises out of activism. Cultures of solidarity refer to the emergence of a collective consciousness and shared meanings that result from engaging in collective action. Ethnic movements often challenge negative hegemonic ethnic images and institutions by redefining the meaning of ethnicity in appealing ways or by using cultural symbols to effectively dramatize grievances and demands.

Examples of the construction and reconstruction of history and culture in order to redefine the meaning of ethnicity can be found in the activities of many of the ethnic groups that mobilized during the civil rights era of the 1960s and 1970s in the United States. During these years, a renewed interest in African culture and history and the development of a culture of black pride-"Black is Beautiful"-accompanied African-American protest actions during the civil rights movement. The creation of new symbolic forms and the abandonment of old, discredited symbols and rhetoric reflected the efforts of African Americans to create internal solidarity and to challenge the prevailing negative definitions of black American ethnicity. For instance, the evolution of racial nomenclature for African Americans can be excavated by a retrospective examination of the names of organizations associated with or representing the interests of black Americans: the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the United Negro College Fund, the Black Panther Party, and the National Council of African-American Men, Inc. The fluidity of names for other American ethnic groups reflects similar shifts in constructed ethnic definitions and revised meanings associated with evolving collective identities: from Indians to American Indians to Native Americans; from Spanish-Surnamed to Hispanics to Latinos. Such changes in ethnic nomenclature were an important part of the discourse of civil rights protest, as were changes in dress, new symbolic themes in art, literature, and music, and counter-hegemonic challenges to prevailing standards of ethnic demeanor and interracial relations.

The expropriation and subversion of negative hegemonic ethnic definitions and institutions is an important way that culture is used in ethnic mobilization around the world. British conceptions of "tribe" and "tribal" shaped many of their colonial policies, such as geographic administrative boundaries, education policies, and hiring practices. These tribal constructions were reshaped by Africans into the anti-colonial ethnic politics of a number of African states. For instance, Wallerstein and Iliffe document the mobilization of various "tribal" unions and associations into nationalist movements for independence in many African countries. In India, similar subversion of colonial cultural constructions designed to facilitate British domination occurred. Cohn argues that the pomp and ceremony of the British Imperial Assemblage and the Imperial Durbars in nineteenth century India were expropriated by Indian elites, who Constructing Ethnicity indigenized and institutionalized this invented tradition, incorporating it into the symbolism and idiom of an independent Indian politics.

This "turning on its head" of cultural symbols and institutions can be seen in the ways ethnic activists use culture in their protest strategies. The tactics used in ethnic movements rely on the presentation, and sometimes the

reconstruction, of cultural symbols to demonstrate ethnic unity, to dramatize injustice, or to animate grievances or movement objectives. For instance, Zulaika, Sullivan, and Clark report the use of various cultural symbols and conventions by Basque nationalist groups, noting, for instance, the central symbolic importance of demands for Basque language rights, although fewer than half of the Basque population speaks the Basque language. The Red Power movement for American Indian rights during the 1960s and 1970s drew its membership from mainly urban Indians from a variety of tribal backgrounds. The movement created a unified pan-Indian cultural front by borrowing cultural forms from many native communities (e.g., the teepee, eagle feathers, the war dance, the drum). Red Power repertoires of contention-as Tilly called them-also employed a rhetorical and dramaturgical cultural style that reflected movement leaders' sensitivity to the place of the American Indian in American popular culture and history. The American Indian Movement (AIM) was especially skilled in the use of such symbolic dramaturgy, as illustrated in the following description of an AIM-sponsored counter-ceremony in 1976:

Custer Battlefield, Mont. Today, on the wind-buffed hill.. .where George Armstrong Custer made his last stand, about 150 Indians from various tribes danced joyously around the monument to the Seventh Cavalry dead. Meanwhile, at the official National Parks Service ceremony about 100 yards away, an Army band playedJust as the ceremony got underway, a caravan of Sioux, Cheyenne, and other Indians led by Russell Means, the American Indian Movement leader, strode to the speakers' platform to the pounding of a drum. Oscar Bear Runner, like Mr. Means, a veteran of the 1973 takeover of Wounded Knee, carried a sacred peace pipe.

The above example shows the interplay between pre-existing cultural forms and the new uses to which they are put in ethnic movements. What we see is the National Parks Service's efforts to commemorate the "official story", and the American Indian Movement's challenge to this hegemonic interpretation of history. Both groups employed the symbolic paraphernalia available to them, drawn from similar strands of American history and culture, but used in opposing ways. By recasting the material of the past in innovative ways, in the service of new political agendas, ethnic movements reforge their own culture and history and reinvent themselves.

11- Conclusion

At the beginning of this paper I posed a number of questions about ethnic boundaries and meaning, inquiring into the forces shaping ethnic identity and ethnic group formation, and the uses of history and culture by ethnic groups and movements. My answers have emphasized the interplay between ethnic group actions and the larger social structures with which they interact. Just as ethnic identity results both from the choices of individuals and from the ascriptions of others, ethnic boundaries and meaning are also constructed from within and from without, propped up by internal and external pressures. For ethnic groups, questions of history, membership, and culture are the problematics solved by the construction process. Whether ethnic divisions are built upon visible biological differences among populations or rest

upon invisible cultural and ideational distinctions, the boundaries around and the meanings attached to ethnic groups reflect pure social constructions.

Yet questions remain. What is driving groups to construct and reconstruct ethnic identity and culture? What is it about ethnicity that seems to appeal to individuals on so fundamental a level? From what social and psychological domains does the impulse toward ethnic identification originate? Why is ethnicity such a durable basis for group organization around the world? If ethnicity is in part a political construction, why do the goals of some ethnic activists favor equal rights, while others demand autonomy or independence? Other questions remain about the social meaning of ethnicity. How are particular meanings (values, stereotypes, beliefs) attached to different ethnic groups, and by whom? What are the implications of these different meanings for conceptions of social justice, intergroup relations, political policy? Concomitantly, how does ethnic stratification (material and ideational) arise? Can constructionist explanations of ethnicity account for persistent prejudice and discrimination, particularly where race or color are involved? To the extent that the constructionist model emphasizes change, how should we understand intractable racial and ethnic antagonism and stratification? These questions comprise not only an agenda for future research, they are also warnings. While ethnic boundaries and the meanings attributed to them can be shown to be socially constructed, they must not, therefore, be underestimated as social forces. In fact, the constructionist model constitutes an argument for the durability, indeed the inevitability, of ethnicity in modern societies. As such, it represents a challenge to simple historical, biological, or cultural determinist models of human diversity.

#

Ralph R. **Donald**, "Savages, Swine and Buffoons: Hollywood's
Selected Stereotypical Characterizations of the Japanese,
Germans, and Italians in Films Produced During World War
II," *Images : A Journal of Film and Popular Culture*,

<http://www.imagesjournal.com/issue08/features/wwii/default-yes.htm>
(see on-line version for notes, references and some sound clips)

During World War II, American mass communications helped create and intensify the most jingoistic, ethnocentric, and ideologically unified public opinion in the history of this country.

During this anomaly in American ideological diversity, through print and radio news, public service announcements, entertainment and consumer advertising, Americans were exposed to a steady diet of U.S. war propaganda -- exquisitely-crafted, persuasive messages designed to raise spirits, engender national pride and foster understanding of our reasons for going to war and of America's inevitable victory. When workers poured out of their around-the-clock shifts at defense plants and other war-essential industries, or when Mr. and Mrs. America simply craved escapist diversion, they visited their local movie theaters, the "television" of their age. In these Bijous, Rialtos and Strands, audiences sat back in the dark and absorbed idealistic, enthusiastic pro-American, anti-Axis messages presented in the form of cartoons, newsreels, and feature films.

This investigation concerns itself with one small aspect of this deluge of war propaganda: the characterizations of the enemy presented to Americans in the feature-length war films Hollywood produced between 1941 and 1946. It will describe how the film industry, at times both cooperating with and defying the wishes of the Roosevelt administration, treated each Axis member differently, portraying the Italians with the least severity, the Germans with considerably more venom, and reserving its most vicious attacks for the Japanese.

Uneven Treatment of the Axis Powers

In Hollywood feature films, Germany, Italy, and Japan were *not* treated as villains of equal stature. Were they handled differently relative to their perceived threat to the U.S.? If so, Japan's attack on American territory on Dec. 7, 1941 might explain why the Japanese became America's number one object of hate. Germany had blitzed England and occupied France prior to December 7, and President Roosevelt's speeches had warned Americans that we were next. So correctly, Germany received much harsher treatment than did Italy, but not at all as severe as the venom reserved for the Japanese (Dolan, 45). In American feature films, with the exception of Mussolini himself, the Italians were either ignored or received little serious criticism beyond their stereotypical lassitude and military ineptitude. By and large Italians were treated, as this investigation's title suggests, as buffoons, simple comic diversions in otherwise melodramatic scenarios. (Interestingly, Frank Capra's propaganda documentary *Prelude to War* (1943) treated Germany, Italy and Japan equally.)

Engagement-driven?

But perhaps this pecking order of damnation was inspired by the amount of engagement American and Allied forces had with each of these enemies. After all, the very best of Hollywood's wartime output was drawn from actual occurrences, producing such fictional accounts as *Mrs. Miniver* (the blitz and the battle of Britain), *They Were Expendable* (defending the Philippines from the Japanese), *Air Force* (recovering and "counter-punching" after Pearl Harbor), *Action In The North Atlantic* (Allied convoys battling German U-Boats), and *Sahara* (holding the line against Rommel's Afrika Corps at El Alamein).

The scant mention of Italians in American films of this period might then be explained by the simple fact that Americans faced them in battle only briefly. Although Italians fought against the Allies during the campaigns in North Africa and Sicily, shortly after the allied invasion of Italy, the Italian army ceased to be an effective fighting force. By the time the Allies drove the Germans out of Sicily and crossed over to Italy, the Italian army was virtually nonexistent. Given a choice between the Nazis and the Allies, most Italians greeted Americans as friends and liberators.

In films produced during or shortly after World War II, only the 1943 film *The Immortal Sergeant* dealt with Allied soldiers actively fighting the Italian army. In *Five Graves to Cairo*, the Italian Army does not engage anyone: it has already been defeated. In *The Immortal Sergeant*, Italians are neither prisoners, turncoats, comic characters, or non-combatants. They are faceless foes across the battlefield. But even in this film, the sons of Caesar get no respect. In one scene, two scruffy-looking excuses for Italian soldiers are on picket duty. Not only do they fail to notice British soldiers sneaking up on their position, but by striking a match to light their cigarettes and illuminate each other, the two Italian soldiers make it easy for the British soldiers to pick them off.

Early in America's portion of the war, however, the Pacific Fleet had suffered a sound thrashing by the Japanese. From FDR to the U.S. media, this blow to American national and military pride was dismissed by reminding audiences that the savage, uncivilized Asian enemy did not "play fair," choosing to mount a "sneak attack" while their envoys were negotiating for peace in Washington. The first major film about America's defeat in the Pacific, *Wake Island*, was portrayed as a victory because the heroics of Wake's defenders delayed the Japanese while America recovered from the treachery of the Pearl Harbor attack. Using a "one front at a time" strategy, FDR and joint chiefs chairman George Marshall planned to first defeat Germany and then turn their efforts toward Japan. American propaganda feature films reflected these priorities.

Stereotype-driven?

Another possible explanation for the uneven treatment of America's enemies can be discovered in the mass-mediated stereotypes of the Italian, German, and Japanese races and cultures. During the formative years of motion pictures, the now-offensive image of the ignorant, happy, harmless, garlic-eating, wine-making, organ-grinding Italian had been frequently presented to American moviegoers. The stereotype of the strutting, monocled, supercilious, Prussian martinet with his riding boots and jodhpurs made its

debut in World War I anti-German propaganda films (Maynard, 50-51). The same type of individual pervaded Hollywood's anti-Nazi films of the late 1930s and continued unabated during the war. At this time, Japanese stereotypes appeared in American films. One Hollywood creation, Mr. Moto, was a cunning, diminutive, bespectacled Oriental, in contrast to the servile, grinning, deferential-to-Occidentals stereotype of the "Chinaman." But "sneaky" may have been the kindest comment Hollywood made about the perpetrators of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Because name-calling is a clear way to define and characterize these distinctions, this discussion will next address this pillar of propaganda.

Japanese as Sub-Human

Racial differences (as well as political and moral differences) made the Japanese easier propaganda targets than the Germans or Italians. More tools to use and no need to hold back. Anthropomorphisms were used often to portray the Japanese as lower creatures, which perhaps explains why U.S. leaders felt that public opinion would support the use of nuclear weapons on Japanese civilian populations. Although they were called worse names, the most common anthropomorphism was the monkey.

For example, in *Guadalcanal Diary*, after capturing the enemy's main base, Marines examined the food their enemy had left behind. They were surprised to find caviar:

Marine: Caviar! I thought these monkeys lived on fish heads and rice! Later, when three ragged Japanese prisoners are paraded in front of a group of Marines, the American soliders say:

Marine #1: Hey, it's three monkeys on a rope. Boy, are they small!

Marine #2: Hey, Snow White! Where's the seven dwarfs [sic]?

Not to belabor this particular anthropomorphism, but to name just a few films, the Japanese were called monkeys five times in *Guadalcanal Diary*, four times in *The Fighting Seabees*, three times in both *Objective Burma* and *Bataan*, twice in *Gung Ho!*, and once each in *China Girl*, *Blood on the Sun* and *Air Force*.

In addition, in *Guadalcanal Diary* and *Black Dragons*, the Japanese are called "apes," and in *Bataan*, the enemy is referred to as "no-tailed baboons" -- a name inspired by the American stereotype of the buck-toothed Japanese.

Another anthropomorphism often used against the Japanese was the "rat," and screenwriters didn't hesitate to suggest that the enemy should be favorably compared to them. As Goebbels suggested about the Jews in the Nazi hate film *The Eternal Jew*, it takes very little imagination to conclude that the Japanese, like the rodent, required extermination.

The reference may be as simple as a backhanded insult, as in *The Purple Heart*. In this film, Dana Andrews argues with a Japanese General, who describes with pride the fanaticism of his army, who are willing to fight to the last man. The American, wittily jabbing at the enemy with a mannerly insult, says,

Andrews: . . . From all I've heard of your soldiers, they fight like cornered rats. [sarcastically] No offense, General.

In *Destination Tokyo*, a submarine's executive officer is watching the

destruction of Japanese ships and shore targets caused by the bombers in the Doolittle raid. As he watches Japanese cruisers and destroyers getting under way to avoid being sitting ducks for the American bombers, the officer shouts: *Exec*: Yipe! Our planes are chasing the rats out of their nests!

Likewise, in *God is My Co-pilot*, an American flyer refers to Japanese pilot "Tokyo Joe's" wingmen as "brother rats." *Bataan* contains an additional rodent variation: the Japanese are called "dirty, rotten rats."

Germans as Scavenger Animals

The Germans also received their share of anthropomorphisms. Although sometimes the object of comparison with rodents, Germans were frequently compared to scavenger animals. For example, in *Lifeboat*, they're "Nazi Buzzards" and in *Sahara*, they're "mad dogs." In addition, in *Five Graves to Cairo*, an Italian general characterizes Italy's fateful alliance with Germany: "Well, as they say in Milano, when you lie down with dogs, you wake up with fleas."

Also in the canine family, in *Tarzan Triumphs* (1943) (yes, even Tarzan fought the Germans in films made during World War II), the ape man calls Germans "jackals" and "hyenas."

Italians Dismissed as Fools

Italians get off relatively easily. In *Sahara*, the Italian prisoner is referred to by Humphrey Bogart as "a load of spaghetti" and the Italian people as "suckers" for buying into Mussolini's fascism. In a dinner conversation about war negotiations in *Five Graves to Cairo*, an Italian general suggests that instead of threats of aggression, disputing countries should exchange chefs rather than envoys. This, reasoned the Italian, would result in conflict resolutions by macaroni rather than threats. Dining with the Italian general is German Field Marshall Rommel, played phlegmatically by Erich von Stroheim. Extremely disdainful of his ally, Rommel calls the general a fool, and, the obsequious Italian apologizes and speaks no more at the table.

And, of course, J. Carrol Nash makes a classic speech in *Sahara*. He plays an Italian prisoner of war who finally stands up to the bullying "Nazi dog" prisoner:

Nash: Italians are not like-a Germans. Only the body wears the uniform, not-a the soul. Mussolini's not so clever like-a Hitler. He can dress his Italians only to look-a like thieves, cheats, murderers. He cannot, like-a Hitler, make-a them feel like that!

In *A Walk in the Sun*, Italians are dismissed as a people, ". . . sold a bill of goods that they were gonna boss the world. . . . Now the ones who sold it to them are gone, they're left holding the bag, the poor suckers." In the same picture, Italians are characterized as ". . . the slap-happiest people I ever saw."

Sticks and Stones

The majority of the venomous names were left for the Germans and Japanese. Here's a chosen handful of mouthfuls from a few dozen World War II films. First the Germans:

"Heels" in *All Through the Night*

"Dirty bastards" in *Action in the North Atlantic* (This line, spoken by Dane Clark, is partially obscured by explosions.)

"Stupid swine" and "oxen" (Ironically spoken by a Nazi colonel about his own men in *Berlin Correspondent*.)

"Heinie" in *Captains of the Clouds* and *Corvette K-225*

"Kraut" in *A Walk in the Sun*

"Huns" and "Jerries." in *Eagle Squadron*

"A crummy bunch of jokers" in *Sahara*

"Brutes" in *This Land is Mine*

"Ersatz Superman" and sarcastic references to "Der Master Race" in *Lifeboat*

Then, the Japanese:

"Japs," of course, in nearly every picture

"Nips" in *The Fighting Seabees* and "little sneakin' Nips" in *Air Force*

"Dirty snipes" in *Destination Tokyo*

"Hong Kong Hophead" ("Tokyo Joe's" air field was in Japanese-held Hong Kong) in *God is My Co-Pilot*

"Suckers" in *Bataan*

and "Savages" in *China Girl* and *Objective Burma*

Other Tactics

American filmmakers adopted several other methods besides name-calling in their campaign of derision against the Axis powers. (Few, if any, of the following methods apply to depictions of Italians.)

The Japanese, and especially the Germans, are often shown thoughtlessly killing their own soldiers if it serves their purposes. Enemy riflemen and especially fighter pilots are shown grinning with delight and sometimes laughing as they gun down Americans, who are sometimes unarmed.

These films include references to Germans and especially the Japanese as cruel and barbaric, preying mostly upon the weak. Germans and Japanese are shown to be capable of bloody and needless reprisals against civilians, including rape, and the murder of women and children.

By the end of the war the Allies were almost as guilty as the Axis powers when it came to bombing civilians (more so, if we count Hiroshima and Nagasaki) -- although Americans were always shown in our films bombing just military targets, and then only in so-called "surgical strikes." But the enemy was repeatedly shown taking great pains to bomb civilian targets, especially orphanages, schools, churches, and hospitals.

German and Japanese cultures were shown in many different ways to be inferior to that of the Allies. In *Destination Tokyo*, a submarine crewman named "Mike" tries to rescue a downed Japanese flyer from the water. Instead, the "ungrateful" Japanese soldier stabs Mike in the back, killing him. Later, as the Captain (Cary Grant) and his men mourn Mike's passing, the Captain delivers this speech:

Captain: ". . . Mike bought his kid roller skates when the kid turned five -
- Well, that Jap got a present when he was five: only it was a dagger. His old man gave it to him so he would know right off what he was supposed to be in

life. [Grant goes on to say that Japanese kids were taught the skills of war at a young age] . . . and by the time he's 13, he can put a machine gun together blindfolded. That Jap was started on the road 20 years ago to putting a knife in Mike's back. And a lot more Mikes are going to die until we wipe out a system that puts daggers in the hands of five-year-old children. That's what Mike died for: more roller skates in this world -- even some for the next generation of Japanese kids.

The differences between "us" -- and "them" -- were made clear in movie after movie during the war. These differences included the Japanese disregard for human life and liberty and their godlike worship of their emperor. Hollywood also showed us the Germans' love of totalitarianism, their plans to make all other nations slaves of the Third Reich, and their worshipful devotion to Hitler. As an example of their imperialistic aims, in *Casablanca* Vichy Captain Renault greets SS Major Strasser as he arrives in the North African city. Renault apologizes for the oppressive heat, but Strasser dismisses Renault's concern, saying that Germans (because of their conquests) must become accustomed to all climates.

In these films, gangster-like behavior was standard for the Germans and frequent for the Japanese, especially in spy films such as *Across The Pacific*. This of course included thievery, the classic double-cross, and officers whose word (including the white flag of truce) could not be trusted. For example, during a lull in the battle between a small band of allied soldiers preventing a battalion of Germans from occupying an oasis in *Sahara*, a swinish Nazi colonel orders his troops to open fire on an allied soldier who waves a white flag while returning to the Allied trenches.

Finally, American film propagandists took great pains to remind us of the Japanese and German disdain for the Allies. In particular, films displayed sneering German and Japanese officers voicing their disdain for American virtue, religion, rule of law, and freedom.

Conclusion

Besides vilifying the enemy, films of World War II took other propagandistic tacks which in this article I can only list. They include establishing, as Harold Lasswell referred to it, the "guilt" of the war -- *who's* responsible for Americans having to go off to a foreign country and kill people they don't know. Or, in movie talk, as John Wayne would say, "They started it, and now we're gonna finish it." As well, these films went to great pains to establish "happy endings," even when Americans lost the battle, to make it clear to all, that again in Lasswell's terminology, that the "Illusion of Victory" -- ultimate triumph over the enemy, was a sure thing -- if Americans all sacrifice and work together against the common foe.

As well, American filmmakers employed even Biblical metaphors and types, dubbed by Ronald Reid Apocalypticism and Typology, to characterize the enemy as the forces of evil and darkness, and the Allies as the army of light and God's righteous avengers, out to conquer the Antichrist.

As well, with frequent references to how the Germans and Japanese planned to conquer America, such as Admiral Yamamoto's famous threat to ". . . dictate peace terms on the steps of the White House," these films employ

appeals to Americans' natural sense of territoriality.

But in all of these, there is a pecking order of venom against our enemies: A slap on the wrist to the hapless Italians, hatred for the Nazis and the fascism they stood for, and antagonism, loathing and revulsion for the Japanese unmatched in filmed war propaganda either before or since.

#

Michael Phillips, "What the President Saw,"

Chicago Tribune (February 8, 2015): sect. 4;7

In the history of American cinema, D.W. Griffith's 1915 landmark "The Birth of a Nation" is the gift that keeps on generating misgivings.

Based on Thomas Dixon Jr.'s 1905 novel "The Clansman," and the subsequent stage version, Griffith's 12-reel Civil War epic, slightly more than three hours in length, remains a uniquely vexing achievement. It is often painful to watch, even when its techniques and ambitions command attention, even now. The film is as accomplished and sophisticated visually as it is notorious and vicious thematically. It's also readily available on YouTube and other sites.

"The Birth of a Nation" defends white Southern honor in the Civil War and depicts the postwar Reconstruction era as another kind of war, grotesque and humiliating. On one side, we have the blacks, newly freed, played mostly by white actors in blackface plus a few actual African-Americans. In the film's distorted remembrance of Reconstruction, we watch the black and biracial characters enjoying the rights the story cannot abide (equality, the vote, intermarriage). On the other side of the war: whites, the besieged majority whose salvation arrives with the creation, according to Dixon and Griffith, of the Ku Klux Klan, defender of "the Aryan birthright."

The Dixon novel, published in 1905, contains passage after passage such as this one:

"Now a negro electorate controlled the city government, and gangs of drunken negroes, its sovereign citizens, paraded the streets at night firing their muskets unchallenged and unmolested. A new mob of onion-laden breath, mixed with perspiring African odour, became the symbol of American Democracy."

Dixon, a friend of fellow Southerner Woodrow Wilson, adapted "The Clansman" for the stage as a response to the success of "Uncle Tom's Cabin," which he viewed as dangerously sympathetic to African-Americans.

"My object," Dixon wrote, was to "demonstrate to the world that the white man must and shall be supreme." Griffith's film cannot disguise this sensibility, even if Griffith's gifts lifted it to a higher poetic realm of lies.

Not all anniversary stories in mainstream journalism are created equal, or equally celebratory. This one's bittersweet. But it has a remarkable bookend.

On Feb. 18, 1915, President Wilson held a private screening of "The Birth of a Nation" in the White House. It was the first such event, if you don't count the White House lawn screening of the 1914 Italian feature "Cabiria," a film that showed Griffith and others new ways to mobilize the camera.

"Like writing history with lightning," Wilson was alleged to have said of Griffith's evocation of the Civil War and its aftermath. That was 100 years ago this month.

A few weeks ago director Ava DuVernay was invited to screen her film "Selma" at the White House, at the invitation of Barack and Michelle Obama.

It was a small event as White House gatherings go. Yet DuVernay felt the significance of it and took to Instagram to mention, among other things, the "Birth of a Nation" screening a century earlier. Seeing "Selma" in the house where Wilson saw Griffith's film, DuVernay wrote, was "a moment I don't have to explain to most ... heavy with history and light with pure, pure joy all at once."

In "Selma," we see a beautifully dramatized idea of what Martin Luther King Jr. learned about politicking, and how he took what he learned to the people. Like Steven Spielberg's "Lincoln," DuVernay's film relishes procedure and keeps a careful eye on maneuvers akin to a high-stakes chess match. In some ways "Selma" follows the contours of conventional historical fiction; in others, and those others are crucial, we're allowed closer and more revealing proximity to the guts of history.

"The Birth of a Nation" is more of a blunt instrument. In its initial engagements it gathered up a lot of anger, great swaths of covert and overt racism, and played to it, fomented it. The results made a lot of money. The film held the box-office record until 1937, when "Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs" took it away. And then, two years later, another film (like Griffith's) featuring the burning of Atlanta and a lot of racial stereotypes (title: "Gone With the Wind"), conquered the planet.

Chicago's history with "The Birth of a Nation" was like that of many big cities: protests, debate, politics, capitulation. After a New York screening, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People board member Jane Addams, founder of Chicago's Hull House, told the New York Post that the film was "a pernicious caricature of the negro race." Initially the film was refused its Chicago exhibition license. Politically the opposition did not hold, and in the summer of 1915, anyone who could afford the \$2 admission price (roughly \$46 today) made the trip to the now-vanished Illinois Theater downtown to see what the fuss was about.

In Lafayette, Ind., a white man killed a black teenager after seeing the movie. It's still a dangerous topic, this film; in 1995, Turner Classic Movies canceled its airing of a restored "Birth of a Nation" print, in the wake of the O.J. Simpson murder trial.

What do its defenders say? Plenty. Griffith was a pioneer of the silent era, with one foot in Victorian romanticism and the other in the medium's newfound expressive possibilities. Lillian Gish, among others in the film's ensemble, worked in a naturalistic style of performance eons away from most of the theatrics on screen at the time. The film, like Leni Riefenstahl's "The Triumph of the Will" a generation later, is the work of a front-rank director who knows exactly what he's doing, although Griffith felt blindsided by the intensity of the controversy over the racism. "Why take a romance of the civil war so seriously?" he wrote after the film's release. He made "Intolerance" following "The Birth of a Nation," as an act of defiance and atonement.

Like many, I first encountered "The Birth of a Nation" in a high school film class. I barely had the resources to process it. I couldn't, and never will, reconcile the scenes of grotesque caricature with the Mathew Brady-like pictorial beauty of its landscapes. The film contains a title card defending itself with the statement that it is "not meant to reflect on any race or people today." Yet on the screen, its calumny against a people is permanent. Funny thing is, Dixon thought the calumny was against people like him.

The film Wilson invited to the White House imagines a sinister day indeed, when "all blacks are given the ballot." But to state the obvious: A lot happens in a century. "Selma" takes up the matter of black voting rights and comes to a rather different conclusion than Griffith's infernal classic did. "The Birth of a Nation" shall not, I hope, ever be banned from public viewing or availability. We are who we are, and we must realize where we've been. If we don't defend free speech, however ashen the taste, even when it maligns millions, then we are Americans no longer.

We have endured long enough as a nation to see Griffith's film screened for one president in 1915 and DuVernay's film for another in 2015. And that's one hell of a set of bookends.

Herbert J. **Gans**, [Excerpts from] "Symbolic ethnicity: the future of ethnic groups and cultures in America," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 2 Number 1 (January 1979):1-20

[for full article which also includes endnotes and bibliography, see Library's website]

Part A

[Please note that this was written in 1979 – as you read this, consider how ethnicity in the US has changed since then.]

1- Introduction

One of the more notable recent changes in America has been the renewed interest in ethnicity, which some observers of the American scene have described as an ethnic revival. This paper argues that there has been no revival, and that acculturation and assimilation continue to take place. Among third and fourth generation 'ethnics' (the grand and great-grand children of Europeans who came to America during the 'new immigration'), a new kind of ethnic involvement may be occurring, which emphasizes concern with identity, with the feeling of being Jewish or Italian, etc. Since ethnic identity needs are neither intense nor frequent in this generation, however, ethnics do not need either ethnic cultures or organizations; instead, they resort to the use of ethnic symbols. As a result, ethnicity may be turning into **symbolic ethnicity**, an ethnicity of last resort, which could, nevertheless, persist for generations.

Identity cannot exist apart from a group, and symbols are themselves a part of culture, but ethnic identity and symbolic ethnicity require very different ethnic cultures and organizations than existed among earlier generations. Moreover, the symbols third generation ethnics use to express their identity are more visible than the ethnic cultures and organizations of the first and second generation ethnics. What appears to be an ethnic revival may therefore only be a more visible form of long-standing phenomena, or of a new stage of acculturation and assimilation. Symbolic ethnicity may also have wider ramifications, however, for David Riesman has suggested that 'being American has some of the same episodic qualities as being ethnic.'

2- Acculturation and assimilation

The dominant sociological approach to ethnicity has long taken the form of what Neil Sandberg aptly calls **straight-line theory**, in which acculturation and assimilation are viewed as secular trends that culminate in the eventual absorption of the ethnic group into the larger culture and general population. Straight-line theory in turn is based on melting pot theory, for it implies the disappearance of the ethnic groups into a single host society. Even so, it does not accept the values of the melting pot theorists, since its conceptualizers could have, but did not, use terms like cultural and social liberation from immigrant ways of life.

In recent years, straight-line theory has been questioned on many grounds. For one thing, many observers have properly noted that even if America might have been a melting pot early in the 20th century, the massive immigration from Europe and elsewhere has since then influenced the dominant groups, summarily labelled White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP),

and has also decimated their cultural, if not their political and financial power, so that today America is a mosaic, as Andrew Greeley has put it, of subgroups and subcultures. Still, this criticism does not necessarily deny the validity of straight-line theory, since ethnics can also be absorbed into a pluralistic set of subcultures and subgroups, differentiated by age, income, education, occupation, religion, region, and the like.

A second criticism of straight-line theory has centered on its treatment of all ethnic groups as essentially similar, and its failure, specifically, to distinguish between **religious groups** like *the Jews* and **nationality groups** like the Italians, Poles etc. Jews, for example, are a 'peoplehood' with a religious and cultural tradition of thousands of years, but without an 'old country' to which they owe allegiance or nostalgia, while Italians, Poles and other participants in the 'new immigration' came from parts of Europe which in some cases did not even become nations until after the immigrants had arrived in America.

That there are differences between the Jews and the other 'new' immigrants cannot be questioned, but at the same time, the empirical evidence also suggests that acculturation and assimilation affected them quite similarly. (Indeed, one major difference may have been that Jews were already urbanized and thus entered the American social structure at a somewhat higher level than the other new immigrants, who were mostly landless laborers and poor peasants.) Nonetheless, straight-line theory can be faulted for virtually ignoring that immigrants arrived here with two kinds of ethnic cultures, sacred and secular; that they were Jews from Eastern — and Western — Europe, and Catholics from Italy, Poland and elsewhere. (Sacred cultures are, however, themselves affected by national and regional considerations; for example, Italian Catholicism differed in some respects from German or Polish, as did Eastern European Judaism from Western.)

While acculturation and assimilation have affected both sacred and secular cultures, they have affected the latter more than the former, for acculturation has particularly eroded the secular cultures which Jews and Catholics brought from Europe. Their religions have also changed in America, and religious observance has decreased, more so among Jews than among Catholics, although Catholic observance has begun to fall off greatly in recent years. Consequently, the similar American experience of Catholic and Jewish ethnics suggests that the comparative analysis of straight-line theory is justified, as long as the analysis compares both sacred and secular cultures.

Two further critiques virtually reject straight-line theory altogether. In an insightful recent paper, William Yancey and his colleagues have argued that contemporary ethnicity bears little relation to the ancestral European heritage, but exists because it is functional for meeting present 'exigencies of survival and the structure of opportunity', particularly for working class Americans. Their argument does not invalidate straight-line theory but corrects it by suggesting that acculturation and assimilation, current ethnic organizations and cultures, as well as new forms of ethnicity, must be understood as responses to current needs rather than only as departures from past traditions.

The other critique takes the reverse position; it points to the persistence of the European heritage, argues that the extent of acculturation and assimilation has been overestimated, and questions the rapid decline and eventual extinction of ethnicity posited by some straight-line theorists. These critics call attention to studies which indicate that ethnic cultures and organizations are still functioning, that **exogamous marriage** remains a practice of numerical minorities, that ethnic differences in various behavior patterns and attitudes can be identified, that ethnic groups continue to act as political interest groups, and that ethnic pride remains strong.

The social phenomena which these observers identify obviously exist; the question is only how they are to be interpreted. Straight-line theory postulates a process, and cross-sectional studies do not preempt the possibility of a continuing trend. Also, like Yancey, *et al*, some of the critics are looking primarily at poorer ethnics, who have been less touched by acculturation and assimilation than middle class ethnics, and who have in some cases used ethnicity and ethnic organization as a psychological and political defense against the injustices which they suffer in an unequal society. In fact, **much of the contemporary behavior described as ethnic strikes me as working class behavior**, which differs only slightly among various ethnic groups, and then largely because of variations in the structure of opportunities open to people in America, and in the peasant traditions their ancestors brought over from the old country, which were themselves responses to European opportunity structures. In other words, ethnicity is largely a working-class style.

Much the same observations apply to ethnic political activity. Urban political life, particularly among working class people, has always been structured by and through ethnicity, and while ethnic political activity may have increased in the last decade, it has taken place around working class issues rather than ethnic ones. During the 1960s, urban working class Catholic ethnics began to politicize themselves in response to black militancy, the expansion of black ghettos, and governmental integration policies which they perceived as publicly legitimated black invasions of ethnic neighborhoods, but which threatened them more as working class homeowners who could not afford to move to the suburbs. Similarly, working and lower-middle class Catholic ethnics banded together in the suburbs to fight against higher public school taxes, since they could not afford to pay them while they were also having to pay for parochial schools. Even so, these political activities have been *pan-ethnic*, rather than ethnic, since they often involved coalitions of ethnic groups which once considered each other enemies but were now united by common economic and other interests: The extent to which these **pan-ethnic coalitions** reflect class rather than ethnic interests is illustrated by the 1968 election campaign of New York City's Mario Proccaccino against John Lindsay. Although an Italian, he ran as a 'candidate of the little people' against what he called the 'limousine liberals'.

The fact that pan-ethnic coalitions have developed most readily in conflicts over racial issues also suggests that in politics, ethnicity can sometimes serve as a convenient euphemism for anti-black endeavors, or for political activities that have negative consequences for blacks. While attitude

polls indicate that ethnics are often more tolerant racially than other Americans, working class urban ethnics are also more likely to be threatened, as homeowners and jobholders, by black demands, and may favor specific anti-black policies not because they are 'racists', but because their own class interests force them to oppose black demands.

In addition, part of what appears as an increase in ethnic political activity is actually an increase in the visibility of ethnic politics. When the pan-ethnic coalitions began to copy the political methods of the civil rights and anti-war movements, their protests became newsworthy and were disseminated all over *the* country by the mass media. At about the same time, the economic and geographic mobility of Catholic ethnic groups enabled non-Irish Catholic politicians to win important state and national electoral posts for the first time, and their victories were defined as ethnic triumphs, even though they did not rely on ethnic constituents alone, and were not elected on the basis of ethnic issues.

The final, equally direct, criticism of straight-line theory has questioned the continued relevance of the theory, either because of the phenomenon of third-generation return, or because of the emergence of ethnic revivals. Thus, Marcus Hansen argued that acculturation and assimilation were temporary processes, because the third generation could afford to remember an ancestral culture which the traumatic Americanization forced the immigrant and second generations to forget. Hansen's hypothesis can be questioned on several grounds, however. His data, the founding of Swedish and other historical associations in the Midwest, provided slender evidence of a widespread third generation return, particularly among non-academic ethnics. In addition, his theory is static, for Hansen never indicated what would happen in the fourth generation, or what processes were involved in the return that would enable it to survive into the future.

The notion of an ethnic revival has so far been propounded mostly by journalists and essayists, who have supplied impressionistic accounts or case studies of the emergence of new ethnic organizations and the revitalization of old ones. Since third and fourth generation ethnics who are presumably participating in this revival are scattered all over suburbia, there has so far been little systematic research among this population, so that the validity of the revival notion has not yet been properly tested.

The evidence I have seen does not convince me that a revival is taking place. Instead, recent changes can be explained in two ways, neither of which conflict with straight-line theory: (1) Today's ethnics, have become more visible as a result of upward mobility; and (2) they are adopting the new form of ethnic behavior and affiliation I call symbolic ethnicity.

3-The visibility of ethnicity

The recent upward social, and centrifugal geographic, mobility of ethnics, particularly Catholics, has finally enabled them to enter the middle and upper middle classes, where they have been noticed by the national mass media, which monitor primarily these strata. In the process they have also become more noticeable to other Americans. The newly visible may not participate more

in ethnic groups and cultures than before, but their new visibility makes it appear as if ethnicity had been revived.

I noted earlier the arrival of non-Irish Catholic politicians on the national scene. An equally visible phenomenon has been the entry of Catholic ethnic intellectuals into the academy, and its flourishing print culture. To be sure, the scholars are publishing more energetically than their predecessors, who had to rely on small and poverty-stricken ethnic publishing houses, but they are essentially doing what ethnic scholars have always done, only more visibly. Perhaps their energy has also been spurred in part by the need, as academics, to publish so that they do not perish, as well as by their desire to counteract the anti-ethnic prejudices and the entrenched vestiges of the melting pot ideal which still prevail in the more prestigious universities. In some cases, they are also fighting a political battle, because their writings often defend conservative political positions against what they perceive — I think wrongly — as the powerful liberal or radical academic majority. Paradoxically, a good deal of their writing has been nostalgic, celebrating the immigrant culture and its *gemeinschaft* at the same time that young Catholic ethnics are going to college partly in order to escape the restrictive pressures of that *gemeinschaft*. (Incidentally, an interesting study could be made of the extent to which writers from different ethnic groups, both of fiction and non-fiction, are pursuing nostalgic, contemporary or future-oriented approaches to ethnicity, comparing different ethnic groups, by time of arrival and position in the society today, on this basis.)

What has happened in the academy has also happened in literature and show business. For example, although popular comedy has long been a predominantly Eastern European Jewish occupation, the first generation of Jewish comic stars had to suppress their ethnicity and even had to change their names, much as did the first generation of academic stars in the prestigious universities. Unlike Jack Benny, Eddie Cantor, George Burns, George Jessel and others, the comics of today do not need to hide their origins, and beginning perhaps with Lenny Bruce and Sam Levinson, comics like Buddy Hackett, Robert Klein, Don Rickles and Joan Rivers have used explicitly Jewish material in entertaining the predominantly non-Jewish mass media audience.

Undoubtedly, some of the academics, writers and entertainers have undergone a kind of third generation return in this process. Some have re-embraced their ethnicity solely to spur their careers, but others have experienced a personal conversion. Even so, an empirical study would probably show that in most cases, their ethnic attitudes have not changed; either they have acted more publicly and thus visibly than they did in the past, or in responding to a hospitable cultural climate, they have openly followed ethnic impulses which they had previously suppressed.

4- Ethnicity in the third generation

The second explanation for the changes that have been taking place among third generation ethnics will take up most of the rest of this paper; it deals with what is happening among the less visible population, the large mass

of predominantly middle class third and fourth generation ethnics, who have not been studied enough either by journalists or social scientists.

In the absence of systematic research, it is even difficult to discern what has actually been happening, but several observers have described the same ethnic behavior in different words. Michael Novak has coined the phrase 'Voluntary ethnicity'; Samuel Eisenstadt has talked about 'Jewish diversity'; Allan Silver about 'individualism as a valid mode of Jewishness', and Geoffrey Bock about 'public Jewishness'. What these observers agree on is that today's young ethnics are finding new ways of being ethnics, which I shall later label symbolic ethnicity.

For the third generation, the secular ethnic cultures which the immigrants brought with them are now only an ancestral memory, or an exotic tradition to be savored once in a while in a museum or at an ethnic festival. The same is true of the 'Americanization cultures', the immigrant experience and adjustment in America, which William Kornblum suggests may have been more important in the lives of the first two generations than the ethnic cultures themselves. The old ethnic cultures serve no useful function for third generation ethnics who lack direct and indirect ties to the old country, and neither need nor have much knowledge about it. Similarly, the Americanization cultures have little meaning for people who grew up without the familial conflict over European and American ways that beset their fathers and mothers: the second generation which fought with and was often ashamed of immigrant parents.

Assimilation is still continuing, for it has always progressed more slowly than acculturation. If one distinguishes between primary and secondary assimilation, that is, out of ethnic **primary and secondary groups**, the third generation is now beginning to move into non-ethnic primary groups. Although researchers are still debating just how much intermarriage is taking place, it is rising in the third generation for both Catholic ethnic groups and Jews, and friendship choices appear to follow the same pattern.

The departure out of secondary groups has already proceeded much further. Most third generation ethnics have little reason, or occasion, to depend on, or even interact with, other ethnics in important secondary group activities. Ethnic occupational specialization, segregation, and self-segregation are fast disappearing, with some notable exceptions in the large cities. Since the third generation probably works, like other Americans, largely for corporate employers, past occupational ties between ethnics are no longer relevant. Insofar as they live largely in the suburbs, third generation ethnics get together with their fellow homeowners for political and civic activities, and are not likely to encounter ethnic political organizations, balanced tickets, or even politicians who pursue ethnic constituencies.

Except in suburbs where old discrimination and segregation patterns still survive, social life takes place without ethnic clustering, and Catholics are not likely to find ethnic subgroups in the Church. Third generation Jews, on the other hand, particularly those who live in older upper-middle class suburbs where segregation continues, if politely, still probably continue to restrict much of their social life to other Jews, although they have long ago forgotten the secular divisions between German (and other Western) and Eastern European

Jews, and among the latter, the division between 'Litwaks' and 'Galizianer'. The religious distinction between German Reform Judaism, and Eastern European Conservatism has also virtually disappeared, for the second generation that moved to the suburbs after World War II already chose its denomination on status grounds rather than national origin. In fact, the Kennedy-Herberg prediction that eventually American religious life would take the form of a triple melting-pot has not come to pass, if only because people, especially in the suburbs, use denominations within the major religions for status differentiation.

Nevertheless, while ethnic ties continue to wane for the third generation, people of this generation continue to *perceive* themselves as ethnics, whether they define ethnicity in sacred or secular terms. Jews continue to remain Jews because the sacred and secular elements of their culture are strongly intertwined, but the Catholic ethnics also retain their secular or national identity, even though it is separate from their religion.

My hypothesis is that in this generation, people are less and less interested in their ethnic cultures and organizations — both sacred and secular — and are instead more concerned with maintaining their ethnic identity, with the feeling of being Jewish, or Italian, or Polish, and with finding, ways of feeling and expressing that identity in suitable ways. By **identity**, I mean here simply the socio-psychological elements that accompany role behavior, and the ethnic role is today less of **an ascriptive than a voluntary role** that people assume alongside other roles. To be sure, ethnics are still identified as such by others, particularly on the basis of name, but the behavioral expectations that once went with identification by others have declined sharply, so that ethnics have some choice about when and how to play ethnic roles. Moreover, as ethnic cultures and organizations decline further, fewer ethnic roles are prescribed, thus increasing the degree to which people have freedom of role definition.

Ethnic identity can be expressed either in action or feeling, or combinations of these, and the kinds of situations in which it is expressed are nearly limitless. Third generation ethnics can join an ethnic organization, or take part in formal or informal organizations composed largely of fellow-ethnics; but they can also find their identity by 'affiliating' with an abstract collectivity which does not exist as an interacting group. That collectivity, moreover, can be mythic or real, contemporary or historical. On the one hand, Jews can express their identity as synagogue members, or as participants in a consciousness-raising group consisting mostly of Jewish women. On the other hand,, they can also identify with the Jewish people as a long-suffering collectivity which has been credited with inventing monotheism. If they are non-religious, they can identify with Jewish liberal or socialist political cultures, or with a population which has produced many prominent intellectuals and artists in the last 100 years. Similar choices are open to Catholic ethnics. In the third generation, Italians can identify through membership in Italian groups, or by strong feelings for various themes in Italian, or Neapolitan or Sicilian culture, and much the same possibilities exist for Catholics whose ancestors came over from other countries.

Needless to say, ethnic identity is not a new, or third generation phenomenon, for ethnics have always had an ethnic identity, but in the past it

was largely taken for granted, since it was anchored to groups and roles, and was rarely a matter of choice. When people lived in an ethnic neighborhood, worked with fellow ethnics, and voted for ethnic politicians, there was little need to be concerned with identity except during conflict with other ethnic groups. Also, the everyday roles people played were often defined for them by others as ethnic. Being a dry-goods merchant was often a Jewish role; restaurant owners were assumed to be Greek; and bartenders, Irish.

The third generation has grown up without assigned roles or groups that anchor ethnicity, so that identity can no longer be taken for granted. People can of course give up their identity, but if they continue to feel it, they must make it more explicit than it was in the past, and must even look for ways of expressing it. This has two important consequences for ethnic behavior. First, given the degree to which the third generation has acculturated and assimilated, most people look for easy and intermittent ways of expressing their identity, for ways that do not conflict with other ways of life. As a result, they refrain from ethnic behavior that requires an arduous or time-consuming commitment, either to a culture that must be practiced constantly, or to organizations that demand active membership. Second, because people's concern is with identity, rather than with cultural practices or group relationships, they are free to look for ways of expressing that identity which suit them best, thus opening up the possibility of voluntary, diverse or individualistic ethnicity.

Any mode of expressing ethnic identity is valid as long as it enhances the feeling of being ethnic, and any cultural pattern or organization which nourishes that feeling is therefore relevant, providing only that enough people make the same choice when identity expression is a group enterprise.

In other words, as the functions of ethnic cultures and groups diminish and identity becomes the primary way of being ethnic, ethnicity takes on an expressive rather than instrumental function in people's lives, becoming more of a leisure-time activity and losing its relevance, say, to earning a living or regulating family life. Expressive behavior can take many forms, but is often involves the use of symbols — and symbols as signs rather than as myths.

Ethnic symbols are frequently individual cultural practices which are taken from the older ethnic culture; they are 'abstracted' from that culture and pulled out of its original moorings, so to speak, to become stand-ins for it. And if a label is useful to describe the third generation's pursuit of identity, I would propose the term symbolic ethnicity.

Part B

5- Symbolic ethnicity

Symbolic ethnicity can be expressed in a myriad of ways, but above all, I suspect, it is characterized by a nostalgic allegiance to the culture of the immigrant generation, or that of the old country; a love for and a pride in a tradition that can be felt without having to be incorporated in everyday behavior. The feelings can be directed at a generalized tradition, or at specific ones: a desire for the cohesive extended immigrant family, or for the obedience

of children to parental authority, or the unambiguous orthodoxy of immigrant religion, or the old-fashioned despotic benevolence of the machine politician. People may even sincerely desire to 'return' to these imagined pasts, which are conveniently cleansed of the complexities that accompanied them in the real past, but while they may soon realize that they cannot go back, they may not surrender the wish. Or else they displace that wish on churches, schools, and the mass media, asking them to recreate a tradition, or rather, to create a symbolic tradition, even while their familial, occupational, religious and political lives are pragmatic responses to the imperatives of their roles and positions in local and national hierarchical social structures.

All of the cultural patterns which are transformed into symbols are themselves guided by a common pragmatic imperative: they must be visible and clear in meaning to large numbers of third generation ethnics, and they must be easily expressed and felt, without requiring undue interference in other aspects of life. For example, Jews have abstracted rites de passage and individual holidays out of the traditional religion and given them greater importance, such as the bar mitzvah and bas mitzvah (the parallel ceremony for 13 year old girls that was actually invented in America). Similarly, Chanukah, a minor holiday in the religious calendar has become a major one in popular practice, partly since it lends itself to impressing Jewish identity on the children. Rites de passage and holidays are ceremonial; and thus symbolic to begin with; equally important, they do not take much time, do not upset the everyday routine, and also become an occasion for family reunions to reassemble family members who are rarely seen on a regular basis. Catholic ethnics pay special attention to saint's days celebrating saints affiliated with their ethnic group, or attend ethnic festivals which take place in the area of first settlement, or in ethnic churches.

Consumer goods, notably food, are another ready source for ethnic symbols, and in the last decades, the food industry has developed a large variety of easily cooked ethnic foods, as well as other edibles which need no cooking, for example, chocolate matzohs which are sold as gifts at Passover, the response to symbolic ethnicity may even be spreading into the mass media, for films and television programs with ethnic characters are on the increase. The characters are not very ethnic in their behavior, and may only have ethnic names - for example, Lt. Colombo, Fonzi, or Rhoda Goldstein — but in that respect, they are not very different from the ethnic audiences who watch them.

Symbolic ethnicity also takes political forms, through identification or involvement with national politicians and international issues which are sufficiently remote to become symbols. As politicians from non-Irish ethnic backgrounds achieve high state or national office, they become identity symbols for members of their group, supplying feelings of pride over their success. That such politicians do not represent ethnic constituencies, and thus do not become involved in ethnic political disputes only enhances their symbolic function; unlike local ethnic politicians, who are still elected for instrumental bread-and-butter reasons, and thus become embroiled in conflicts that detract from their being symbols of ethnic pride.

Symbolic ethnicity can be practiced as well through politically and geographically even more distant phenomena, such as nationalist movements

in the old country. Jews are not interested in their old countries, except to struggle against the maltreatment of Jews in Eastern Europe, but they have sent large amounts of money to Israel, and political pressure to Washington, since the establishment of the State. While their major concern has undoubtedly been to stave off Israel's destruction, they might also have felt that their own identity would be affected by such a disaster. Even if the survival of Israel is guaranteed in the future, however, it is possible that as allegiances toward organized local Jewish communities in America weaken, Israel becomes a substitute community to satisfy identity needs. Similar mechanisms may be at work among other ethnic groups who have recently taken an interest in their ancestral countries, for example the Welsh and Armenians, and among those groups whose old countries are involved in internal conflict, for example the Irish, and Greeks and Turks during the Cyprus war of 1973.

Old countries are particularly useful as identity symbols because they are far away and cannot make arduous demands on American ethnics; even sending large amounts of money is ultimately an easy way to help unless the donors are making major economic sacrifices. Moreover, American ethnics can identify with their perception of the old country or homeland, transforming it into a symbol which leaves out its domestic or foreign problems that could become sources of conflict for Americans. For example, most American Jews who support Israel pay little attention to its purely domestic policies; they are concerned with its preservation as a state and a Jewish homeland, and see the country mainly as a Zionist symbol.

The symbolic functions of old countries are facilitated further when interest in them is historical; when ethnics develop an interest in their old countries as they were during or before the time of the ancestral departure. Marcus Hansen's notion of third-generation return was actually based on the emergence of interest in Swedish history, which suggests that the third generation return may itself only be another variety of symbolic ethnicity. Third generations can obviously attend to the past with less emotional risk than first and second generation people-who are still trying to escape it, but even so, an interest in ethnic history is a return only chronologically.

Conversely, a new symbol may be appearing among Jews: the Holocaust, which has become a historic example of ethnic group destruction that can now serve as a warning sign for possible future threats. The interest of American Jews in the Holocaust has increased considerably since the end of World War II; when I studied the Jews of Park Forest in 1949-1950, it was almost never mentioned, and its memory played no part whatsoever in the creation of a Jewish community there. The lack of attention to the Holocaust at that time may, as Nathan Glazer suggests, reflect the fact that American Jews were busy with creating new Jewish communities in the suburbs. It is also possible that people ignored the Holocaust then because the literature detailing its horrors had not yet been written, although since many second generation American Jews had relatives who died in the Nazi camps, it seems more likely that people repressed thinking about it until it had become a more historical and therefore a less immediately traumatic event. As a result, the Holocaust may now be serving as a new symbol for the threat of group destruction, which is required,

on the one hand, by the fact that rising intermarriage rates and the continued decline of interest and participation in Jewish religion are producing real fears about the disappearance of American Jewry altogether; and on the other hand, by the concurrent fact that American anti-semitism is no longer the serious threat to group destruction that it was for first and second generation Jews. Somewhat the same process appears to be taking place among some young Armenians who are now reviving the history of the Turkish massacre of Armenians some sixty years later, at a time when acculturation and assimilation are beginning to make inroads into the Armenian community in America.

I suggested previously that ethnicity *per se* had become more visible, but many of the symbols used by the third generation are also visible to the rest of America, not only because the middle class people who use them are more visible than their poorer ancestors, but because the national media are more adept at communicating symbols than the ethnic cultures and organizations of earlier generations. The visibility of symbolic ethnicity provides further support for the existence of an ethnic revival, but what appears to be a revival is probably the emergence of a new form of acculturation and assimilation that is taking place under the gaze of the rest of society.

Incidentally, even though the mass media play a major role in enhancing the visibility of ethnicity, and in communicating ethnic symbols, they do not play this role because they are themselves ethnic institutions. True, the mass media, like other entertainment industries, continue to be dominated by Jews (although less so than in the past), but for reasons connected with anti-semitism, or the fear of it, they have generally leaned over backwards to keep Jewish characters and Jewish fare out of their offerings, at least until recently.

Even now, a quantitative analysis of major ethnic characters in comedy, drama and other entertainment genres would surely show that Catholic ethnics outnumber Jewish ones. Perhaps the Jews who write or produce so much of the media fare are especially sensitive to ethnic themes and symbols; my own hypothesis, however, is that they are, in this case as in others, simply responding to new cultural tendencies, if only because they must continually innovate. In fact, the arrival of ethnic characters followed the emergence and heightened visibility of ethnic politics in the late 1960s, and the men and women who write the entertainment fare probably took inspiration from news stories they saw on television or read in the papers.

I noted earlier that identity cannot exist apart from a group and that symbols are themselves part of a culture, and in that sense, symbolic ethnicity can be viewed as an indicator of the persistence of ethnic groups and cultures. Symbolic ethnicity, however, does not require functioning groups or networks; feelings of identity can be developed by allegiances to symbolic groups that never meet, or to collectivities that meet only occasionally, and exist as groups only for the handful of officers that keep them going. By the same token, symbolic ethnicity does not need a practiced culture, even if the symbols are borrowed from it. To be sure, symbolic culture is as much culture as practiced culture, but the latter persists only to supply symbols to the former. Indeed, practiced culture may need to persist, for some, because people do not borrow their symbols from extinct cultures that survive only in museums. And insofar

as the borrowed materials come from the practiced culture of the immigrant generation, they make it appear as if an ethnic revival were taking place.

Then, too, it should be noted that even symbolic ethnicity may be relevant for only some of the descendents of the immigrants. As intermarriage continues, the number of people with parents from the same secular ethnic group will continue to decline, and by the time the fourth generation of the old immigration reaches adulthood, such people may be a minority. Most Catholic ethnics will be hybrid, and will have difficulty developing an ethnic identity. For example, how would the son of an Italian mother and Irish father who has married a woman of Polish-German ancestry determine his ethnicity, and what would he and his wife tell their children? Even if they were willing, would they be able to do so; and in that case to decide their children's ethnicity, how would they rank or synthesize their diverse backgrounds? These questions are empirical, and urgently need to be studied, but I would suggest that there are only three possibilities. Either the parents choose the single ethnic identity they find most satisfying, or they become what I earlier called pan-ethnics, or they cope with diversity by ignoring it, and raise their children as non-ethnic.

6- The emergence of symbolic ethnicity

The preceding observations have suggested that symbolic ethnicity is a new phenomenon that comes into being in the third generation, but it is probably of earlier vintage and may have already begun to emerge among the immigrants themselves. After all, many of the participants in the new immigration were oppressed economically, politically and culturally in their old countries, and could not have had much affection even for the village and regions they were leaving. Consequently, it is entirely possible that they began to jettison the old culture and to stay away from ethnic organizations other than churches and unions the moment they came to America, saving only their primary groups, their ties to relatives still left in Europe, and their identity. **In small town America, where immigrants were a numerically unimportant minority, the pressure for immediate acculturation and assimilation was much greater than in the cities,** but even in the latter, the seeds for symbolic ethnicity may have been sown earlier than previously thought.

Conversely, despite all the pressures toward Americanization and the prejudice and discrimination experienced by the immigrants, they were never faced with conditions that required or encouraged them to give up their ethnicity entirely. Of course, some of the earliest Jewish arrivals to America had become Quakers and Episcopalians before the end of the nineteenth century, but the economic conditions that persuaded the Jamaican Chinese in Kingston to become Creole, and the social isolation that forced Italians in Sydney, Australia, to abolish the traditional familial male-female role segregation shortly after arriving, have never been part of the American experience.

Some conditions for the emergence of symbolic ethnicity were present from the beginning, for American ethnics have always been characterized by freedom of ethnic expression, which stimulated both ethnic diversity, and the right to find one's own way of being ethnic that are crucial to symbolic ethnicity. Although sacred and secular ethnic organizations which insisted that

only one mode of being ethnic was legitimate have always existed in America, they have not been able to enforce their norms, in part because they have always had to compete with other ethnic organizations. Even in ethnic neighborhoods where conformity was expected and social control was pervasive, people had some freedom of choice about ethnic cultural practices. For example, the second generation Boston Italians I studied had to conform to many family and peer group norms, but they were free to ignore ethnic secondary groups, and to drop or alter Italian cultural practices according to their own preference.

Ethnic diversity within the group was probably encouraged by the absence of a state religion, and national and local heads of ethnic communities. For example, American Jewry never had a chief rabbi, or even chief Orthodox, Conservative and Reform rabbis, and the European practice of local Jewish communities electing or appointing local laymen as presidents was not carried across the ocean. Catholic ethnics had to obey the cardinal or bishop heading their diocese, of course, but in those communities where the diocese insisted on an Irish church, the other ethnic groups, notably the Italians, kept their distance from the church, and only in parochial schools was there any attempt to root out secular ethnic patterns. The absence of strong unifying institutions thus created the opportunity for diversity and freedom from the beginning, and undoubtedly facilitated the departure from ethnic cultures and organizations.

Among the Jews, symbolic ethnicity may have been fostered early by self-selection among Jewish emigrants. As Liebman points out, the massive Eastern European immigration to America did not include the rabbis and scholars who practiced what he called an elite religion in the old countries; as a result, the immigrants established what he calls a folk religion in America instead, with indigenous rabbis who were elected or appointed by individual congregations, and were more permissive in allowing, or too weak to prevent, deviations from religious orthodoxy, even of the milder folk variety. Indeed, the development of a folk religion may have encouraged religious and secular diversity among Jews from the very beginning.

Still, perhaps the most important factor in the development of symbolic ethnicity was probably the awareness, which I think many second generation people had already reached, that neither the practice of ethnic culture nor participation in ethnic organizations were essential to being and feeling ethnic. For Jews, living in a Jewish neighborhood or working with Jews every day was enough to maintain Jewish identity. When younger second generation Jews moved to suburbia in large numbers after World War II, many wound up in communities in which they were a small numerical minority, but they quickly established an informal Jewish community of neighborly relations, and then built synagogues and community centers to formalize and supplement the informal community. At the time, many observers interpreted the feverish building as a religious revival, but for most Jews, the synagogue was a symbol that could serve as a means of expressing identity without requiring more than occasional participation in its activities. Thus, my observations among the second generation Jews of Park Forest and other suburbs led me to think as

far back as the mid 1950s that among Jews, at least, the shift to symbolic ethnicity was already under way.

7- The future of ethnicity

The emergence of symbolic ethnicity naturally raises the question of its persistence into the fifth and sixth generations. Although the Catholic and Jewish religions are certain to endure, it appears that as religion becomes less important to people, they, too will be eroded by acculturation and assimilation. Even now, synagogues see most of their worshippers no more than once or twice a year, and presumably, the same trend will appear, perhaps more slowly, among Catholics and Protestants as well.

Whether the secular aspects of ethnicity can survive beyond the fourth generation is somewhat less certain. One possibility is that symbolic ethnicity will itself decline as acculturation and assimilation continue, and then disappear as erstwhile ethnics forget their secular ethnic identity to blend into one or another subcultural melting pot. The other possibility is that symbolic ethnicity is a steady-state phenomenon that can persist into the fifth and sixth generations. Obviously, this question can only be guessed at, but my hypothesis is that symbolic ethnicity may persist. The continued existence of Germans, Scandinavians, and Irish after five or more generations in America suggests that in the larger cities and suburbs, at least, they have remained ethnic because they have long practiced symbolic ethnicity. Consequently, there is good reason to believe that the same process will also take place among ethnics of the new immigration.

Ethnic behavior, attitudes, and even identity are., however, determined not only by what goes on among the ethnics, but also by developments in the larger society, and especially by how that society will treat ethnics in the future; what costs it will levy and what benefits it will award to them as ethnics. At present, the costs of being and feeling ethnic are slight. The changes which the immigrants and their descendants wrought in America now make it unnecessary for ethnics to surrender their ethnicity to gain upward mobility, and today ethnics are admitted virtually everywhere, provided they meet economic and status requirements, except at the very highest levels of the economic, political, and cultural hierarchies. Moreover, since World War II, the ethnics have been able to shoulder blacks and other racial minorities with the deviant and scapegoat functions they performed in an earlier America, so that ethnic prejudice and 'institutional ethnism' are no longer significant, except again at the very top of the societal hierarchies.

To be sure, some ethnic scapegoating persists at other levels of these hierarchies; American Catholics are still blamed for the policies of the Vatican, Italo-Americans are criticized for the Mafia, and urban ethnics generally have been portrayed as racists by a sometime coalition of white and black Protestant, Jewish, and other upper-middle class cosmopolitans. But none of these phenomena, however repugnant, strike me as serious enough to persuade many to hide their ethnicity. More important but less often noticed, white working class men, and perhaps others, still use ethnic stereotypes to trade insults, but this practice serves functions other than the maintenance of prejudice or inequality.

At the same time, the larger society also seems to offer some benefits for being ethnic. **Americans increasingly perceive themselves as undergoing cultural homogenization, and whether or not this perception is justified, they are constantly looking for new ways to establish their differences from each other.** Meanwhile, the social, cultural and political turbulence of the last decade, and the concurrent delegitimation of many American institutions have also cast doubt on some of the other ways by which people identify themselves and differentiate themselves from each other. Ethnicity, now that it is respectable and no longer a major cause of conflict, seems therefore to be ideally suited to serve as a distinguishing characteristic. Moreover, **in a mobile society**, people who move around and therefore often find themselves living in communities of strangers, tend to look for commonalities that make strangers into neighbors, and shared ethnicity may provide mobile people with at least an initial excuse to get together. Finally, as long as the European immigration into America continues, people will still be perceived, classified, and ranked at least in part by ethnic origin. Consequently, external forces exist to complement internal identity needs, and unless there is a drastic change in the allocation of costs and benefits with respect to ethnicity, it seems likely that the larger society will also encourage the persistence of symbolic ethnicity.

Needless to say, it is always possible that future economic and political conditions in American society will create a demand for new scapegoats, and if ethnics are forced into this role, so that ethnicity once more levies social costs, present tendencies will be interrupted. Under such conditions, some ethnics will try to assimilate faster and pass out of all ethnic roles, while others will revitalize the ethnic group socially and culturally if only for self-protection. Still, the chance that Catholic ethnics will be scapegoated more than today seems very slight. A serious economic crisis could, however, result in a resurgence of anti-semitism, in part because of the affluence of many American Jews, in part because of their visibly influential role in some occupations, notably mass communications.

If present societal trends continue, however, symbolic ethnicity should become the dominant way of being ethnic by the time the fourth generation of the new immigration matures into adulthood, and this in turn will have consequences for the structure of American ethnic groups. For one thing, as secondary and primary assimilation continue, and ethnic networks weaken and unravel, it may be more accurate to speak of ethnic aggregates rather than groups. More important, since symbolic ethnicity does not depend on ethnic cultures and organizations, their future decline and disappearance must be expected, particularly those cultural patterns which interfere with other aspects of life, and those organizations which require active membership. Few such patterns and organizations are left in any case, and leaders of the remaining organizations have long been complaining bitterly over what they perceive as the cultural and organizational apathy of ethnics. They also criticize the resort to symbolic ethnicity, identifying it as an effortless way of being ethnic which further threatens their own persistence. Even so, attacking people as apathetic or lazy, or calling on them to revive the practices and loyalties of the past have never been effective for engendering support, and reflect instead

the desperation of organizations which cannot offer new incentives that would enable them to recruit members.

Some cultural patterns and organizations will survive. Patterns which lend themselves to transformation into symbols and easy practice, such as annual holidays, should persist. So will organizations which create and distribute symbols, or 'ethnic goods' such as foodstuffs or written materials, but need few or no members and can function with small staffs and low overheads. In all likelihood, most ethnic organizations will eventually realize that in order to survive, they must deal mainly in symbols, using them to generate enough support to fund other activities as well.

The demand for current ethnic symbols may require the maintenance of at least some old cultural practices, possibly in museums, and through the work of ethnic scholars who keep old practices alive by studying them. It is even possible that *the* organizations which attempt to maintain the old cultures will support themselves in part by supplying ethnic nostalgia, and some ethnics may aid such organizations if only to assuage their guilt at having given up ancestral practices.

Still, the history of religion and nationalism, as well as events of recent years, should remind us that the social process sometimes moves in dialectical ways, and that acculturative and assimilative actions by a majority occasionally generate revivalistic reactions by a minority. As a result, even ethnic aggregates in which the vast majority maintains its identity in symbolic ways will probably always bring forth small pockets of neo-traditionalism — of rebel converts to sacred and secular ways of the past. They may not influence the behavior of the majority, but they are almost always highly visible, and will thus continue to play a role in the ethnicity of the future.

8- Symbolic ethnicity and straight-line theory

The third and fourth generation's concern with ethnic identity and its expression through symbols seem to me to fit straight-line theory, for symbolic ethnicity cannot be considered as evidence either of a third generation return or a revival. Instead, it constitutes only another point in the secular trend that is drawn, implicitly, in straight-line theory, although it could also be a point at which the declining secular trend begins to level off and perhaps straightens out.

In reality, of course, the straight-line has never been quite straight, for even if it accurately graphs the dominant ethnic experience, it ignores the ethnic groups who still continue to make tiny small bumps and waves in the line. Among these are various urban and rural ethnic enclaves, notably among the poor; the new European immigrants who help to keep these enclaves from disappearing; the groups which successfully insulate themselves from the rest of American society in deliberately-enclosed enclaves; and the rebel converts to sacred and secular ways of the past who will presumably continue to appear.

Finally, even if I am right to predict that symbolic ethnicity can persist into the fifth and sixth generations, I would be foolish to suggest that it is a permanent phenomenon. Although all Americans, save the Indians, came here as immigrants and are thus in one sense ethnics, people who arrived in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and before the mid-nineteenth century

'old' immigration, are, except in some rural enclaves, no longer ethnics even if they know where their emigrant ancestors came from.

The history of groups whose ancestors arrived here seven or more generations ago suggests that eventually, the ethnics of the new immigration will be like them; they may retain American forms of the religions which then ancestors brought to America, but their secular cultures will be only a dim memory, and their identity will bear only the minutest trace, if that, of their national origin. Ultimately, then, the secular trend of straight-line theory will hit very close to zero, and the basic postulates of the theory will turn out to have been accurate — unless of course by then America, and the ways it makes Americans, has altered drastically in some now unpredictable manner.

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W. E. Burghardt **Du Bois**, "Strivings of the Negro People"

Originally published in *The Atlantic Monthly* August 1897

Between me and the other world there is ever an unasked question: unasked by some through feelings of delicacy; by others through the difficulty of rightly framing it. All, nevertheless, flutter round it. They approach me in a half-hesitant sort of way, eye me curiously or compassionately, and then, instead of saying directly, How does it feel to be a problem? they say, I know an excellent colored man in my town; or I fought at Mechanicsville; or, Do not these Southern outrages make your blood boil? At these I smile, or am interested, or reduce the boiling to a simmer, as the occasion may require. To the real question, How does it feel to be a problem? I answer seldom a word.

And yet, being a problem is a strange experience, -- peculiar even for one who has never been anything else, save perhaps in babyhood and in Europe. It is in the early days of rollicking boyhood that the revelation first burst upon one, all in a day, as it were. I remember well when the shadow swept across me. I was a little thing, away up in the hills of New England, where the dark Housatonic winds between Hoosac and Taghanic to the sea. In a wee wooden schoolhouse, something put it into the boys' and girls' heads to buy gorgeous visiting-cards -- ten cents a package -- and exchange. The exchange was merry, till one girl, a tall newcomer, refused my card, -- refused it peremptorily, with a glance. Then it dawned upon me with a certain suddenness that I was different from the others; or like, mayhap, in heart and life and longing, but shut out from their world by a vast veil. I had thereafter no desire to tear down that veil, to creep through; I held all beyond it in common contempt, and lived above it in a region of blue sky and great wandering shadows. That sky was bluest when I could beat my mates at examination-time, or beat them at a foot-race, or even beat their stringy heads. Alas, with the years all this fine contempt began to fade; for the world I longed for, and all its dazzling opportunities, were theirs, not mine. But they should not keep these prizes, I said; some, all, I would wrest from them. Just how I would do it I could never decide: by reading law, by healing the sick, by telling the wonderful tales that swam in my head, -- some way.

With other black boys the strife was not so fiercely sunny: their youth shrunk into tasteless sycophancy, or into silent hatred of the pale world about them and mocking distrust of everything white; or wasted itself in a bitter cry, Why did God make me an outcast and a stranger in mine own house? The "shades of the prison-house" closed round about us all: walls strait and stubborn to the whitest, but relentlessly narrow, tall, and unscalable to sons of night who must plod darkly against the stone, or steadily, half hopelessly watch the streak of blue above. After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and **gifted with second-sight in this American world**, -- a world which yields him no self-consciousness, but only **lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world**. It is a peculiar sensation, **this double-consciousness**, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One feels his two-ness, -- an American, a Negro;

two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife, -- this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. In this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He does not wish to Africanize America, for America has too much to teach the world and Africa; he does not wish to bleach his Negro blood in a flood of white Americanism, for he believes -- foolishly, perhaps, but fervently -- that Negro blood has yet a message for the world. He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American without being cursed and spit upon by his fellows, without losing the opportunity of self-development.

This is the end of his striving: to be a co-worker in the kingdom of culture, to escape both death and isolation, and to husband and use his best powers. These powers, of body and of mind, have in the past been so wasted and dispersed as to lose all effectiveness, and to seem like absence of all power, like weakness. The double-aimed struggle of the black artisan, on the one hand to escape white contempt for a nation of mere hewers of wood and drawers of water, and on the other hand to plough and nail and dig for a poverty-stricken horde, could only result in making him a poor craftsman, for he had but half a heart in either cause. By the poverty and ignorance of his people the Negro lawyer or doctor was pushed toward quackery and demagogism, and by the criticism of the other world toward an elaborate preparation that over-fitted him for his lowly tasks. The would-be black-savant was confronted by the paradox that the knowledge his people needed was a twice-told tale to his white neighbors, while the knowledge which would teach the white world was Greek to his own flesh and blood. The innate love of harmony and beauty that set the ruder souls of his people a-dancing, a-singing, and a-laughing raised but confusion and doubt in the soul of the black artist; for the beauty revealed to him was the soul-beauty of a race which his larger audience despised, and he could not articulate the message of another people.

This waste of double aims, this seeking to satisfy two unreconciled ideals, has wrought sad havoc with the courage and faith and deeds of eight thousand people, has sent them often wooing false gods and invoking false means of salvation, and has even at times seemed destined to make them ashamed of themselves. In the days of bondage they thought to see in one divine event the end of all doubt and disappointment; eighteenth-century Rousseauism never worshiped freedom with half the unquestioning faith that the American Negro did for two centuries. To him slavery was, indeed, the sum of all villainies, the cause of all sorrow, the root of all prejudice; emancipation was the key to a promised land of sweeter beauty than ever stretched before the eyes of wearied Israelites. In his songs and exhortations swelled one refrain, liberty; in his tears and curses the god he implored had freedom in his right hand. At last it came, -- suddenly, fearfully, like a dream. With one wild carnival of blood and passion came the message in his own plaintive cadences: --

Shout, O children! Shout,
you're free!
The Lord has bought your liberty!

Years have passed away, ten, twenty, thirty. Thirty years of national life, thirty years of renewal and development, and yet the swarthy ghost of Banquo sits in its old place at the national feast. In vain does the nation cry to its vastest problem, --

Take any shape but that, and my firm nerves
Shall never tremble!

The freedman has not yet found in freedom his promised land. Whatever of lesser good may have come in these years of change, the shadow of a deep disappointment rests upon the Negro people, -- a disappointment all the more bitter because the unattained ideal was unbounded save by the simple ignorance of a lowly folk.

The first decade was merely a prolongation of the vain search for freedom, the boon that seemed ever barely to elude their grasp, -- like a tantalizing will-o'-the wisp, maddening and misleading the headless host. The holocaust of war, the terrors of the Kuklux Klan, the lies of carpet-baggers, the disorganization of industry, and the contradictory advice of friends and foes left the bewildered serf with no new watchword beyond the old cry for freedom. As the decade closed, however, he began to grasp a new idea. The ideal of liberty demanded for its attainment powerful means, and these the Fifteenth Amendment gave him. The ballot, which before he had looked upon as a visible sign of freedom, he now regarded as the chief means of gaining and perfecting the liberty with which war had partially endowed him. And why not? Had not votes made war and emancipated millions?

Had not votes enfranchised the freedmen? Was anything impossible to a power that had done all this? A million black men started with renewed zeal to vote themselves into the kingdom. The decade fled away, -- a decade containing, to the freedman's mind, nothing but suppressed votes, stuffed ballot-boxes, and election outrages that nullified his vaunted right of suffrage. And yet that decade from 1875 to 1885 held another powerful movement, the rise of another ideal to guide the unguided, another pillar of fire by night after a clouded day. It was the ideal of "book-learning;" the curiosity, born of compulsory ignorance, to know and test the power of the cabalistic letters of the white man, the longing to know. Mission and night schools began in the smoke of battle, ran the gauntlet of reconstruction and at last developed into permanent foundations. Here at last seemed to have been discovered the mountain path to Canaan; longer than the highway of emancipation and law, steep and rugged, but straight, leading to heights high enough to overlook life.

Up the new path the advance guard toiled, slowly, heavily, doggedly; only those who have watched and guided the faltering feet, the misty minds, the dull understandings, of the dark pupils of these schools know how faithfully, how piteously, this people strove to learn. It was weary work. The cold statistician wrote down the inches of progress here and there, noted also where here and there a foot had slipped or some one had fallen. To the tired climbers, the horizon was ever dark, the mists were often cold, the Canaan was always dim and far away. If, however, the vistas disclosed as yet no goal,

no resting-place, little but flattery and criticism, the journey at least gave leisure for reflection and self-examination; it changed the child of emancipation to the youth with dawning self-consciousness, self-realization, self-respect. In those sombre forests of his striving his own soul rose before him, and he saw himself, -- darkly as through a veil; and yet he saw in himself some faint revelation of his power, of his mission. He began to have a dim feeling that, to attain his place in the world, he must be himself, and not another.

For the first time he sought to analyze the burden he bore upon his back, that dead- weight of social degradation partially masked behind a half-named Negro problem. He felt his poverty; without a cent, without a home, without land, tools, or savings, he had entered into competition with rich landed, skilled neighbors. To be a poor man is hard, but to be a poor race in a land of dollars is the very bottom of hardships. He felt the weight of his ignorance, -- not simply of letters, but of life, of business, of the humanities; the accumulated sloth and shirking and awkwardness of decades and centuries shackled his hands and feet. Nor was his burden all poverty and ignorance. The red stain of bastardy, which two centuries of systematic legal defilement of Negro women had stamped upon his race, meant not only the loss of ancient African chastity, but also the hereditary weight of a mass of filth from white whoremongers and adulterers, threatening almost the obliteration of the Negro home.

A people thus handicapped ought not to be asked to race with the world, but rather allowed to give all its time and thought to its own social problems. But alas! while sociologists gleefully count his bastards and his prostitutes, the very soul of the toiling, sweating black man is darkened by the shadow of a vast despair. Men call the shadow prejudice, and learnedly explain it as the natural defense of culture against barbarism, learning against ignorance, purity against crime, the "higher" against the "lower" races. To which the Negro cries Amen! and swears that to so much this strange prejudice as is founded on just homage to civilization, culture, righteousness, and progress he humbly bows and meekly does obeisance. But before that nameless prejudice that leaps beyond all this he stands helpless, dismayed, and well-nigh speechless; before that personal disrespect and mockery, the ridicule and systematic humiliation, the distortion of fact and wanton license of fancy, the cynical ignoring of the better and boisterous welcoming of the worse, the all-pervading desire to inculcate disdain for everything black, from Toussaint to the devil, -- before this there rises a sickening despair that would disarm and discourage any nation save that black host to whom "discouragement" is an unwritten word.

They still press on, they still nurse the dogged hope, -- not a hope of nauseating patronage, not a hope of reception into charmed social circles of stock-jobbers, pork-packers, and earl-hunters, but the hope of a higher synthesis of civilization and humanity, a true progress, with which the chorus "Peace, good will to men,"

May make one music as before,
But vaster.

Thus the second decade of the American Negro's freedom was a period of conflict, of inspiration and doubt, of faith and vain questionings, of Sturm und Drang. The ideals of physical freedom, of political power, of school training, as separate all-sufficient panaceas for social ills, became in the third decade dim and overcast. They were the vain dreams of credulous race childhood; not wrong, but incomplete and over-simple. The training of the schools we need to-day more than ever, -- the training of deft hands, quick eyes and ears, and the broader, deeper, higher culture of gifted minds. The power of the ballot we need in sheer self-defense, and as a guarantee of good faith. We may misuse it, but we can scarce do worse in this respect than our whilom masters. Freedom, too, the long-sought, we still seek, -- the freedom of life and limb, the freedom to work and think. Work, culture, and liberty -- all these we need, not singly, but together; for to-day these ideals among the Negro people are gradually coalescing, and finding a higher meaning in the unifying ideal of race, -- the ideal of fostering the traits and talents of the Negro, not in opposition to, but in conformity with, the greater ideals of the American republic, in order that some day, on American soil, two world races may give each to each those characteristics which both so sadly lack. Already we come not altogether empty-handed: there is to-day no true American music but the sweet wild melodies of the Negro slave; the American fairy tales are Indian and African; we are the sole oasis of simple faith and reverence in a dusty desert of dollars and smartness. Will America be poorer if she replace her brutal, dyspeptic blundering with the light-hearted but determined Negro humility; or her coarse, cruel wit with loving, jovial good humor; or her Annie Rooney with Steal Away?

Merely a stern concrete test of the underlying principles of the great republic is the Negro problem, and the spiritual striving of the freedmen's sons is the travail of souls whose burden is almost beyond the measure of their strength, but who bear it in the name of an historic race, in the name of this the land of their fathers' fathers, and in the name of human opportunity.

#

Deanna **Othman**, "Will Muslims ever be part and parcel of America?" *Chicago Tribune* (February 13, 2015):1;22

As Muslim-Americans, we constantly reassure ourselves. Get an education. Excel in your fields. Be that Muslim you wish the media could see; be the "moderate" they are looking for. And things will change. People will open up their minds and hearts. They will see beyond ISIS and 9/11; they will realize you are not Boko Haram and you do not stand for the murder of innocents. And they will accept you. They will embrace you.

But then a tragedy of the magnitude of the Chapel Hill, N.C., murders occurs [where three Muslims, Deah 23, his wife Yosur 21, and her sister Razan 19, were killed], and you realize this may all be a farce. Your worst fear, the one you suppress and relegate to the recesses of your mind, becomes a reality. You realize that you could be the top of your class and give back to your community — be the model citizen. You could even voice your disapproval at every possible act of violence you may or may not be falsely identified with, constantly justifying and rejustifying the legitimacy of your faith, screaming from the rooftops #JeSuisCharlie and #NotInMyName. You could use the hashtags, lead the protests and issue the requested and expected condemnations.

And you could still be a target.

You ask yourself: Are we destined to remain "otherized," categorically excluded, alienated and repelled from the very society in which we live? Must we constantly assert our Americanness and prove our loyalty, only to be demonized, vilified and caricatured by our media?

It is exhausting to feel compelled to constantly validate your identity. Must Muslims be paragons of excellence, lest there be a motive found for their murder other than sheer hatred? Littering? Running a stop sign? Being too loud? Existing?

The overwhelming sense of grief many Muslim-Americans felt following the cold-blooded murder Tuesday in Chapel Hill of Deah Shaddy Barakat, 23, his wife, Yusor Mohammad, 21, and her sister Razan Mohammad Abu-Salha, 19, hit us directly in our hearts. We are them. They represent us, everything we grew up with — our lifestyles, our identities, our faith. They embody what our communities tried to instill, and continue to struggle to instill, in young Muslims growing up in this country — a sense of pride in their faith and a sense of devotion to their fellow man.

The Islamophobia propagated by media — whether in the form of sensationalist news coverage, providing a platform for the rabid hate speech of right-wing politicians, or stereotypical film plots and the lionization of "heroes" such as American sniper Christopher Kyle — is palpable and has very real consequences for Muslim-Americans. It is not a figment of our imaginations;

we are not being dramatic, nor are we exaggerating the effects of such rhetoric. It is time for those who rile up the public and fuel virulent racism and Islamophobia with their unfounded claims and ignorant assertions to take responsibility for the consequences of their heedless and insidious speech.

I believe in divine justice, and to me, it is no accident that the three victims of this heinous crime were not just ordinary Americans — they were extraordinary. They excelled academically, were active socially and gave to humanity. There is divine wisdom in having their uplifting stories told, and it is devastating that it took their murders to compel network news to broadcast such inspirational stories of Muslim-Americans.

It was just last week I stood in front of my classroom full of Muslim high school juniors, discussing with them the poetic insight of Walt Whitman, who envisioned an America that was robust and free; a "teeming nation of nations" that encompassed the dreams, ideals and philosophies of those who landed on her shores. We analyzed and dissected Whitman's prose and poetry, asking ourselves, where do we as Muslims fit into this narrative? Do we belong in Whitman's America? Are Muslims part and parcel of this nation? Can we ever be?

I didn't have a definitive answer for them then. And I certainly don't have one now. But I do know that Whitman also said, "The largeness of nature or the nation were monstrous without a corresponding largeness and generosity of the spirit of the citizen."

Deah, Yosur and Razan were those citizens. And we will never forget their legacies.

#

James **Fallows**, “Review of *Fields of Blood* by Karen Armstrong,”
New York Times Book Review, December 10, 2014

Just after finishing Karen Armstrong’s new book, I happened to hear a discussion on television about the latest outbreak of violence in the Middle East. “We have to hope that this disagreement stays on the political level, rather than becoming a religious dispute,” one of the experts said. “Political differences can be resolved. Religious ones cannot.”

“Fields of Blood” can be thought of as a long, wide-ranging and overall quite effective rebuttal to the outlook expressed in that comment. “In the West, the idea that religion is inherently violent is now taken for granted and seems self-evident,” Armstrong says on the book’s first page. It follows that the main hope for peace is to keep faith and statecraft separate.

Armstrong, a onetime Roman Catholic nun and the author of several influential works on religion including “A History of God,” argues that this is an incorrect diagnosis leading to a flawed prescription. The page-by-page detail of the book is much of the reason to read it, but if you reduced its complexities and tangles to their essence, they would amount to these three points:

First, through most of human history, people have chosen to intertwine religion with all their other activities, including, notably, how they are governed. This was “not because ambitious churchmen had ‘mixed up’ two essentially distinct activities,” she says, “but because people wanted to endow everything they did with significance.”

Second, this involvement with politics means that religions have often been tied up with violence: Crusaders, conquistadors, jihadists and many more. But — a point Armstrong cares about so much that she makes it dozens of times — the violence almost always originates with the state and spills over to religion, rather than vice versa. This, she says, is because any governing body, democratic or tyrannical, peace-loving or expansionist, “was obliged to maintain at its heart an institution committed to treachery and violence,” and because “violence and coercion . . . lay at the heart of social existence.” The earliest states required force to maintain systems of agricultural production; mature ones found that the threat of violence — by police within their borders, by armies between them — was, sadly, the best way to keep the peace.

Third, citizens thus face the duty of confronting and trying to control violence carried out in their name by the state, without blaming religion for it or imagining that the solution lies in a cleaner separation of church and state. This extends to understanding the roots of violence or terrorism directed against them: “As an inspiration for terrorism . . . nationalism has been far more productive than religion.” And religions face the dilemma of whether to accept the protection of a state, and the threat of violence that necessarily entails, or to live in hermetic isolation.

Armstrong develops this argument through the interacting evolutions of religion and government from Mesopotamian times onward. She has sections on the rise of Zoroastrianism in Persia, on the Sanskrit-speaking Aryans four millennia ago in India, on the early formation of the Chinese state — and that is before her multi-chapter examination of the development of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. She then explores the best-known examples of violence

involving each of these faiths, from the Spanish Inquisition of the 15th century to the Islamic (and other) extremists of the 21st, including ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel. In nearly all cases, she argues, violent impulses that originated elsewhere — with nationalism, struggles for territory, resentment at loss of power — may have presented themselves as “religious” disputes but really had little to do with faith.

I doubt many readers will be able to assess Armstrong’s handling of every bit of this vast saga. Certainly I cannot. But when she touches on areas I do know about, mainly involving the histories of the United States, Japan and China, she seems careful, fair and true. This naturally inclines me to trust her elsewhere.

Apart from its larger argument, the book is packed with little insights and discoveries. For instance, on the “especially psychotic” nature of the First Crusade, about 1,000 years ago: “From all accounts, the Crusaders seemed half-crazed,” she says. “For three years, they had had no normal dealings with the world around them, and prolonged terror and malnutrition made them susceptible to abnormal states of mind.” Armstrong makes the following observation about Jews in the time of Jesus, but it applies to the modern tragedy of Tibet and elsewhere: “Once colonized, a people often depends heavily on their religious practices, over which they still have some control and which recall a time when they had the dignity of freedom.” And through a connection too complex to explain fully here, she traces many of today’s bitter American faith-versus-science disputes on evolution, same-sex rights and climate change to world events a century ago. “Their horrified recoil from the violence of the First World War also led American fundamentalists to veto modern science,” since the science of killing had reached new heights in the Great War.

So convincing is Armstrong’s overall case that I wish she had not tried to make it airtight. Even in episodes that would seem to have some religious element, she is at pains to say that the origins must be seen as wholly political. The Muslim-Hindu violence that followed the end of the Raj and the partition between India and Pakistan? “Muslims and Hindus would both fall prey to the besetting sin of secular nationalism: its inability to tolerate minorities. And because their outlook was still permeated by spirituality, this nationalist bias distorted their traditional religious vision.” The massacre of Muslim Bosnians, by Orthodox Serbians, in the Bosnian war of the early 1990s? “Despite the widespread assumption in the West that . . . the violence was ineradicable because of its strong ‘religious’ element, this communal intolerance was relatively new” — and based, again she argues, on political disagreements. If the Taliban or Islamic State marauders cite their faith as justification for their killing, that is, Armstrong says, a sign not that they’ve spent too much time with the Quran, but too little — and have ignored (among teachings that are as internally contradictory as those of the Old and New Testaments) the many passages exhorting mercy and tolerance. The argument comes right to the edge of tautology in suggesting that if a religion seems to provoke violence, then it’s not properly a religion at all but rather a manifestation of state power.

But only to the edge. Armstrong demonstrates again and again that the great spasms of cruelty and killing through history have had little or no religious overlay. In modern times Hitler, Stalin and Mao were all atheists, and

the power behind the Holocaust, Armstrong says, was an ethnic rather than a religious hatred. An overemphasis on religion's damage can blind people to the nonholy terrors that their states inflict.

I generally end up judging books in two ways: by whether I can remember them and whether they change the way I think about the world. It's too soon to know about the first test, but on the basis of the second I recommend "Fields of Blood."

FIELDS OF BLOOD: Religion and the History of Violence By Karen
Armstrong 512 pp. Alfred A. Knopf.

#

Mary **Hudetz**, “**Native Americans Push to Rename Columbus Day**”

Chicago Tribune (October 11, 2015)

<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-columbus-day-name-20151011-story.html>

More cities are recognizing Native Americans on Columbus Day this year as they revive a movement to change the name of the holiday to celebrate the history and contributions of indigenous cultures around the country.

As the U.S. observes Columbus Day on Monday, it will also be Indigenous Peoples Day in at least nine cities for the first time this year, including Albuquerque; Portland, Oregon; St. Paul, Minnesota; and Olympia, Washington.

Encouraged by city council votes in Minneapolis and Seattle last year, Native American activists made a push in dozens of cities in recent months to get local leaders to officially recognize the second Monday of October as Indigenous Peoples Day. Their success was mixed.

The campaigns say the federal holiday honoring Christopher Columbus — and the parades and pageantry accompanying it — overlook a painful history of colonialism, enslavement, discrimination and land grabs that followed the Italian explorer’s 1492 arrival in the Americas. The indigenous holiday takes into account the history and contributions of Native Americans for a more accurate historical record, activists have argued.

Columbus Day supporters say the holiday celebrates centuries of cultural exchange between America and Europe, commemorates an iconic explorer and honors Italian-Americans, a group that has endured its own share of discrimination.

“For the Native community here, Indigenous Peoples Day means a lot. We actually have something,” said Nick Estes of Albuquerque, who is coordinating a celebration Monday after the City Council recently issued a proclamation. “We understand it’s just a proclamation, but at the same time, we also understand this is the beginning of something greater.”

Native Americans are the nation’s smallest demographic, making up about 2 percent of the U.S. population. In recent decades, a significant number of tribal members have moved from reservations to urban areas, where a large majority live today. The shift makes the cities’ resolutions and proclamations more meaningful, Estes said.

Congress set aside the second Monday of October as a federal holiday honoring Columbus in 1934. Over the years, Native Americans have slowly begun winning more recognition around the day.

South Dakota renamed Columbus Day to Native American Day in 1990, and it has been an official state holiday ever since. Berkeley, California, has observed Indigenous Peoples Day since 1992.

Parades and festivals that developed around Columbus Day have faced protests that are known for being confrontational, especially in Denver. Anna Vann, a longtime member of the Sons of Italy’s Denver Lodge, recalls protests during the 1992 parade, which marked the 500th anniversary of Columbus’ voyage, as the most unnerving and pivotal.

That year, protesters blocked the parade route for several hours, she said. After that, the parade wasn’t held again until 2000, and it has been difficult to make it the draw it once was, she said.

“It’s been a struggle to even get people to come and attend the parades as spectators,” Vann said. “It’s a celebration of when the Europeans came over and started their lives here. We wouldn’t be where we are today if it weren’t for this history.”

The renewed push for Indigenous Peoples Day carries the sentiment of past decades’ protests against Columbus, but it has proven less confrontational, with advocates instead finding traction at City Hall.

“They really didn’t prove anything,” Rey Garduno, an Albuquerque city councilman and longtime community organizer, said of the confrontational protests. “Whatever victory people took from them, you still ended up at the end of the day in the same place or even worse.”

#

Rohit Kumar, “Why Preserving Ancestral Languages Is Key for Uplifting Immigrant American Communities,”

Huffington Post blog, 04/23/2013

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rohit-kumar/an-indianamerican-relearn_b_3111708.html

The first language through which I perceived the world was Hindi -- the language of Northern India. As I entered kindergarten, I distinctly remember a classroom atmosphere of condescension towards my language. I'm sure that many other schools were different, but that was the tone in my school. As I spent more time in that environment, I slowly began to lose fluency in my own ancestral language. Hindi eventually became a memory stored in the back of my mind. Like so many other children of immigrants in America, English became the only language I could speak fluently.

Language loss among immigrant cultures in the United States is a symptom of many forces operating together. Mass media, the education system, and employment requirements are all parts of the reason. However, I believe the root cause lies with the ugly legacy of centuries of colonialism. Many non-white peoples have been made to feel that their language and culture is somehow lesser.

Eliminating the language of a culture was a primary strategy used by colonialists to assimilate, fragment, and ultimately control peoples. In the United States, Native Americans were taken from their tribes and placed in English schools where they were not allowed to speak their own language. The modern day language loss of so many immigrant children like myself shows that some element of that assimilationist attitude still exists in American schools -- even if it's not as overt as before.

Language is like a programming for the mind -- it shapes our perception of ourselves and our world. Each culture's language is the embodiment of its unique outlook on life. When I lost Hindi, I lost the key to identifying with my own people -- like losing the ability to tune into a certain frequency.

Without our ancestral languages, we may look like one another, but we've lost one of our deepest common bonds. We become isolated from our communities -- unable to relate to each other all that differently than we would with a white person, or someone from another culture. A unique and special bond forms when two Armenian-Americans meet and can converse in Armenian, or when Korean-Americans converse in Korean.

Our language unites us. Speaking our language among our people keeps our culture alive, gives us pride in ourselves, and strengthens our bonds. This is why preserving our ancestral languages is key to uplifting our condition in America: language unites us and united we are strong. Divided we are weak.

Although personal sentiments toward immigrant cultures have improved since the time of legislation like the Chinese Exclusion Act, we all know that we're still far from having a fair and equitable system. Non-white communities in America still face systemic prejudice in almost every aspect of their interaction with the establishment. In addition to this, we have less wealth, less social and political power, less access to fresh food, and we tend to live in more polluted inland and urban areas with dirtier water. Our condition needs

to be improved. Language loss is fragmenting us. Preserving our languages will help us to maintain more cohesive and strong communities. And strong communities can advocate for themselves.

Children of immigrants like me were socialized as minorities within a majority white culture. Growing up, I feel that they made it seem like European-American culture, historically and currently, has everything right and is always on the path towards progress. On the other hand, cultures like my own had gotten it wrong. It felt like they were saying that we had fallen behind and our cultures were backward.

When I started college at Berkeley, I took it upon myself to relearn Hindi. I took Hindi classes at Berkeley, and arranged to study for a semester abroad in India, during which time I studied more Hindi. After graduating, I went back to the same language school that I went to during my semester abroad, and spent nearly half a year single-mindedly focused on learning Hindi. I regained my verbal fluency completely, and now I can also read and write Hindi with proficiency.

I think that when you know your ancestral language, you can fully understand your culture. You can see that in many spheres, your culture possesses profound wisdom and insight. For example, in the Hindi language, the words for tomorrow and yesterday are the same word: "kal." This reflects the Indian culture's cyclical view of time, in contrast to the Western conception of time as linear. Indians believe in rebirth -- not only of people but of the universe itself. During my time in India when I was fully immersed in Hindi, even dreaming in Hindi, I felt how the rhythm of the language made the rhythm of my life different. Life was slower and more musical. It was and is uplifting for me to tune into this different frequency through language.

Connecting with the ancient and historical truths of my culture -- which are embedded in the language -- has been empowering for me. And I think it would be empowering for any immigrant American to maintain this bond with their culture and community.

#

Carol **Anderson**, “White rage doesn’t have to take to the streets: The historic resistance to racial progress,” *Chicago Tribune* (November 26, 2014): 1;23

When we look back on what happened in Ferguson, Mo., during the summer of 2014, it will be easy to think of it as yet one more episode of black rage ignited by yet another police killing of an unarmed African-American male.

But that has it precisely backward. What we’ve actually seen is the latest outbreak of white rage. Sure, it is cloaked in the niceties of law and order, but it is rage nonetheless.

Protests and looting naturally capture attention. But the real rage smolders in meetings where officials redraw precincts to dilute African-American voting strength or seek to slash the government payrolls that have long served as sources of black employment.

It goes virtually unnoticed, however, because white rage doesn’t have to take to the streets and face rubber bullets to be heard. Instead, white rage carries an aura of respectability and has access to the courts, police, legislatures and governors, who cast its efforts as noble, though they are actually driven by the most ignoble motivations.

White rage recurs in American history. It exploded after the Civil War, erupted again to undermine the Supreme Court’s *Brown v. Board of Education* decision and took on its latest incarnation with Barack Obama’s ascent to the White House. For every action of African-American advancement, there’s a reaction, a backlash.

The North’s victory in the Civil War did not bring peace. Instead, emancipation brought white resentment that the good ol’ days of black subjugation were over. Legislatures throughout the South scrambled to reinscribe white supremacy and restore the aura of legitimacy that the antislavery campaign had tarnished. Lawmakers in several states created the Black Codes, which effectively criminalized blackness, sanctioned forced labor and undermined every tenet of democracy. Even the federal authorities’ promise of 40 acres — land seized from traitors who had tried to destroy the United States of America — crumbled like dust.

Influential white legislators such as Rep. Thaddeus Stevens, R-Pa., and Sen. Charles Sumner, R-Mass., tried to make this nation live its creed, but they were no match for the swelling resentment that neutralized the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments, and welcomed the Supreme Court’s 1876 *United States v. Cruikshank* decision, which undercut a law aimed at stopping the terror of the Ku Klux Klan.

Nearly 80 years later, *Brown v. Board of Education* seemed like another moment of triumph — with the ruling on the unconstitutionality of separate public schools for black and white students affirming African-Americans’ rights as citizens. But black children, hungry for quality education, ran headlong into more white rage. Bricks and mobs at school doors were only the most obvious signs. In March 1956, 101 members of Congress issued the Southern Manifesto, declaring war on the *Brown* decision. Governors in Virginia,

Arkansas, Alabama, Georgia and elsewhere then launched “massive resistance.” They created a legal doctrine, interposition, that supposedly nullified any federal law or court decision with which a state disagreed. They passed legislation to withhold public funding from any school that abided by Brown. They shut down public school systems and used tax dollars to ensure that whites could continue their education at racially exclusive private academies. Black children were left to rot with no viable option.

A little more than half a century after Brown, the election of Obama gave hope to the country and the world that a new racial climate had emerged in America, or that it would. But such audacious hopes would be short-lived. A rash of voter-suppression legislation, a series of unfathomable Supreme Court decisions, the rise of stand-your-ground laws and continuing police brutality make clear that Obama’s election and re-election have unleashed yet another wave of fear and anger.

It’s more subtle — less overtly racist — than in 1865 or even 1954. It’s a remake of the Southern Strategy, crafted in the wake of the civil rights movement to exploit white resentment against African-Americans, and deployed with precision by Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan.

As Reagan’s key political strategist, Lee Atwater, explained in a 1981 interview: “You start out in 1954 by saying, ‘N-----, n-----, n-----.’ By 1968 you can’t say ‘n-----’ — that hurts you. Backfires. So you say stuff like ‘forced busing,’ ‘states’ rights’ and all that stuff. You’re getting so abstract now you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are totally economic things, and a byproduct of them is blacks get hurt worse than whites. And subconsciously maybe that is part of it. I’m not saying that.” (The interview was originally published anonymously, and only years later did it emerge that Atwater was the subject.)

Now, under the guise of protecting the sanctity of the ballot box, conservatives have devised measures — such as photo ID requirements — to block African-Americans’ access to the polls. A joint report by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund and the NAACP emphasized that the ID requirements would adversely affect more than 6 million African-American voters. (Twenty-five percent of black Americans lack a government-issued photo ID, the report noted, compared with only 8 percent of white Americans.) The Supreme Court sanctioned this discrimination in *Shelby County v. Holder*, which gutted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and opened the door to 21st century versions of 19th century literacy tests and poll taxes.

The economic devastation of the Great Recession also shows African-Americans under siege. The foreclosure crisis hit black Americans harder than any other group in the United States. A 2013 report by researchers at Brandeis University calculated that “half the collective wealth of African-American families was stripped away during the Great Recession,” in large part because of the impact on home equity. In the process, the wealth gap between blacks and whites grew: Right before the recession, white Americans had four times more wealth than black Americans, on average; by 2010, the gap had increased to six times. This was a targeted hit. Communities of color were far more likely to have riskier, higher-interest-rate loans than white communities, with good credit scores often making no difference.

Add to this the tea party movement's assault on so-called Big Government, which despite the sanitized language of fiscal responsibility constitutes an attack on African-American jobs. Public-sector employment, where there is less discrimination in hiring and pay, has traditionally been an important venue for creating a black middle class.

So when you think of Ferguson, don't just think of black resentment at a criminal justice system that allows a white police officer to put six bullets into an unarmed black teen. Consider the economic dislocation of black America.

Remember a Florida judge instructing a jury to focus only on the moment when George Zimmerman and Trayvon Martin interacted, thus transforming a 17-year-old, unarmed kid into a big, scary black guy, while the grown man who stalked him through the neighborhood with a loaded gun becomes a victim.

Look at *Connick v. Thompson*, a partisan 5-4 Supreme Court decision in 2011 that ruled it was legal for a city prosecutor's staff to hide evidence that exonerated a black man who was rotting on death row for 14 years.

And think of a recent study by Stanford University psychology researchers concluding that, when white people were told that black Americans are incarcerated in numbers far beyond their proportion of the population, "they reported being more afraid of crime and more likely to support the kinds of punitive policies that exacerbate the racial disparities," such as three-strikes or stop-and-frisk laws.

Only then does Ferguson make sense. It's about white rage.

#

Dawn **Turner**, **"White separatist echoes Trump: Your fear is real,"** *Chicago Tribune* (September 1, 2015): 3.

When I finished speaking with Richard Spencer on Sunday afternoon, I better understood why he vehemently opposes immigration, feels the white race will soon be a "hated minority" in America and supports Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump even though he never imagined he would.

I talked to the 37-year-old University of Chicago grad, who now lives in Montana, because I know that Trump has tapped into a fear that's deeply felt by people near and far. It's just that most folks wouldn't articulate it in the same way, or as willingly, as Spencer, especially to someone like me.

Spencer is president of the National Policy Institute, a think tank. On its website under the name is the creed, "For our people, our culture, our future." He doesn't want to be called a "white supremacist" because although he's a staunch believer in the separation of the races, he says he doesn't believe in the superiority of the white race.

(The institute's publishing division, which Spencer oversees, however, has published work on racial differences in intellect and behavior.)

Spencer also doesn't want to be called a "white nationalist" because "nationalism is about chauvinism." Instead, he considers himself a European "identitarian," which he says is based on white people of European descent understanding who they are as a people and uniting along the lines of their shared historical experiences. "Most political ideology in the 20th century is based on abstract theories and history, or even economic dogmas," he told me. (By "abstract theories," he means ideals such as "all men are created equal.")

"I call myself an identitarian and not an American," he said. "I think white will need to be post-American and rediscover our identity as Europeans."

The Southern Poverty Law Center calls him "a kind of professional racist in khakis," who takes "a quasi-intellectual approach to white separatism."

Spencer rails against consumerism and wants the country to return to a "spiritual dimension." He describes an America -- or any country -- that's racially and ethnically diverse as one in which people are "all thrown into this flat world where they don't have a historical or emotional connection to the nation."

He believes America has been a "failed experiment" and that by 2044, when the U.S. Census Bureau predicts people of color will outnumber white, they will be "a defeated people."

"But won't a lot of white people still be in power?" I asked him. "I don't doubt that white people will still hold power," Spencer said. "But those are the managers of white decline." He referred to Hillary Clinton, whom he called "pathetic."

I reminded him that for millennia, Europe has brimmed with white people who have hated and fought each other (and continue to hate and fight each other) over ethnic, religious and ideological differences.

And although he dreams of Trump one day inhabiting a separate place -- "a big European empire" -- today's Europe is dealing with its own issues regarding multiculturalism. He doesn't deny any of this.

I asked him if he feared that people of color (particularly those whose ancestors were brought over here as slaves) would exact some form of retribution

against white people. And, well, bingo.

"I don't think there will be a slavery, or a Holocaust or Jim Crow against whites, but this anti-European ideology will continue," he said. "We are a hated people. It's like that Susan Sontag line, 'The white race is the cancer (of human history).'"

Wow.

To be clear, not all of Trump's supporters share Spencer's extreme views. But there is a disaffected, angry knot of folks who are afraid they will be and have been steamrolled by immigrants and affirmative action. They wholeheartedly believe a particular way of life continues to be under threat.

So in walks a bold and brash presidential candidate who gives voice to their fears while trumpeting the idea of making America great again. Although Spencer likes Trump, he doesn't believe America can be great again. "That's backward-looking," he said. "We want to look forward and think about who we're going to be. People want to know everything is going to be OK, that my grandchildren are going to be OK. "Donald Trump is not a white nationalist, or an identitarian. But he's giving people a sense that 'your fears are real and we can find a way out' and this contrasts with other Republicans who say, 'Your fears are not real.'"

Spencer -- who has no ties to Trump -- said he thought the candidate's statement on America not being a nation unless it has borders was powerful. And, he's deeply inspired by the way the Trump has gained traction without the conservative establishment. "If identitarians are going to have a future, we have to operate outside those paradigms," he said. "Trump is demonstrating the bankruptcy of the GOP and Fox News, and showing you don't need the Bush family."

Spencer grew up in Dallas in a wealthy family of, as he jokingly puts it, "country club Episcopalians." He credits his time at the University of Chicago, where he received a master's degree in humanities, for his intellectual flowering, which includes a kinship with the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche (and, at one time, that of Karl Marx). I asked him what his family thinks of his ideas. "They tolerate my views," he said. "They're not into it. There's a generational divide." Luckily, for the rest of us, the divide is much bigger than a generation.

#

David G. **Savage**, **“Affirmative action, but not for poor, stirs debate: Race-based policy favoring the middle class before justices,”** *Chicago Tribune* (November 29, 2015): sect. 1, p.25

— With the constitutionality of race-based affirmative action hanging by a thread at the Supreme Court, University of Texas officials are struggling to explain a policy that gives an extra edge to Latino and African-American students from middle-class households and top-performing high schools.

It is called “qualitative diversity,” and premiere state universities insist such policies are vital to preserving academic standards and combating stereotypes about minorities.

The case of *Fisher v. University of Texas* began six years ago when a rejected white student complained about the role race played in deciding who was admitted to the Austin campus.

As the case returns for a second time to the high court, it has triggered a debate over who should benefit from affirmative action, what counts as diversity and whether minority students from integrated suburban high schools may contribute more on campus than those from inner-city high schools.

For 80 percent of its admissions, the university operates under a race-neutral state law that awards admission to students who graduate in the top 7 percent of their high school class. In an earlier version, it was the top 10 percent.

The law has resulted in an influx of minority students to Austin, mainly from schools in low-income areas in the Rio Grande Valley and in Houston, Dallas and San Antonio.

But citing its interest in the “educational benefits of diversity,” the university says it also needs to supplement that policy with a race-based one to admit promising minority students who are not in the top 7 percent of their class, including “the African American or Hispanic child of successful professionals in Dallas.”

Critics say the policy is unfair to similar white students from the same schools, and it turns its back on the idea that affirmative action is intended to benefit disadvantaged students.

“Preferring minority students from wealthier, integrated backgrounds over minority students who have flourished despite economic hardships is at best counter-intuitive, if not an outright distortion of the diversity rationale,” said lawyers for Abigail Fisher, the white student who sued the university after she was denied admission in 2008.

Race-based admission policies have long drawn scrutiny from the Supreme Court, which will hear arguments in the case Dec. 9.

The court’s conservatives say the guarantee of “equal protection” forbids universities from using race in deciding who is admitted. Often joining them is Justice Anthony Kennedy, who has regularly voted to limit affirmative action but stopped short of prohibiting such policies entirely. Race, he has said, may be used only as a “last resort.”

Two years ago, when the court first took up the Texas case, Kennedy wrote an opinion that told the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals to take a second, more skeptical look at the admissions policy in Austin to decide if the university still needed “to use race to achieve educational diversity” or “could achieve sufficient

diversity without using racial classifications.”

When the lower court ruled again for the university, the high court agreed to hear the case again.

The university’s argument is complicated by the growing number of minority students earning admission based solely on grades.

When Fisher applied in 2008, a fourth of incoming students were Latino or black. Last year, 35 percent of freshmen were “underrepresented minorities.”

Many of the nation’s top state universities joined in support of Texas.

Richard Kahlenberg, a leading advocate of need-based affirmative action, says universities should give breaks to students — regardless of their race — who come from low-income families and whose parents did not go to college. He said focus on race over economic and social disadvantage has put Texas in a tight spot.

“They’re in the tough position of arguing for preferences for middle- and upper-middle income students,” he said.

Though the university argues minority students from higher-ranked schools would bring new perspectives to campus debates, Kahlenberg questioned that.

“If one is looking for a lively discussion from students with the greatest possible variety of backgrounds, then including a poor white student from a trailer park might add more diversity than a wealthy African American graduate of a prep school,” he argued in a friend-of-the-court brief.

Jackie C. Horne, [Excerpt] **“Harry and the Other: Answering the Race Question in J. K. Rowling's Harry Potter,”** *The Lion and the Unicorn* 34, #1 (January 2010):76-104

The full article, including *notes and references* can be found on line at:
<http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/uni/summary/v034/34.1.horne.html>

What approach to antiracism education does J. K. Rowling draw upon in order to teach her antiracism lesson to Harry Potter, Hermione, Ron, and through them, to her readers? Intriguingly, one can find traces of *both* a multicultural *and* a social justice approach, as well as the tensions between them, in the seven books that depict the coming of age of the teenage wizard. To demonstrate this, I would now like to turn to the novels, narrowing my focus to two of the main “races” depicted in Rowling’s stories: the house-elves and the goblins. Most of the following discussion will draw upon *Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows*, but with references to earlier books as needed, to show how Rowling deploys both a multicultural *and* a social justice approach, exploring the benefits and limitations of each. We can see the multicultural approach in Rowling’s depiction of the house-elves, while a social justice lens brings the more difficult race of the goblins into focus.

Rowling creates many different sentient races in the course of her Harry Potter novels. such races can be grouped by how each interacts with the wizarding race. some races, in traditional high fantasy fashion, are purely evil. Wizards interact with races associated with the Dark Arts only as enemies. Giants form a subgroup of this type, racial others hunted to the point of extinction by Aurors or other wizards. A second group are racial others that may be at odds with, or dangers to, wizards in *some* circumstances, but that in others work for them: for example, in Book 1, the troll that invades the school is bad, but in Book 3, the trolls who guard the Fat Lady’s portrait serve wizarding interests. Leprechauns and veelas seem to be in similar circumstances, at least as witnessed by their actions during the World Cup match at the opening of Book 4. A third group consists of those races that choose to separate themselves entirely from the world of the wizards, such as the Centaurs, who deem teaching wizards to be treason against their race. This essay is most interested in the final two groups, groups that interact more closely with wizards than any of the other races depicted in the novels: the house-elves and the goblins. House-elves willingly serve the wizards as servants or slaves, accepting their subservient role in a racial hierarchy. In contrast, the goblins interact with wizards in many ways as equals, a power relationship that causes much tension between the two groups.⁷

Rowling’s depiction of Dobby and his fellow elves contains uncomfortable echoes of many of the stereotypes held by whites of enslaved African Americans. simple, loyal, and childlike, happy to serve their betters, Rowling’s house-elves speak in a patois closer to 1930s and 40s Hollywood misconceptions of “darky” dialect than to any actual African-American speech pattern. Even the house-elf Dobby, who desires and gains freedom, proves more an object of humor (as were many black characters in twentieth-century popular culture) than a model of what a free elf can accomplish. Harry, and through him, the reader, is invited to

laugh at Dobby's mismatched clothing, his bargaining over wages with Dumbledore (he wants lower, rather than higher, wages than the headmaster offers), and his assertion of his "free will": "Dobby is a free house-elf and he can obey anyone he likes and Dobby will do whatever Harry Potter wants him to do!"

Now that the series has concluded, where has it left Dobby, Winky, and the other house-elves? We can begin to understand their fates by placing Rowling's depiction of the house-elves, and how Harry learns to interact with them, in the context of the universalist, multicultural approach to antiracism work. The most important way to fight racism, Harry learns, is to be kind to the elves, to treat each individual elf as an equal. To put it in Dumbledore's words, Harry must learn to see elves as "being[s] with feelings as acute as a human's", a multicultural emphasis on universal emotional identification. In Books 2–4, Harry begins to learn this lesson through his interactions with Dobby. To bring the lesson into greater prominence, Rowling introduces a third major elf character in the series' last four volumes: Kreacher, the "distinctly unlovable" house-elf loyal to the Voldemort-sympathizing Black family.

Kreacher proves far less appealing an elf than does the comic Dobby. Old, almost naked, baggy-skinned, with bloodshot eyes and a snout-like nose, Kreacher continually whispers insults about Sirius and the other members of the Order of the Phoenix after the Order takes up residence in the Black family's London house in Book 5. Mrs. Weasley is disgusted by Kreacher's lax housework, while Ron and his brothers find him a "nutter" for his devotion to pure-blood wizards and his life's ambition to "have his head cut off and stuck up on a plaque". Sirius, though he advocates humane treatment of house-elves in general, has less tolerance for Kreacher; when no one has seen the elf for a while, Sirius speculates "I expect I'll find him upstairs crying his eyes out over my mother's old bloomers or something. . . . Of course, he might have crawled into the airing cupboard and died. . . . But I mustn't get my hopes up . . ."

While Harry is beginning to see that wizarding culture relies on the labor of the elves, he is not yet ready to talk openly about it, or to make elf liberation a cause worth fighting for. A social justice approach to antiracism is not one that Rowling suggests her protagonist need pursue.

Instead, Harry, initially through Dumbledore and later on his own, learns to fight his unconsciously racist attitudes toward elves on a *personal* level, by learning to recognize that elves have feelings. Once he is able to recognize that elves, like humans, feel emotions, Harry can then learn to identify with, and have sympathy for, the plight of individual elves. Cultivating this ability to identify begins in earnest in Book 6, when Dumbledore relates the story of the elf Hokey, whom Voldemort framed for murder. Actually, Dumbledore does not just *relate* Hokey's story; he takes Harry back through the Pensieve in order to witness scenes, allowing Harry to "meet" Hokey himself. Dumbledore leads Harry to recognize the way that Ministry prejudice against house-elves aided Voldemort's plan: "the Ministry was predisposed to suspect Hokey—" he says,

leading Harry to interrupt “—because she was a house-elf.” Interestingly, Harry’s recognition of the institutional prejudice makes him think of political, rather than personal, solutions: “He had rarely felt more in sympathy with the society Hermione had set up, S.P.E.W.”

Yet Harry’s feelings do not lead him to embrace Hermione’s way of fighting social inequities. Instead, he continues to fight on a personal level, employing a multicultural approach, as witnessed by his changing behavior toward Kreacher during Book 7. This change in Harry’s behavior occurs, significantly, after he hears the story of how Kreacher was used and left for dead by Voldemort, and then had to witness the self-sacrificing death of his beloved master, Regulus Black. At first, Harry resists feeling sympathy for the elf, with Kreacher’s betrayal of Sirius blinding him to all else. However, when Hermione (of course!) points out that house-elves are loyal to those “who are kind to [them],” Harry remembers Dumbledore’s words—“*I do not think Sirius ever saw Kreacher as a being with feelings as acute as a human’s*—” and starts to realize that both he and Kreacher are mourning for dead Black brothers. Only after he recognizes this similarity between his and Kreacher’s losses, and the feelings that stem from them, does Harry begin to take Dumbledore’s lesson to heart. Harry still gives Kreacher orders, but does so kindly, with a marked change in tone. He says “please,” asks “Do you think you could do that for us?” and even gives the elf a present. By the end of the series, Harry (and through him, the reader) has learned the central lesson of multicultural antiracism: to treat others with kindness, respect, and sympathy.

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