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August, 1992. I have just received a letter from Nuria, an Albanian friend in Kosova. She writes from her village just north of Prishtina. Like most of her friends, Nuria was raised in a conservative Moslem family, was engaged and married to a man she had never met, and lives now with her husband and children in her husband's extended family. Having been denied, by her father, an education beyond primary school, she cultivated her mind and nourished her imagination by reading novels and poetry in secret, hiding them under her embroideries and needlepoint. Her frequent letters tell of the landscapes around her, of the color and texture of the seasons, of the feelings these evoke in her. They also convey her reaction to the hardship and desperation which has engulfed her world. This is her letter:
The sun is setting in the west and a light breeze begins to blow. The edge of our wheat field is painted with the red shades of evening. The sky is quiet, filled with clouds; it is a rare and beautiful sunset tonight. We are all healthy. But the political and economic situation is now unbearable. It is especially difficult in the village, where the hardships have pushed us against the edge. My father and two brothers have been fired from their jobs. My husband works, but receives no salary. The taxes are so high--we are forced to give 70% of the profit from the land to the cooperative. It is a terrifying situation. But what are we to do? It is the same for all Albanians. In the midst of this crisis we can only hope that a brighter future awaits us. We live for the day when Kosova will be able to build a new life for itself in Europe, when our tomorrow will no longer be only in the dreams of children. Toward these ideals today we raise our voices to the whole world, and await an answer.
On March 23, 1989 the Federal government in Belgrade declared martial law in Kosova, ending fifteen years of nominal autonomy within the Republic of Serbia and ushering in a period of political upheaval, blatant civil rights abuses and ethnic violence in the province. Economic hardship coupled with a general state of repression and fear have inspired an unprecedented sense of unity and nationalism among Albanians. These developments have challenged some fundamental aspects of Albanian identity.
What have been the social repercussions of the crisis gripping Kosova? What effect have years of fear and deprivation had upon the Albanians' perception of self and nation? During the 1980s Albanian identity was forged primarily in terms of social symbols derived from the past. Ideological conservatism in rural Kosova had deepened as Albanians responded to mounting ethnic and economic marginalization. Albanians seized upon tradition in order to reinforce their personal and collective dignity in the face of a demeaned status in Yugoslavia. How have recent events challenged this persuasion.
Looking into the future, how will the demise of Yugoslavia, the end to five decades of ideological conditioning [read: Titoism and Serbian hegemony] and the persistent threat to the Albanians' survival change the way they structure their lives? Will the obsession with conservative ideals, with familism and gender stratification championed by the Albanian masses be abandoned? Would Kosova's independence promote a new world view, or would the uncertainty brought about by a new political order inspire Albanians to find psychological security in Tradition?
At this point we can only speculate about Kosova's political future. But from an anthropological standpoint, questions about the direction of social change in Kosova beg to be examined. Let us then lay a groundwork for an investigation into the prospects of a social and cultural reformation. We begin with a brief look at Kosova's demographic and historical profile.
The Setting: Demographic and Historical Notes:
Kosova is bordered in the south by Macedonia, in the east and north by Serbia, in the northwest by Montenegro, and in the southwest by the country of Albania. Its heartland of fertile plains, hills and valleys is almost completely surrounded by dramatic mountain ranges chiseled by gorges. With a population of 1.8 million (1986 figures), the ethnic distribution in 1981 was 77.4% Albanian, 13.2% Serbian, 3.7% Serbian-speaking Moslems, 2.2% Rom (Gypsies), 1.7% Montenegrin (The Provincial Statistical Bureau, 1987). The steady exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins which began in the late 1960s and accelerated in the 1980s due to political pressures has increased the percentage of Albanians to 90%. Kosova has the highest natality and infant mortality rates in Europe, with 29.9 live births per thousand, 55.2 infant deaths per thousand live births. Kosova's rate of population increase is 24.7 per thousand with an annual population growth of 2.4% (1987 statistics). Today the average age of Albanians is twenty-four, making them the youngest ethnic group in Europe.
Kosova's 10,908 sq. km. are divided into twenty-two komuna (counties). Until its establishment as an autonomous region in 1946, Kosova was considered as two regions: "Kosova" (also known as Fusha e Kosovo [The Kosova Field]) in the east and Metohija (or Rrafshi i Dukagjinit [The Plain of Dukagjin]) in the west. This division was based upon geographical relief and consequent patterns of economic subsistence resulting in cultural patterns unique to each region.
Historically, Kosova was part of the north-south link from Belgrade to Thessalonika and the east-west route from Istanbul to the Adriatic coast and to Bosnia-Hercegovina. It has served as a frontier between the eastern and western Roman empires, between Serbian, Bulgarian and Byzantine states, between Christianity and Islam, Greek Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism, and between the modern states of Albania and Yugoslavia. Its strategic economic and political position, fertile land and plentiful mineral resources have made Kosova a desirable possession for a succession of invaders throughout its turbulent history.
The Albanians are believed by many scholars to be descendants of the Illyrians who lived throughout much of the territory of present-day Yugoslavia and Albania until the fifth century B.C. Throughout their history Albanians were ruled by Greece, Rome, Byzantium, the Celts, Slavs and Ottoman Turks. The Turkish occupation lasted five-hundred years and profoundly effected Albanian social, cultural and political life.
The Ottomans began their domination of the Balkan Peninsula in 1389 after the victory over the Serbs at the famous "Battle of Kosovo" near the modern-day capital of Prishtina. Prior to 1389 the medieval Serbian monarchy ruled Serbia from the heartland of Kosova. During this period the highland Albanians were beginning their descent into the lowlands of Kosova in response to population pressure in the mountains. This descent accelerated when the Ottomans invaded and the Serbian lords and their subjects moved northward. During the fifteenth century the Albanians staged a massive resistance against the Ottomans led by their greatest national hero, Gjergj Kastriot (better known as "Skenderbeg"). After his death, resistance weakened and the Ottoman occupation became further entrenched.
The current political dispute over Kosova centers on the fact that both Albanians and Serbs claim historical rights to the province. Kosova was the center of the Serbian medieval kingdom and many of Serbia's most important monuments are located there. The Serbian defeat at the hand of the Turks in 1389 is at the heart of Serbian epic literature. As such Kosova plays a deep emotional role in the identity of contemporary Serbs. In addition, while it is clear that Albanians have "always" inhabited parts of western Kosova, the length of time they have been in other parts of the province is unclear, making historical claims on territory a source of perpetual enmity between Albanians and Serbs.
Modern History:
The growing nationalism of eighteenth century Europe was lost on the Albanians. In Europe nationalist movements were nurtured by religious and linguistic unity, the leadership of one class, the influence of foreign intellectuals and discontent with foreign rule. Through the centuries fierce clan and regional loyalties and the absence of the incentives for unification present in European nations prevented the emergence of an Albanian nationalist consciousness which would unite the Albanians against their oppressors. Finally, in 1878, Albanians united against foreign manipulation when the Congress of Berlin gave the Albanian regions of Gusinje and Pllav to the Montenegrins. Leading Albanian writers met at the fabled "League of Prizren" to make their will known to Berlin. They demanded autonomy within the Ottoman empire, a right to the taxes collected, schooling in the Albanian language and religious freedom. But because Albanians sought autonomy under Istanbul rather than independence, the European powers saw them as an Ottoman tool. It was not until the revolt of the Young Turks in 1908 and the harsh, repressive measures of their new policies of "Ottomanism" that Albanians finally began a unified revolt against the Turks.
In 1912 the Ottomans were defeated and Albania was proclaimed a republic. With the withdrawal of the Turks in 1913 the European powers constructed the "Treaty of Berlin" which created an independent state of Albania. This new state excluded the ethnic Albanians in Kosova who then became part of the "Serbian Kingdom," and in 1918 part of the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes." By this time there was a new united Balkan front against the Ottomans and against an autonomous Albania which would claim precious lands. In 1915 the secret "Treaty of London" was written which granted Italy, Greece and Yugoslavia parts of greater Albania. Serbia and Montenegro divided Kosova and today's western Macedonia between them. Albanian holdings were greatly reduced while Serbia expanded its territory by 82%.
Albania faced World War I in political anarchy, once again hosting foreign troops and fighting off the territorial ambitions of its neighbors. New Albanian borders were set in 1926 which left a half-million Albanians in Yugoslavia. Kosova was now underpopulated from decades of war and forced emigration, and the Yugoslav government encouraged Serbians to colonize the lowlands. This created new pressure on Albanians who began to migrate out of Kosova as seasonal laborers.
In July of 1945 most of Kosova was formally annexed by Serbia. Other parts of Kosova were given to Macedonia and Montenegro. Cooperation between Albania and Yugoslavia during the war broke down in 1944-45 as Albanians faced new persecutions under the Yugoslavs. The Kosova Albanians revolted and martial law was declared. After several years of improved treatment, another era of persecution ensued under Rankovic, head of the Yugoslav secret police. The 1950s were another period of repression and forced assimilation in Kosova.
In the 1960s a new federalism emerged in Yugoslavia which promised equal rights to the minority populations. The post-Rankovic era had inspired Albanians to agitate for greater autonomy. In 1968 widespread demonstrations in Kosova called for an independent university, the replacement of the name "Kosova-Metohija" with "Kosova," and Republican status. This last demand was rejected, but as compensation Tito offered greater autonomy and economic aid to Kosova. The 1974 constitutional amendments made Kosova a "Socialist Autonomous Province" with its own university, the right to fly the Albanian flag, and the equality of Albanian, Serbo-Croatian and Turkish languages. Albanians were put in positions of authority in the administration and police force.
The 1960s and 1970s were decades of tremendous social change in Kosova wrought against a backdrop of poverty, widespread illiteracy, a population explosion and a deepening national economic crisis. As the economic and social gap between Yugoslavia's more prosperous north and poorer south widened, ethnic tensions increased and in 1981 culminated in massive Albanian demonstrations in Kosova followed by a period of purges and repressed hostilities.
In the spring of 1989 new constitutional amendments were adopted in Serbia aimed at reducing Kosova's autonomy by giving Serbia jurisdiction over Kosova's courts and police. These changes, seen by Albanians as a regression to pre-1974 statutes, were coupled with sky-rocketing inflation, unemployment and renewed ethnic hostility between Albanians and Serbs.
Kosova took the first step toward independence with the formation of the Democratic League (Lidhje Demokratike) on December 28, 1989 headed by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, leader of Kosova's writer's association and an outspoken anti-Communist. This was soon followed by the creation of several other parties whose common goal was realization of Kosova's independence from Serbia. The parties formed a coalition, the Council of Political Parties, also led by Rugova.
During the summer of 1990 violations of Albanian civil rights increased. In June Serbian authorities adopted the "Law on Labor in Special Circumstances" which sought to replace Albanian business leaders and the directors of administrative and cultural institutions with Serbs. This move inaugurated the systematic elimination of tens of thousands of Albanians from their jobs in the public sector, catapulting many families into poverty and wreaking havoc on civil life. Professional people--engineers, actors, university professors--are trying to make ends meet by selling fruits and vegetables on the marketplace. Albanian doctors and nurses have been dismissed, forcing women to deliver their babies at home and the sick to seek medical care in improvised home clinics. Medicine is scarce; supplies brought in from abroad are confiscated at border points. School teachers, now unemployed, are giving lessons in private homes. The university is closed to Albanian students. Thousands of young people--their classes canceled, their hope of future employment all but extinguished--pass the days in a state of limbo as they await the turn of political events. Thousands of young men--villagers, urbanites, some barely out of high school, some with families to support--have fled to Western Europe in search of jobs. Lacking any promise of employment, many are turned away at the border, returning home to join in the massive despair gripping their people. Albanian and Serbian neighbors, co-workers and school-mates, friends and confidants before 1989, no longer look each other in the eye or speak to each other on the street.
On July 5, 1990 Serbian police occupied the radio and television stations in Prishtina, putting over 1,350 Albanians out of work, cutting off all Albanian language broadcasts. The daily newspaper was soon shut down. On September 7, leaders from Kosova's dissolved Albanian parliament met in secret created a new constitution which declared Kosova a Republic. Later that month Serbians wrote their own constitution which nullified this proclamation. Albanian leaders continued to agitate for independence despite Serbia's denial of Kosova's declarations of autonomy. From September 26 to 30, 1991, a popular referendum was held in which 87% of the populace participated and 99.87% voted to declare Kosova an independent republic. In October of 1991 the Albanian government of Kosova was formed. By the time the Serbian police began trying to round up the leaders of the new government, they had already fled the country, establishing themselves as representatives of the Kosova government in exile. May 24, 1992 marked the first free elections in Kosova in which Rugova was unanimously voted in as the new President of Kosova. Serbia refused to recognize the elections and prevented the deputies from holding the first meeting of the Assembly of the newly born republic.
At the present time Rugova represents the majority of Kosova Albanians in working for international recognition of Kosova as an independent state neutral to both Serbia and Albania with close economic ties to western Europe. Because Kosova is still under Serbian occupation, it's self-proclaimed independence has not yet been recognized by the international community. Their most pressing concern is to internationalize the conflict in Kosova. Most Kosovar fear that without foreign diplomatic intervention war is inevitable.
In Bosnia-Hercegovina the death toll mounts as war ravages the countryside, pitting Croats, Muslims and Serbs against each other. Meanwhile, Albanians live week to week, month to month in a state of suspended animation, perched on the brink of civil war, dreading the day when the winds of war may shift, when Serbian forces may turn their vengeance to the south, redirecting the campaign of "ethnic cleansing" towards them. But an attack on Kosova would be unlike those in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia. The Serbs have confiscated the Albanians' guns. There is no private militia. Fathers and brothers have fled the country in search of employment, leaving behind women, children, and the elderly. Nothing short of a massacre is feared.
Everyday life in Kosova goes on. Women care for home and family, attend to guests, plot engagements and plan weddings. Men strategize how to get wood for the winter stove, how to pay for food, how to get work abroad for themselves or for their sons. Young people fall in love or have marriages arranged for them. Life goes on. But three years of hostility, confusion and fear about an uncertain future has created a veil of desperation which weighs upon the consciousness of every Albanian.
Having looked at the current state of events in Kosova, the focus now turns to Albanian social life and world-view. I consider the strategies used to define personal and collective identity and the way these strategies may be changing as a result of recent political events.
Ideology and Social Structure Among the Kosova Albanians-The Legacy:
It must be emphasized that this paper looks at the lives of rural people and traditionally oriented families living in Kosova towns in the 1980s. Extensive fieldwork throughout Kosova revealed a majority of Albanians still steeped in a rhetoric of honor and shame and the exigencies of "la longue dureé." At least until the 1990s, these were not ideas held by a few families. They were principles championed by the masses of rural people. It must also be pointed out that this paper looks at behavioral ideals. Clearly, every Albanian family makes choices which may contradict the voices of the past, and conflict, dissent and dysfunction are very much a part of the social fabric. In the interest of brevity the present discussion will not address these aspects of Albanian life. Finally, the ethnography describes the lives of Moslem Albanians but for the most part applies equally to Catholic Albanians.
Personal and collective identity among Albanians has been forged primarily in terms of symbols derived from the past. The Yugoslav political regime discouraged the masses from eliciting their identity from a contemporary political agenda. Instead, the Albanians seized upon tradition as the guide to personhood. They appropriated history as a repository of sacred, ancient, "uniquely Albanian" values: honor (ndera), the oath (besa), hospitality (mikpritja), right conduct (sjellja) and identification with one's clan (fisi). The "perceived past" has been a vivid canvas in the collective memory painted with martyrdom, heroism, dignity and sacrifice, a past which serves to ennoble the race, constructed according to an agenda of the present. Albanians engage in what Royce has called "an anesthetizing process of retreat into an all-absorbing, all forgiving identity" (1982:229). Customs are considered valid and indisputable simply by virtue of being of the past.
Tradition is expressed in the observance of age and gender stratification, submission to the will of the collective, the restriction of women's movement outside the home, arranged marriages, inflated bride-wealth and wedding rituals, and, in some rural districts, the denial of secondary education to girls. Though obedience to these doctrines varies in intensity from rural people living in extended families to the "elite" urban class, it is this set of attitudes that distinguishes Albanians from neighboring societies which have severed themselves more completely from the hold of pre-war values and customs.
The key to these social configurations is the persistence of the patrilocal extended family structure including parents, sons and their wives and children, and unmarried daughters. A typical rural family (and families of rural-urban migrants) has fifteen members, but families of thirty or more people contributing to a joint economy and sharing meals and labor are not uncommon. Behavior is structured to promote harmony in the extended family. Consistent with this ideal, many rural marriages are arranged by parents or relatives. In some regions couples are still betrothed as teen-agers, some never meeting before their wedding night.
A fundamental aspect of Albanian tradition is havale--woman's semi-seclusion, the restriction of her contact with people outside the kin group. This seclusion is symbolized in the garden wall which confines her domestic life, in the scarf and overcoat she wears outside the house, and for the rural and urban woman, in the invisible veil of self-control which circumscribes her behavior, projecting an image of impenetrability.
Another central principle is the power of marre, shame, in strictly controlling behavior. For a village woman, it is marre not to be up at five and have the fire stoked and the courtyard swept before her father-in-law rises. It is marre for a man to contradict his father, to balk at the marriage arranged for him, to shirk his filial obligations.
Pajtim, acquiescence, is another legacy which guides experience and perception. Older generations of Albanians lived by the principle that they were destined to suffer and endure. This sentiment has not been lost on post-war generations. Duhet m'u pajtu, "You must accept it," is an expression often heard from women and men, young and old. Like their mothers before them, young girls accept their fate in terms of a denied education, an arranged marriage, and a life under the direction of the mother-in-law. Like their fathers, boys accept the dismal job prospects at home and the migration imperative.
Another expression of the past is an acceptance of the inevitability of vuajtje: suffering. Albanians cope with marginality by cultivating their identity as an oppressed people. As a key element in the "discourse of identity," persecution may be interpreted, Herzfeld tells us, ideologically as well as literally (1985:21). Albanians accentuate an ideology of persecution in order to transform the inferiority associated with marginality into a sense of superiority associated with uniqueness. They counter this debased status by defending their collective worth on the basis of racial purity, moral uprightness, and as the keepers of a tradition uncorrupted by the breakdown of gender barriers and the individualism found among their neighbors.
An Albanian friend captured this sentiment in a recent letter:
Our land: it is backward, exhausted, and held down by suffering, fanaticism, hatred, poverty and a myriad of problems which eat away at us. For Albanians suffering and problems are daily companions. The only salvation from suffering is in our tradition of honor, the oath, morality and hospitality--the part of our culture which distinguishes us from other people.
Emic Explanations for Preserving the Past:
Saying, "this is our tradition" as a strategic evocation of the past is used both to reiterate a sense of belonging and to justify a way of life. The Albanians have been, as Herzfeld puts it, "invoking the pre-established system," the overlapping influences of Islam, customary law, and a legacy of persecution, in order to validate what they are doing.
The most fundamental emic rationale for observing customary behavior has been the force of public opinion as social control. This is expressed in one powerful word, rreth. Literally translated as "circle," the word is taken to mean the social circle, the influence of the moral community. Conformity and the fulfillment of traditional behavioral norms in the eyes of the community still override individual accomplishments or wealth in creating and maintaining personal authority and family honor. "We have always been oppressed by the weight of public opinion, afraid of the consequence of unconventional action. Now in the pseudo-freedom of recent years, we are still bound to this rigid way of thinking. We can't imagine anything else."
Many Albanians argue that their resistance to change derives from a devotion to Islam, and that their observance of customary behavior is a religious mandate. (This is in spite of the fact that the many Catholic Albanians in Kosova hold the same world view as their Moslem neighbors.) For Moslem Albanians there is no clear distinction between being Albanian and being Moslem. "We cannot say which customs are more important, Albanian or Moslem. It is one thing, and we must maintain both." In fact, except on special holidays mosques are usually frequented only by old men. A mixture of Marxism (learned at school), capitalism (learned as migrants) and secularism (learned as Yugoslavs) has replaced Islam as the social directive for Albanians educated in post-war Yugoslavia. But as Stirling observed in Turkey, in spite of a decline in the formal observance of Islam there is still a sense in which "religious dogma and practice are absolute and eternal" (1974:229). Religion is indeed an important element in the formation of consciousness among Albanians, but I would argue that religion is also used to justify conservatism, to rationalize behavior inspired by other motives. It is also used as an ethnic symbol, setting the Albanians apart from their Slavic, Orthodox Christian neighbors.
Economic hardship is also considered a fundamental reason for "living in the past." "We've always been too busy struggling against political oppression and poverty to worry about the emancipation of women and other issues of change."
We may be thinking in an abstract sense about modern things like choosing your own wife and taking an educated bride, but the economic decline and accompanying unemployment, accelerated migration, and life in extended families dictates a different reality. It dictates that we live in the traditional way. We would like change to occur, but the economic conditions control our lives.
An outcome of economic stagnation, the migration of Albanian men to western Europe for "temporary" employment is blamed for "backwardness" on several counts. One clear reason is the long absence of household heads and their subsequent failure to integrate new customs modeled by urban Albanians into village life. Another major factor is the migrants' insistence on moral conservatism back home to insulate and "protect" wives and children left behind. The men believe that aging parents and other family members will be secure as long as strict, traditional behavior is upheld in their absence. They also find comfort abroad knowing that each time they return home they will find the same lifestyle they left months, years and decades ago. The only changes they hope to find upon their return are in the family's material conditions.
Some Albanians also argue that the accumulation of fancy clothes, televisions, and cars made possible by migrant money helps to perpetuate the status quo by appeasing those who remain behind, by making them passive about the way they live. This complaint, made by men and women, is directed particularly to women.
There have been many technological improvements in the village-washing machines, electric stoves-but life doesn't change, it just goes around in circles. Things don't change because the women are appeased. A woman has such an easy life, why should she bother herself with an education or employment? She is convinced that life is the way it should be. She's proud of the way she lives (Bajram).
Appropriating the Past to Reinforce and Express Identity:
Albanians use the past to demonstrate and elevate ethnic, regional and personal identity in the face of political, economic and ethnic stigmatization and liminality. They perceive themselves as a marginalized people on different levels. As former Yugoslavs, they were members of a developing country which found itself just beyond the borders of the economic prosperity and the cultural and political hegemony of the west. As an ethnic "minority" in former Yugoslavia, they have been subordinate to the economic, political and cultural dominance of the ethnic "majorities" around them. As a disparaged ethnic group, Albanians are scorned for their peculiar, non-Slavic language, appearance and customs. As Moslems in a land of Christians they are seen as an uncivilized "other." As migrants Albanians are stigmatized as an ethnic "underclass." Rural Albanians are seen as backward and reactionary, peripheral to a society grappling with change.
Changes which have taken place in neighboring regions and for the Albanians' relatives living in towns or abroad are now at issue for the villagers themselves. Many young villagers, especially those who have ventured beyond the borders of their region, are aware of a deepening schism between their lifestyles and the way people are living in other parts of Kosova. Customs associated with the past appear increasingly inadequate and the traditional universe no longer seems inevitable. Few men want to contradict the norm, to economize on ceremonial events, to subvert the patriarchal power structure. Few women believe they are in a position to step out of character, to follow the example of urban women. Throughout the 1980s the persistence of the extended family structure, the nature of the migration experience and the force of public opinion arbitrated against change.
Albanians in the 1990s: Will the Past Prevail?
So far we have looked at the profound allegiance to tradition held by many Albanians prior to the events of 1989. During my fieldwork in Kosova I was convinced, like the Albanians themselves, that the desire to uphold customs and ideology of the past would prevail, undaunted, well into the 1990s. Indeed, many aspects of the traditional ideology have remained entrenched in the Albanian spirit during the recent conflicts. But some ideas which, only months before, had seemed so much a part of the Albanian psyche have begun to lose their hold on the collective imagination. Some of the customs understood as inviolable only a few years ago have been rendered illegitimate by the turn of political and social events.
The current struggle for civil rights combined with a fledgling pro-democracy movement in Kosova have altered Albanian consciousness, producing an unforeseen effect on the way they perceive and construct reality. The breakdown of the federal power structure which had dominated civil life since 1945 has precipitated an open expression of Albanian nationalism. In the context of this new freedom of expression many Albanians are trying to re-define their identity, replacing dogmas of the past with visions of the future in an attempt to tell themselves who they are. They are appropriating new political agendas and a renewed expression of Albanian nationalism in the process of articulating a new version of what it means to be Albanian.
There has been, in some villages, a conscious attempt to reform their tradition. An example is the movement of village councils to "rationalize" the economic excesses associated with ceremonial life. As of 1988, when I left Kosova, Albanians were appalled at the amount being spent on weddings (constantly inflated by migrant remittances) in the face of tremendous economic hardship. But as with other unpopular traditions, people felt helpless in combating the social stigma attached to non-conformity. No one could be the first to change. But in 1989 the reigning political party, the Democratic Alliance, prescribed as one of its mandates the rationalization of this custom. This mandate was introduced to villagers via the local branches of the Alliance. Most villages agreed that every family should scale down the wedding enterprise. This has been a monumental step, representing the ability of the people, supported by a collective leadership, to consciously implement change, to reshape their internal social structure. It supports the argument made by my informants prior to 1989 that people do indeed support change, but only on the community level, not at the hand of individual families.
In this context we are compelled to consider the prospect of change and the interplay between the forces of tradition and modernity in the definition of Albanian identity in the 1990s. The "industry of nationalism," the construction of nationalist rhetoric in Kosova, is treating the past in contrasting ways.
In some ways today's nationalism continues to appropriate symbols of the past. To some extent, even in the politicized Kosova of the 1990s, to be Albanian is to uphold traditional customs and values. Unlike neighboring ethnic groups striving to forge a renewed ethnic identity by resurrecting, mythologizing or inventing national symbols, Albanians do not have to dig very deep in time to harvest a multitude of unique ethnic symbols in the "fabrication" of a nationalism for the nineties.
On the other hand, it is clear that some of these symbols which have been synonymous with being Albanian are anachronistic and detrimental to the creation of an image for the future. Especially problematic are the "amoral familism," clan chauvinism and political factionalism which have such deep roots in Albanian society. The greatest effort to counteract this aspect of the past has been the formation of a united political front represented by the Democratic Alliance.
Another attempt at combating familism in the construction of a new national identity has been the efforts of a retired folklorist named Anton etta and his followers to reconcile blood feuds throughout the province. Inter-family feuds are deeply entrenched the in Albanian tradition. In 1989 it was estimated that blood vengeance has accounted for as many as 100 deaths a year in Kosova. In the interest of changing the national profile of his people, etta is acting as a "culture builder," trying to create, as it were, a "new" tradition. 150 feuds have been settled since 1990, and the participants in this movement are confident that it can settle many of the 450 to 550 remaining cases and that the truces will hold firm even after Kosova achieves independence.
Another attempt to re-form national identity has been spearheaded by a small group of urban women, the "Motrat Qiriazi," who are determined to redress some of the inequities of family life in Kosova. Unlike the northern republics, Kosova has never had an active women's movement. City intellectuals have been indifferent to social problems in the countryside. But the violence and repression derailing their lives have politicized and activated these women. Their first project, a literacy campaign in select villages, has sensitized the organizers to the inequality and fanaticism in the Albanian family and moved them to consider ways of working for real social change, for democracy in the family.
Many Albanians, though cognizant of brazen "flaws" in their national character, are skeptical of the attempts of individuals to depart from dictates of the past. They are convinced that the power of the rreth, the social circle, will drag the past into the future. Some people deride social activism as unimportant and misplaced in the context of the national crisis. They champion an all-forgiving nationalism, ignoring issues of internal complexity and dysfunction, believing that political independence will deliver modernity in its wake. Demokracia, the key symbol and driving idea in Eastern Europe, is the magic word for Albanians. Most believe that once they are liberated from Serbian hegemony, democracy will take root as a matter of course, and social problems wrought in a dependence on ideals of the past will right themselves in turn.
The key question is whether changes in attitudes and the new activism in Kosova which have emerged as a response to the political conflict will endure beyond this period of upheaval in former Yugoslavia. Will the fledgling woman's movement take root? Will the truces on blood revenge hold? To what extent will customs and values of the past lose their grip on the Albanian mind in the years to come? How will the political future influence this process?
Would liberation from Serbian hegemony, autonomy in Yugoslavia or union with Albania inspire a new social order divorced from the tyranny of tradition? Or would an inundation of political change and an ensuant fear of the unknown, of social ambiguity, cause the masses to retrench into the secure structure of customary law? Would the they be reluctant to relinquish the "psychic income" they derive from upholding the past?
Would the defeat of Kosova's liberation movement and further subjugation under Serbian rule catalyze a new wave of fatalism and complacency, a renewed acquiescence to the legacy of the past? Would the renewed threat of a hostile Serbian presence continue to inspire families to isolate their women against a perceived threat in the public sphere? Or have the events which have taken place since 1989 irrevocably changed the Albanians' perceptions of their lives and their obedience to the past?
One can only speculate about the response of consciousness to political change. But conclusions about the inviability of the past drawn during my research have clearly been challenged by recent events. While some aspects of thought and action will surely be re-entrenched in the collection imagination, it is possible that others will have been transformed. We are now witnessing the agony of an uncertain future and the hope for a new social order as the Albanians stand at the threshold of change.
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