Network Defenses to Denial of Service Attacks

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DoS attack prevention is difficult

- Applications, hosts and networks are often significantly oversubscribed.
- Internet (data) traffic is naturally bursty on all time scales, thus
- discerning bad traffic from good can be hard.
- There is no one, easy thing to fix that will make the problem go away.

It's been proposed that re-architecting the Internet is a solution, but no one wants to go through that pain.
Visualizing DoS Attack Data
Visualizing Bottlenecks

155 megabit/second to the Internet

1 gigabit/second

100 megabit/second each
What are the popular defenses?

- Block bogon, invalid and attack packets.
- Monitor traffic thresholds, patterns and trends.
- Rate limit traffic to help prevent oversubscription.
- Prevent end hosts from becoming DoS agents.
- Black hole victim hosts/networks.
- Maintain good incident response and support staff.

As you might guess, no one defense solves it all.*
In depth look at packet blocking

- Blocking invalid/bogon packets from reaching the net is generally considered a best practice.
- However, it may severely impact forwarding performance and be difficult to manage.
- Blocking on general attack characteristics may also block and break legitimate applications.

Many ISPs mitigated the recent Slammer/Sapphire worm by temporarily blocking UDP port 1434 traffic.
Traceback

- Enabled routers generate or encode trace information to the traced destination.
- Victims can use trace information to discover the real path back to the original source.
- Authentication, deployment and practical issues exist.
Source path isolation engine

- Routers keep a hash of all packets passing through and send to a collector.
- To trace a packet, query the collector based on packet characteristics.
- SPIE can potentially trace a single packet.
- Significant scaling and deployment issues.
Pushback

- A mechanism to signal downstream routers to aggressively drop/limit attack traffic.
- Routers must detect attack traffic. A similar problem shared by signature based filters.
- If attack traffic is widely distributed, pushback may be ineffective.

IMHO, pushback and related techniques are the most interesting and elegant network-based solutions.
Slammer/Sapphire the DoS attack
Other defenses

• Legal action. Costly (in more ways than one) and problematic when crossing legislative borders.

• Mirror and distribute victims. Costly and management intensive.

• User education? Security Forum 2003!

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